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INTRODUCTION

The homosexual in 1961 was smothered by law.' He or she risked
arrest and possible police brutalization for dancing with someone of the
same sex, cross-dressing, propositioning another adult homosexual,
possessing a homophile publication, writing about homosexuality without
disapproval, displaying pictures of two people of the same sex in
intimate positions, operating a lesbian or gay bar, or actually having sex
with another adult homosexual. Arrest meant more than a file and an
overnight stay in jail. Misdemeanor arrests for sex-related vagrancy or
disorderly conduct offenses meant that the homosexual might have his
or her name published in the local newspaper, would probably lose his
or her job, and in several states would have to register as a sex offender
(assuming conviction). In some states, the convicted homosexual lost his
or her driver's license. If the homosexual was not a citizen, he or she
would likely be deported. If the homosexual were a professional-a
teacher, lawyer, doctor, mortician, beautician-he or she would likely
lose the certification needed to practice that profession. Having oral or
anal intercourse with someone of the same sex was the worst thing a
homosexual could do in America circa 1961. Consensual homosexual
intercourse was a serious crime in all the states, and a felony in all but
one; several states imposed life sentences. A felony conviction (and in
some states merely being charged) subjected the homosexual to special
psychiatric evaluation as a potential "sexual psychopath." If found to be
such a creature, the homosexual was incarcerated indefinitely in a mental
institution which, for many inmates, was a horror chamber of electroshock and mental torture, and for some, a life sentence. If the charged
homosexual was a member of the armed forces, he or she might be court
martialed and would likely be dishonorably discharged, thereby losing all
veterans' benefits, however distinguished his or her service record.
Fear of social and familial ostracism kept most homosexuals in the
closet. The law sealed that closet shut for most gays and lesbians, while
at the same time, outing others in state-sponsored witchhunts. It is those
who were outed who transformed both the law and the homosexual
existence, and that transformation began in earnest during 1961.2

1. Background can be found in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudenceand the
Apartheidof the Closet, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
2. I choose 1961 as a pivotal date because it marked a generational transition away from the
traditionalism of the Eisenhower Administration, the due process jurisprudence of Felix Frankfurter,
and the apologists of the Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bilitis. In 1961, John Kennedy
opened a New Frontier in American politics, the Warren Court began shifting decisively toward the
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The year 1961 was homosignificant on both coasts. In November,
Dr. Franklin Kameny and a handful of others founded the Mattachine
Society of Washington, D.C. ("MSW") as a more aggressive minority
rights group.' Whereas the West Coast homophile groups from the
1950s sought to persuade straight society to tolerate homosexuals who
would occupy a mutually protective closet, MSW insisted upon equal
rights for the "homosexual minority." The stated goals of the group were:
to "secure for homosexuals the basic rights and liberties established by
the word and spirit of the Constitution of the United States"; "[t]o
equalize the status and position of the homosexual with those of the
heterosexual by achieving equality under law, equality of opportunity,
equality in the society of his fellow men, and by eliminating adverse
prejudice, both private and officiar'; and "[t]o secure for the homosexual
the right, as a human being, to develop and achieve his full potential and
dignity, and the right, as a citizen, to make his maximum contribution to
the society in which he lives." 4 This statement of purpose represented
an intellectual turning point in the history of the closet: homosexuals
insisted upon equality as uncloseted citizens, not liberty engendered by
a protective closet.
The main practical agenda of MSW was to confront harassment of
homosexuals by the federal and district governments. At the August 1961
organizational meeting for MSW, Kameny was alerted that one of the
sixteen men present was Lieutenant Louis Fochet of the District of
Columbia Morals Squad. Kameny announced, "I understand that there is
a member of the Metropolitan Police Department here. Could he please
identify himself and tell us why he's here?"' Thus outed by an out-ofthe-closet homosexual, Fochet skulked out. Kameny and MSW followed
the same unashamed approach in dealings with all branches of govern-

path-breaking rights jurisprudence of Hugo Black and William Douglas, and a new generation of
homosexuals began to assault the public with an insistence that "Gay Is Good," and not one step
away from felonious. Beneath these superficial benchmarks were profound changes in American
society that were generated by the baby-boomers reaching college and adulthood, the availability of
birth control, and an astonishing economic prosperity that left an impression that the pie was
growing and more could share in it. Most Americans (especially the huge wave of boomers) felt less

threatened than they had in the 1950s, and they watched or participated in a sexual revolution. The
1960s was a great decade for the ftirthering of the civil rights of racial minorities, the flourishing of
women's liberation, and the beginnings of gay rights.
3. See JOHN D'EMIuo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL CoMMUNmES: THE MAKINO OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 152 (1983); David Y. Johnson,

"Homosexual Citizens": Washington's Gay Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST.,
FalAVinter 1994-1995, at 44.
4. Constitution of the Mattachine Society of Washington, Art. II, § l(a)-(c).

5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 45, 56.
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ment, including the White House and the Selective Service, both of
which were on MSW's mailing list.' This more aggressive spirit was
also taking charge of New York's Mattachine Society ("New York
Mattachine"), whose leadership changed hands from the old to the new
guard in 1965, when Dick Leitsch was elected president of the group.7
If 1961 was significant in the East for the formation of MSW, it was
significant in the West for the candidacy of Jos6 Sarria, the beloved
waiter at the Black Cat bar, for city supervisor of San Francisco. In the
midst of a citywide police crackdown on gay cruising and bars, Sarria
persuaded hundreds of "very bold queens" to sign his petition and ran as
an openly gay man, thereby offering thousands of men and women some
public affirmation of their worth. His candidacy also galvanized the
newly formed League for Civil Education to publish a newsletter, the
LCE News, which was circulated in gay bars, and by 1962 reached a
circulation of 7,000 copies (1,000 more people than voted for Sarria).
Sarria was the spark that lit a small organizational brushfire, as the
owners and employees of the city's gay bars organized the Tavern Guild
in 1962; William Plath, William Beardemphl, and associates organized
the Society for Individual Rights ("SIR") in September 1964.8
SIR affirmed "the worth of the homosexual and.., the principle
that the individual has the right to his own sexual orientation so long as
the practice of the belief does not interfere with the rights of others."9
Like MSW in Washington, D.C., SIR in San Francisco insisted upon
equal rights and not just an apartheid of the closet. Also like MSW and
New York Mattachine in the mid-1960s, SIR was active in informing its
members of their legal rights and in pressing for legal reform through
lobbying and lawsuits seeking an end to state-imposed penalties. Unlike
MSW and previous homophile organizations, however, SIR reached out
to the larger gay community, including people who frequented gay bars.
It organized social events, bridge clubs, bowling leagues, and opened a
gay community center in 1966; SIR cooperated rather than competed
with the Tavern Guild and the Council on Religion and the Homosexual,
which had also been founded in 1964. As a result, SIR saw its member-

6. See D'EMIUO, supra note 3, at 154.
7. See id. at 165-68, 206.
8. See id. at 187-90.
9. SJR. "sStatement of Policy, VECTOR, Dec. 1964, at 1.
"There should be an end to dismissals from our jobs; an end to police harassment, and
the interference of the state with the sanctity of the individual within his home. To assure

that these reprisals cease, we believe in the necessity of a political mantel guaranteeing
to the homosexual the rights so easily granted to others."
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ship grow from 250 in 1964 to almost 1,000 by 1967, making it the
largest homophile organization in the country' 0
Homophile, or gay rights, organizations were blossoming like
wildflowers in Tuscany by the end of the 1960s, and their growth was
marked by the formation of an Eastern Conference of Homophile
Organizations in 1963, a North American Conference of Homophile
Organizations ("NACHO") in 1966, and a Western Regional Planning
Conference of Homophile Organizations in 1967. The new wave of
homophile leaders dominated the regional conferences of these groups.
Kameny told the NACHO convention of February 1966 that "'all the
problems of the homosexual,"' like those of racial minorities, were
"'questions of prejudice and discrimination."'' At the August convention, Dick Leitsch, the new president of New York Mattachine, urged
homophile organizations to be rights-insistent. "'We must demand the
right to cruise, the right to work, the right to public accommodations, and
the other rights the homosexual lacks.""' 2 Two years later, the NACHO
conference endorsed "Gay Is Good" as the slogan of the homophile

movement. 13
By the late 1960s, the heat was on. It boiled over the night of June
27-28, 1969, when the New York City police raided a Greenwich Village
gay bar, the Stonewall Inn.' 4 Rather than going along with the raid, the
gay people fought back. They surrounded the paddywagon and pelted the
police with beer cans, bottles, and coins; the officers were forced back
into the bar, which caught fire. When reinforcements arrived, the
burgeoning crowd refused to disperse. Mild rioting recurred the next
night, and some the next as well." Among those visiting the Stonewall
after the initial riot was poet Allen Ginsberg, who remarked: "'You
know, the guys there were so beautiful... [t]hey've lost that wounded
look that fags all had ten years ago."" 6
Literally overnight, the Stonewall riots transformed the homophile
reform movement of several dozen brave homosexuals, into a gay
liberation movement populated by thousands of lesbians, gay men, and

10. See D'EMILo, supra note 3, at 190-91, 193.

11. Id. at 198.
12. Id.

13. See Gary Patterson, Gay IsGood, VECroR, Nov. 1968, at 5.
14. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 181-212 (1993). For contemporary accounts, see
Dick Leitsch, FirstGay Riot: Police Raid on N.Y. Club Sets Off FirstGay Riot, ADVOCATE, Sept.
1969, at 3 (reprinted from N.Y. MATrACHINE NEwSL.), and Lucian Truscott, IV, Gay Power Comes
to Sheriden Square, VILLAGE VOICE (New York City), July 3, 1969, at 1.
15. See DUBERMAN, supra note 14, at 205-08.
16. D'EMILIO, supra note 3, at 232.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

6

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
1997]

CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

bisexuals who came out of the closet and formed hundreds of organizations--first the Gay Liberation Front ("GLF") and the Radicalesbians;
then the Gay Activists Alliance ("GAA") in various cities and universities; then the National Gay Task Force, the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., and other national groups dedicated to pressing for
gay-friendly changes in the law. 7 "Gay Is Good" reverberated with
new, radical meaning in manifestos and books calling for sexual liberty
and gender equality, and for the end of institutions thwarting those goals:
sodomy and public indecency laws, vice squads and decoy cops,
marriage and the two-parent family, obscenity laws, and antigay
exclusions from state and federal employment, immigration and
citizenship, and the armed forces. The 1970s roiled with legal disputes
as gay people insisted that the law change to reflect gay liberation.
Openly gay people did transform the law, not in a burst of energy
after Stonewall, but over a half generation (1961 to 1981) of which
Stonewall was a midpoint and a focal point. Antihomosexual rules and
laws were not abolished during this period, and in fact they actually
increased in number. But their enforcement was blunted, and they were
joined by rules and statutes that offered affirmative state protection for
gay people.
Gay liberation was not a simple phenomenon but involved three
interrelated struggles, all of which challenged the philosophy of the
closet. The term "coming out" originally meant one's first sexual
experience with someone of his or her own sex,"8 and rejection of the
closet began with intimate sexual expression. Conservatives in the 1950s
and 1960s considered homosexual conduct criminal, and even most
liberals thought homosexual intimacy weird and unhealthy even if
tolerable for pragmatic reasons. An increasing number of gay people
rejected these assumptions and asserted that they could live sexually fulfilled and integrated lives, so long as they were left alone by nosy state
agents. Gay liberation's initial struggle, therefore, was to ensure
opportunitiesfor homosexual intimacy, which could be accomplished by
protecting private gay spaces (Part I). These private spaces included the
home, the automobile, and, for many gay men, the enclosed toilet stall
and sex club booth as well.
After World War II, lesbians and gay men flocked to distinctive
subcultures in the big cities (New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco,

17. See id. at 233.
18. On this point and the evolution of "coming out of the closet" generally, see William N.
Eslaidge, Jr.,A Jurisprudenceof "ComingOut". Religion,Homosexuality, andCollisions ofLiberty
and Equality in American Public Law, YALE LJ. (forthcoming 1997).
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Chicago, Washington, D.C.). In the 1950s, some gay people used the
term "coming out" in its most old-fashioned sense, as an introduction of
the gay person to those gay subcultures. Middle-class society was
appalled by the subcultures and sought to suppress them. Agents of
suppression included the local police and the FBI, liquor control boards
and their spies, state and federal censors (including postal inspectors and
customs agents), and university administrators. Where gay people sought
connection and affirmation with others of their preference, mainstream
society just saw a conspiracy of sickos and criminals. A second struggle,
therefore, was for gay people to create their own nomos (normative
community), which required asserting control over the territory of gay
subculture:gay bars and restaurants, social and educational organizations,
literature and erotica, movies and radio programs (Part II).
A third struggle, for full gay citizenship, was not really feasible
until progress was made in the earlier two struggles. Only after a
normal degree of privacy and association was assured for gay people
could many of them even aspire to equal treatment as immigrants and
citizenship applicants, public and private employees, soldiers, couples,
and even parents. It was not until the 1960s that many gay people started
to deploy the term "coming out" to denote expression of homosexuality
to outsiders. Only after the Stonewall riots in 1969 did large numbers
publicly self-identify as gay: they claimed space in public culture (Part
III). That claim triggered the most resistance. Even after Stonewall, the
government remained committed to a tolerant closet, where gay people
would be safe from persecution so long as they were publicly silent
about themselves. ("Don't ask, don't tell.") By the 1970s, however,
silence was impossible, and the demands of screaming queers were
grating as well as unacceptable to mainstream America. Indeed,
arguments for homosexual equality helped reenergize traditionalist
politics in America. Traditionalists were most successful when they
could credibly claim that equality for gay people threatened third
parties-children and homophobic coworkers--with harm or was
institutionally disruptive.
Law was critical to all three struggles for gay liberation, and
lawyers-especially those associated with the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU)-played key roles in those struggles. Legal rights that
had been articulated in connection with women's struggles for gender
equality and, especially, African Americans' struggles against apartheid,
were at every point focal for gay rights advocates: the right to privacy
(due process and the Fourth Amendment) was the rallying call for
protecting private gay spaces; rights of association, speech, and press (the
First Amendment) protected the territory of gay subculture; and equality
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rights (due process, then equal protection) pressed the agenda of full gay
citizenship. Law was in one sense more important for ending the
apartheid of the closet than it had been for ending racial apartheid,
because the gay ghetto was harder to organize than the black one. Gays
had the personal luxury, and the political disability, of being able to pass
for straight, and most did. Lawyers and near lawyers, therefore, became
not only the intermediaries of gay liberation to legal auth6rities, but
representatives of all gay people to a society that still wished they would
be unseen but not heard. In the 1960s most lawyers representing gay
people were nongays associated with the ACLU, including Morris and
Juliet Lowenthal in California, Norman Dorsen in New York, and
Monroe Freedman in Washington, D.C. (Openly gay Frank Kameny was
not a lawyer but did yeoman legal work in the same period.) In the
1970s, gay people would come to represent themselves increasingly.
At the end of the period covered in this account, 1981, the lesbian,
bisexual, and gay man were still surrounded by law but no longer
smothered by it. Gay people living in urban centers were unlikely to be
arrested for dancing with or kissing someone of the same sex, crossdressing in public, possessing a homophile publication, writing about
homosexuality, displaying pictures of two adults of the same sex in
intimate positions, operating a lesbian or gay bar, or having sex in
private with another consenting adult. In most states, they could still be
arrested for public solicitation if the object were an undercover cop,
selling or possessing "hard core" pornography, having sex with a minor,
loitering or having oral sex in a public rest room, or being disorderly or
vagrant or lewd in public, whatever those terms meant. Except for
offenses going to lack of consent, such as forcible sodomy and sex with
a minor, the penalties were light and no longer included registration or
incarceration in mental institutions. The police were much less likely to
victimize gay people in 1981, but private violence was on the upswing,
with sporadic police response. State and federal employers were not
likely to fire a person for being gay in 1981, although private employers
remained prone to do so. Many cities and a few states assured the
lesbian, gay man, and bisexual protection against losing a job and being
excluded from housing or public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation. No state, however, assured same-sex couples the right to
marry, and few treated lesbian parents with respect when they sought
custody or visitation of their children from different-sex marriages.
As this summary suggests, changes in the law made a big difference
in gay lives and some difference in American history. Decriminalization
of most homosexual conduct shifted the balance of power between gay
people and the state. Where homosexuals had been at the mercy of
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pitiless police in the 1950s, gay people were often entitled to police
protection by the 1980s. Protections against police and workplace
harassment meant that more people felt comfortable being openly gay,
and the more openly gay people there were the more space there was for
a normalizing gay presence in movies, on the radio, at universities and
even high schools, in politics and government, and so forth. The partial
collapse of state censorship and the increasing demand for homosexual
outlets directly contributed to an explosion and diversification of gay
community centers, bars, baths, bookstores, erotica, literature, newspapers, and discourse. The love that dare not speak its name in the 1950s
became a love that would not shut up in the 1980s, saturating American
culture with homophile ideas such as the positive values of sex, consent
as the dividing line between good and bad sex, equality of the sexes and
deconstruction of gender, and benign sexual variation.
The most interesting features in my account are law's ambiguities,
which need to be emphasized at the beginning. One important theme is
the limits of legal change. Legal tolerance did not require, or even much
contribute to, social tolerance in the medium term. Gay people remained
alien to most Americans, and even the dramatic legal changes described
above applied only in the major urban centers: New York; Boston;
Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Miami; Dallas; Houston;
Chicago; St. Louis; Denver; Seattle; San Francisco; Los Angeles; and
San Diego. 9 In the suburbs and rural areas, even of states having large
urban populations (Georgia, Texas, Florida), homosexuals remained in
the closet, almost as firmly as in the 1950s. Even in the big cities, the
opening of the closet door was only partial, and perhaps even temporary.
Gay rights made headway where the state was already wasting its time
and resources rooting out perversion, and where deregulation was
invisible to heterosexual society. But wherever gay presence threatened
straight society, there was a backlash, a countermovement to limit or
retract gay rights.
Thus the most important gay initiatives, equality in family
recognition and in the private workplace, were substantially rebuffed
during this period. Antihomosexual forces were not only able to prevent
or roll back gay initiatives, but in a few areas ended up strengthening

19. Note that most of these cities in the 1970s and thereafter became increasingly gay, drugridden, and pauperized. The flight of the white middle class from the big cities presented
opportunities for gay gentrification but also may have trapped gay subcultures in decomposing urban
spaces.
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antigay rules by modernizing their defenses.2 ° Same-sex marriage was
a more distant goal in 1981 than it had been in 1961, and military
service by lesbians and gay men was harder as well. The military cases
are particularly noteworthy, for the defense of a gay exclusion shifted
from the ridiculously circular (the possibility of blackmail) or daffily
unscientific (gay people are mentally ill and unstable) rationales to
stronger pragmatic rationales: closets are cramped in the armed forces
and gay presence there unsettles heterosexuals and undermines morale
and unit cohesion. In most areas, however, even a modernized rationale
did not hold the line. State exclusions of gay men, bisexuals, and
lesbians from teaching had previously been grounded in stereotypes of
the homosexual as predatory on young children. States sought to
perpetuate the exclusion by reference to more modem rationales such as
the danger that openly gay teachers would signal state "approval" of
homosexuality, contrary to the desires of most parents. Although this was
a smarter rationale, states continued to lose ground in this area, and an
increasing number of gay people popped up in the classroom. The same
was true of police forces, where unit cohesion and officer disgust--the
same arguments that would protect the military exclusion-failed to head
off policies opening up police forces to gay officers.
For me, the most salient limitation of the law was its gendered
agenda. Gaylegal goals little reflected the interests or perspectives of
lesbians, not to mention gays of color or in poverty. The big changes in
the law allowed middle class gay men more opportunities for cruising
and casual sex, consumption of pornography and other products of the
sex industry, and job advancement without the bother of a sham marriage
or other techniques of passing for straight. These issues were of marginal
importance for lesbians, however. Their lives were much more affected
by private violence, child custody determinations, sexual harassment,
gender discrimination, and workplace segregation by sex, all of which
were foci of the feminist movement and substantially ignored by the gay
liberation movement until the late 1970s. Some items flagged by the
emergent gayocracy--especially marriage and pornography-were issues
to which many lesbians were deeply ambivalent or opposed. Although
the gaylegal agenda itself was changing in 1981, it was male-centered
and sometimes misogynistic during most of this period.21

20. Compare Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy,
105 YALE U. 2117 (1996), which makes this
"displaced rhetoric" argument for wife beating.
21. See DelMartin'sFarewell,in LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM: THE ADVOCATE HISTORY OF THE
GAY AND LESBIAN MOvEMiENT 41 (Mark Thompson ed., 1994).
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Simply put, the gay male agenda was sexual liberty, while the
lesbian agenda was gender equality. The sexual liberty agenda can be
criticized not only from a feminist or lesbian feminist perspective. It can
be, and was, criticized as more generally unhealthy.' Gay subculture
was the avant-garde in expanding the definition of sex, valorizing sex as
spiritual and even intellectual expression, divorcing sex from procreation,
commodifying sex, and creating numerous opportunities for people to
have sex. Was their shift a good one, from unhealthy sex negativity
toward a more positive view of sex? Or was it bad, from a balance
between sexuality and commitment to a nation of sex addicts abusing
their bodies? With the benefit of hindsight, it may have been both.
I.

PROTECTING PRIvATE GAY SPACES: DUE PROCESS AND
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is often
taken to be the traditionalist anchor of the Constitution. As the Supreme
Court stated in 1937, the Due Process Clause does not assure all
procedural or substantive rights that seem fair to us today, but only those
that violate a "'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.', 23 The Warren
Court of the 1960s, however, read the Due Process Clause in light of the
general policy it embodied, that individual liberty should not be at the
mercy of arbitrary state intrusion. Thus, the Court nationalized the
criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights to apply to state
police harassment of people of color and ethnic minorities. The Court
created a substantive right of privacy to protect women's reproductive
freedom through contraception and abortion. The Court gave teeth to the
doctrine that vague criminal laws were unenforceable, applying this to
strike down vagrancy and other relics of the past that were used to
control the lives and movement of poor people.
These Warren Court decisions, and the even more expansive
decisions by the California Supreme Court, unsettled police practices and
the criminal law. They shifted citizen-police bargaining power from

22. See, for example, Andrew Holleran, Dancerfrom the Dance (1979), and Larry Kramer,
Faggots (1979), two novels that unblinkingly and critically depicted the gay male subculture of sex,
sex, and more sex.
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that states are not required to
recognize the federal right providing protection from double jeopardy) (quoting Snyder v.

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
For a more recent Supreme Court (plurality) opinion using similar reasoning, see Michael H. v.
GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110, 121-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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unfettered police discretion, toward some regard for groups traditionally
disenfranchised in American history, such as people of color (criminal
procedure cases), women (privacy cases), and the poor (vagueness cases).
Although these due process doctrines developed in response to the initiatives of other groups, homophile litigants appropriated these precedents
to advance their agenda of protecting private gay spaces against police
intrusion and harassment.
When successful, gay deployment of due process arguments
rendered the principles of the cases even more destabilizing than they
already appeared to traditionalist critics of the Warren Court. For
example, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
extended to the states by the Court, was successfully invoked as a
defense to police searches of closed toilet stalls by gay litigants, first in
California, and later in other states, including southern states such as
Florida and Texas. The right to privacy, snugly situated as an element of
heterosexual marital intimacy, became an iconographic precedent for gay
litigants challenging sodomy laws, other criminal penalties, restrictions
on citizenship, civil services exclusions, and bar closings. There was
nothing inherent in those precedents that required lower courts and
legislatures to rescind antihomosexual measures, and the Warren and
(especially) Burger Courts cut no breaks for gay litigants and typically
went out of their way to oppose them. Their opinions bristled with
antihomosexual rhetoric. The Justices would have been shocked that their
decisions were being used to empower gay people. But, nonetheless, they
did empower gay people by providing them with points of resistance to
police authority.
Those points of resistance proved most important in combination
with gay political campaigns for relief from police terror. During the
period 1961-1981, gay rights discourse and lobbying persuaded most
major cities to let up on police harassment of gay people. Enforcement
of criminal laws in the big city states shifted from instances of homosexual dancing, kissing, cross-dressing, consensual intercourse, and
solicitation to24instances of homosexual prostitution, sex with minors, and
pornography.
The role of courts can easily be overestimated. Courts were more
important protections at the retail level of arrest and detention than at the

24. By "urbanized states" I mean those of the East and West Coasts and the Midwest: New
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, perhaps Florida, California,
Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan. I do not include any states in the South, except Florida, or the rural
states of the Vest and Midwest. The old patterns of police enforcement (consensual intercourse and
solicitation) persisted in the South and West during this period.
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wholesale level of criminal law policy. Judges dismissed disorderly
conduct, sodomy, and lewdness charges right and left for individual
defendants but-with the notable exception of the California Supreme
Court-were reluctant to nullify criminal laws used against gender
benders and gay people. The right to privacy had virtually no bite for
constitutional challenges to sodomy and lewdness statutes but proved a
potent rallying point for gay political pushes to repeal sodomy laws, to
realign prosecutorial policy away from consensual conduct between
adults, and to defund police vice squads.
A.

Due ProcessIncorporationof the Bill of Rights
(CriminalProcedure)

1. The Warren Court's Nationalization of the Rights of Criminal
Defendants
In the 1950s, the constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants
varied among the states, because the criminal procedural assurances of
the Bill of Rights had generally not been applied by the Supreme Court
to the states. Also, those few rights theoretically available to defendants
in state constitutions (which usually paralleled the Bill of Rights) were
honored mainly in the breach, especially when defendants were African
American, Latino, or homosexual. Homosexual defendants claimed,
apparently with frequent justification, that they were enticed into law
violation by decoy cops, spied on in private places, and tricked or
subjected to the third degree for the purpose of extracting confessions.25
By 1970, the Supreme Court had nationalized the rights of criminal
defendants, by "incorporating" most of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause, which rendered them directly applicable to the states.26
Among the rights of criminal defendants that were so nationalized were
the following:
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth
27
Amendment);

25. See Frank C. Wood, Jr., The Homosexual and the Police, ONE, May 1963, at 21. See
generallyJESS STEARN, THE SIXTH MAN (1961) (journalistic account ofhomosexuals' lives and their
interactions with the law).
26. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court held that the Sixth

Amendment's right to a jury trial for criminal defendants was of such importance that it "qualifies
for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be

respected by the States." Id. at 156.
27. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,26-27 (1949), overruledinpartby Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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the right not to incriminate oneself (Fifth Amendment);2
* the right not29 to be tried twice for the same offense (Fifth
Amendment)
* the right to a speedy and public trial (Sixth Amendment);"
* the right to counsel, provided by the state if the defendant cannot
afford one (Sixth Amendment);3
*
the right to confront one's accusers (Sixth Amendment);3 2
*
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases (Sixth Amendment);33
" the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth
Amendment);3 4 and
"
the right against excessive bail (Eighth Amendment).35
Not only did the Warren Court nationalize these protections, but it also
gave existing protections greater legal bite. For example, in Mapp v.
Ohio, the Court expanded the application of the federal exclusionary rule
to the states. Thereafter, violation of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure standards meant that the evidence seized would be excluded, even
if it established the defendant's guilt. 36 Moreover, the Court interpreted
the Due Process Clause to prohibit police "entrapment" of defendants not
otherwise disposed to commit crimes.37
Homophile organizations were alert to every legal nuance and
served to convey the latest legal developments to the aborning gay
communities. As early as 1954, One, the earliest continuing homophile
publication, published a one-page explication entitled Your Rights in
Case of Arrest.38 In 1964, MSW distributed to the gay community, as
well as to the FBI, a similar instruction sheet on what to do "[i]f you are
arrested." 39 In 1965, SIR printed 20,000 copies of the Pocket Lawyer,

*

28. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
29. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937)).
30. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
31. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963); cf.Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel applies even to misdemeanors resulting in
incarceration ofjust a single day).
32. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
33. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
34. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
35. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
36. See 367 U.S. 643, 654-57 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
37. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (elaborating upon Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)); see also People v. Perez, 401 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1965).
38. ONE, Jan. 1954, at 14.
39. See MATrACHINE SOC'Y OF WASH., D.C., IFYou ARE ARREsTED (1964) (on file with the
FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320, (Mattachine Society), § 6, Serial No. 117).
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which were distributed by gay bars and homophile organizations.4 °
These instructions advised homosexuals that, if arrested or even
questioned, they need not, and should not, cooperate with the police or
say anything about homosexuality, the events leading to the arrest, or
their employment and personal backgrounds. Furthermore, homosexual
defendants were instructed to insist upon their right to contact a lawyer
immediately and to follow his advice. The best defense homosexual
defendants had against police harassment was knowledge of their rights.
2. Criminal Procedural Rights as Protections for Homosexual
Defendants
Among the most important Supreme Court criminal procedure
decisions were Escobedo and Miranda,which required the police to warn
the accused that anything he said may be used against him and to inform
the accused of his immediate right to counsel. a ' These precedents were
immediately applied to protect homosexual defendants. Oscar Maldonado
and Joseph Holman were arrested for having oral sex with a young blond
man in a public rest room in Los Angeles.42 The complaint against them
was dismissed, then reinstated, and they were subsequently convicted,
based upon the testimony of the police, Maldonado's casual confession,
and Holman's silence in the face of that confession. (Maldonado had
tried to explain to the police that the blond man had enticed him and
"'[he] couldn't help [him]self so [he] went down on him."' 3) The
defendants charged that they were victims of selective prosecution, as
they were Latino and African American, respectively; the same
magistrate who had reinstated the charges against them had dismissed
charges against two white men for precisely the same conduct with the
same blond man. The appeals court was unpersuaded by the race
discrimination argument but reversed on the basis of Escobedo and the
state's failure to apprise the defendants of their right to be silent and to
have counsel at the state's expense.4' An attorney would not have
allowed Maldonado to make such a casual statement to the police.
Individual rights were equally important when the police engaged
in mass raids seeking to terrorize lesbian and gay communities. The
Philadelphia police, in March 1968, arrested twelve customers at a
lesbian bar and interrogated them with the usual third degree. The

40. See "PocketLawyer" Ready, VECTOR, Sept. 1965, at 1.
41. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
42. See People v. Maldonado, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45, 46 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

43. Id. at 47.
44. See id. at 47, 48.
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Daughters of Bilitis ("DOB") retained a lawyer who persuaded the
district attorney to drop the charges because the interrogations obviously
violated Miranda.4 Alerted that lesbians were no longer easy arrests,
the Philadelphia police directed their resources elsewhere. The most
common defenses to police raids were violations of the Fourth Amendment warrant or reasonable cause requirements. After the Los Angeles
vice squad raided the properties and confiscated the files of Jaguar
Productions (producers of gay pornography) in January 1974, attorneys
for the defendants complained that incriminating evidence gathered in the
search exceeded the terms of the warrant that the police had obtained.
The defendants not only won pretrial suppression motions that led to
withdrawal of criminal charges but also sued the police department for
U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of their Fourth
$2 million under 442
6
rights.
Amendment
These episodes demonstrate the dual effects of criminal procedural
rights: they not only protect individual defendants ex post by reversing
illegal convictions, but also protect all similarly situated defendants ex
ante by raising the costs of police investigations or prosecutions
generally, and by assuring future defendants of attorneys who put the
state to its proof. Where the crime was victimless, as was the case for
most charges against gay people, proof was typically shaky and often
relied on illegal confessions, searches, and seizures. The search and
seizure cases opened up another line of defense in these circumstances
as well: the police were spying into private spaces where they had no
right to look.
Early cases where homosexual defendants raised privacy-based
Fourth Amendment arguments were litigated in California state courts.
The leading case, Bielicki v. Superior Court,47 involved an officer of the
Long Beach Vice Squad who staked out the pay toilets of an amusement
park and, through a pipe overlooking two closed toilet booths, espied
Robert John Bielicki and another man engage in sodomy. Upon this
evidence, Bielicki and his companion were arrested. The California
Supreme Court, however, suppressed the officer's evidence on the ground
that it was the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure that violated
the California and United States Constitutions. The court held that such
spying invaded the "personal right of privacy of the person occupying the

45. See D'EItIO, supra note 3, at 200-01; LADDER, May-June 1968, at 22-23.
46. See Raid Victims to Sue: "Rights Trampled", ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 1974, at 2; Douglas

Sarff, LA. Gay Leaders Cleared,ADVOCATE, Jan. 1, 1975, at 3.
47. 371 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. 1962).
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stall" and represented an abusive police practice.4 8 By extending the
protective closet to include water closets, the California Supreme Court
was extending unprecedented legal rights to homosexual male cruisers.
Lower courts in the state applied Bielicki conservatively, however,49 and
the Ninth Circuit rejected its rule outright.50
The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed Bielicki's understanding of the
Fourth Amendment in 1967 with its decision in Katz v. United States.51
Overturning a conviction based on evidence obtained from an FBI listening device attached without a warrant to a public telephone booth, the
Court held that private activity, even in an area accessible to the public,
is constitutionally protected against warrantless searches. 2 As Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion explained, "an enclosed telephone booth is
an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy" that cannot be
invaded without a warrant. 3 After Katz ratified Bielicki's analytical
framework, states as diverse as Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Texas adopted the Bielicki holding that closed toilet stalls are a zone of
privacy which the police cannot invade without a proper warrant. 4
The lower courts in California declined to extend Bieliclid to exclude
police observations of oral copulation when the toilet stalls had no doors
and, therefore, were open to public view.5 Gay defendants resisted this

48. Id. at 292. "Authority of police officers to spy on occupants of toilet booths-whether in
an amusement park or a private home--will not be sustained on the theory that if they watch enough
people long enough some malum prohibitum acts will eventually be discovered." Id.
49. See Maldonado, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 46, 47 (allowing police to spy into a rest room area
unscreened from public view, but overturning the conviction because of an illegally obtained confession); People v. Norton, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676, 678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (finding that Bielicki was
inapplicable when a toilet stall had no door).
50. See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
981 (1966).
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. See id. at 351-52, 359.
53. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The lucid concurring opinion has
arguably been more influential than the muddier opinion for the Court.
54. See Brown v. State, 238 A.2d 147, 150 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968); People v. Dezek, 308
N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801, 804 (Minn. 1970);
Buchanan v. State, 471 SAV.2d 401,404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (by implication). The leading case
rejecting Bielicki was Smayda, 352 F.2d at 251, which was decided before, and arguably inconsistent
with, Katz.
55. See, e.g., People v. Crafts, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Norton, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Compare Britt v. Superior Court, 374 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1962), which
involved a toilet stall having walls and a door that did not extend down to the floor. Although
acknowledging the fact that "the act committed ...might possibly have been visible" to anyone
entering the common use area of the rest room, the court noted that the officer "v/as not so stationed
and the subject evidence [of oral copulation] was not so obtained," and held that this rendered the
evidence inadmissible. Id. at 819. Crafts sidestepped the analysis of Britt, stating that the California
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interpretation and, represented by ACLU attorneys, obtained a favorable
decision from the California Supreme Court in People v. Triggs.56 The
court held that "[m]ost persons using public rest rooms have no reason
to suspect that a hidden agent of the state will observe them. The
expectation of privacy a person has when he enters a rest room is
reasonable and is not diminished or destroyed because the toilet stall
being used lacks a door.'5 7 Other states did not follow California in this
regard,5 8 but Triggs contributed to the decline of toilet spying by the
police in California.
By the 1980s, Katz protections were sometimes applied to various
forms of electronic surveillance that were available for rest room spying
by police. Some courts expanded upon Bielicki by excluding evidence
obtained by police spying on men in parked cars 9 and in booths at
adult theaters.' One of the leading adult bookstore cases was Leibman
v. State.6' Defendants Leibman and Bloomer entered adjoining booths
of an adult theater in Dallas. Officers Przywara and Thomas, both in the
Dallas Vice Squad, witnessed oral sex by Leibman on Bloomer's penis,
inserted into a "glory hole" which connected their two booths. The
officers were able to witness this violation only by assisting one another,
through hand-holds, to peer over the walls of the booths. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the enclosed booths were spaces
in which Leibman and Bloomer had reasonable expectations of privacy

Supreme Court had retreated from its prior position and acquiesced to subsequent court of appeals

decisions. See Crafts, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
56. 506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973).

57. Id. at 236. In holding that patrons have a reasonable expectation of privacy, Chief Justice
Donald Wright's opinion also relied on a 1970 law making it a misdemeanor to place a two-way

observation mirror in public rest rooms. See id.at 238 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 653n (West 1988)
(effective April 1, 1970)); see also People v. Metcalf, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1971)
(relying on section 653n as a basis for applying a Bielicki evidentiary exclusion to observations of
open-stall oral copulation). When police arrested 40 men on charges of lewd bathroom behavior
observed illegally, not only did defendants invoke Bielecki-Triggs rights, but gay activists publicly
criticized abusive police practices and called for a criminal investigation of the department store
which allowed the illegal observation. See San Diego Tearoom Busts Leave Ugly Wounds,

ADVOCATE, Oct. 23, 1974, at 6.
58. See, e.g., Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336 (Nev. 1993); State v. Jarrell, 211 S.E.2d 837 (N.C.
CL App. 1975); State v. Johnson, 536 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); State v. Holt, 630 P.2d 854,

857-58 (Or. 1981).
59. Compare Honeycutt v. State, 690 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (excluding evidence
obtained by police spying into parked cars), with Longoria v. State, 624 S.W.2d 582 (rex. Crim.
App. 1981) (refusing to exclude such evidence).
60. See, e.g., People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
61. 652 S.W.2d 942 (rex. Crim. App. 1983). Earlier Texas authorities include Green v. State,
566 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), and Cammack v. State, 641 S.W.2d 906 (rex. Crim. App.

1982).
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under Katz. Even though the booths were "public spaces" under the
state's public lewdness law, the officers' surveillance was the search of
a private space under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the
search of Bloomer's booth was constitutionally unreasonable, and
evidence against him was suppressed, because it was "nothing more than
a calculated invasion of privacy which has little relationship to protecting
the average law-abiding citizen." 62 But once the officers saw Bloomer
flush against his booth, the court held that there was a reasonable basis
for believing a crime was being committed in Leibman's adjoining booth.
Hence, Leibman's privacy was justifiably invaded, and his conviction
upheld.
Leibman suggests this bizarre image: just as the Dallas police were
looking over the booths to spy on and monitor Leibman and Bloomer's
moment of sexual contact, so the Texas courts were looking over the
heads of Officers Przywara and Thomas to spy on and monitor the police
department's moment of official voyeurism. The Fourth Amendment
privacy cases are about which spaces are free game for police monitoring. Even occasional judicial intervention, as in states like Texas, had
some retarding effect on law enforcement against consensual homosexual
activities, one would think. As the next section suggests, though, the
matter is somewhat more complicated.
3. Criminal Procedural Rights and Gay Power
In the 1950s, the police ran roughshod over homosexuals and their
groups, with little fear of political repercussions. This was not the case
in the larger metropolitan areas after the 1960s. The major reason was
that lesbians and gays organized and fought back politically, insisting
that they be treated decently. But gay political presence often triggered
a backlash among the police and local political leaders, who increased
the persecution. When that happened, constitutional rights not only saved
many defendants from long prison sentences, but rights discourse gave
lesbian and gay people arguments around which they could rally and
which might be persuasive to neutral observers. In cities as divergent as
Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C., homophile groups and their lawyers (usually affiliated
with the ACLU) took their rights-based arguments to police chiefs,
prosecutors, mayors, and councils and slowly achieved a new balance of
power between police and gay people. Consider the most prominent
examples.

62. Leibman, 652 S.W.2d at 949.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, San Francisco was both a gay mecca
and a gay hell. The thriving gay and lesbian subculture provoked
repeated official bashing in the form of police raids on gay clubs,
massive entrapment squads, and constant pressure to close gay bars. The
era of constant harassment was sharply punctuated with the following
event: a vicious police raid on a benefit ball hosted by San Francisco's
Committee on Religion and the Homosexual ("CRH") on New Year's
Day, 1965.63 Although the event had been cleared with San Francisco
officials, the police showed up and demanded entry into the hall.
Lawyers for CRH refused them admission, because the event was private
under Bielicki, and police had no warrant or probable cause to believe a
crime was being committed. The police took the lawyers into custody,
entered the hall to great fuss, and arrested two men for lewd behavior.
The organizers were able to orchestrate substantial publicity and public
outrage, in part because the police had wantonly disregarded privacy
rights recognized by the California Supreme Court and in part because
some of the victims of police brutality were respectable straight people,
including religious leaders. The ministers and other members of the
coalition denounced the police behavior the next day at a press conference that commanded headlines from all the San Francisco newspapers.
"'That was when we got newspapers, TV, and radio on our side,"' stated
Harold Call, a homophile leader who suffered under years of antigay
alarmism by the city's newspapers. 64 The firestorm of protest cowed
police harassment of gay people for several years and impelled it to
assign a staff person as full-time liaison with the homosexual community.
The community, in turn, formed a "Citizens Alert" answering service
where people could report police misbehavior.
Public outrage was soon forgotten, though, and permanent reductions in police terror awaited solid displays of gay political power.
Arrests of gay people for "perversion" (oral sex, usually consensual)
soared again in 1970-71 under Mayor Joseph Alioto. 65 Gays protested
this resurgence, but their voices were not seriously attended to until after
1971, when their votes decisively contributed to the election of progay
Sheriff Richard Hongisto.6 Almost immediately, arrests and police

63. Accounts of this event can be found in SusAN STRYKER & JIM VAN BUSKIRK, GAY BY
THE BAY: A HISTORY OF QUEER CULTURE INTHE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 41-42 (1996), and
EDWARD ALWOOD, STRAIGHT NEWS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40 (1996).

64. Beth Hughes, San Francisco'sOwn Stonewall, S.F. EXAM'R, Oct. 12, 1961, at 3.
65. See 4-Year Sex Arrest Climb Traceableto S.F. Mayor?, ADVOCATE, Aug. 30, 1972, at 12
(arrests for perversion up from II in 1967 to 97 in 1970 and 114 in 1971).
66. See Sasha Gregory-Lewis, Building a Gay Politic:The San FranciscoModel, ADVOCATE,
Oct. 8, 1975, at 27, 32.
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harassment fell off. Although police continued some decoy and spying
operations, virtually all the arrests in 1972 were for public sex and, even
more prominently, commercial sex.' After the early 1970s, police
harassment of gay people in San Francisco was sporadic, and when
harassment occurred it was often swiftly and severely punished by the
authorities. By 1981, San Francisco was actively recruiting gay people
to serve as police officers and vigorously prosecuted gay-bashing
incidents by straight youths.
The Stonewall riots illustrate the equally uneven progress made in
New York City." Like San Francisco, New York's large gay community was constantly harassed by the police, censors, and liquor licensing
agents during the 1950s and 1960s. The police were unremittingly hostile
to homosexuals during the administration of Mayor Robert Wagner
(1954-1966), and it is believed that gay people strongly supported the
insurgent candidacy of Republican John Lindsay (Mayor, 1966-1974).69
The Lindsay administration got off to a bad start when the new mayor
announced a campaign to rid Times Square of undesirable elements,
including people the homophobic New York imes referred to as
"promenading perverts."7' The Mattachine Society, as well as the
ACLU, publicly protested the crackdown, asserting that the Lindsay
police were illegally entrapping gay people through decoy cops and
interrogating them without informing them of their rights. After
conferring with the mayor, Police Commissioner Howard Leary
announced that the police would thereafter avoid entrapment and respect
the rights of homosexual defendants. Arrests fell off markedly. Although
the police continued to raid gay bars, Commissioner Leary reduced the
number of officers assigned to such duty and concentrated on bars and
private clubs allegedly run by organized crime."
In 1969, at the end of Lindsay's first term in office, police
harassment of gay people and their bars again increased. In February, a
raid of the Continental Baths netted twenty-two arrests, but the magistrate

67. See S.F.Mental Unit Says Most '72 Arrests for Public Sex, ADVOCATE, May 9, 1973, at
23.

68. See Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment ofHomosexual Women and Men in New York
City 1960-1980, 12 CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 159, 172-73 (1980-1981).
69. See id. at 164-68.
70. See Clayton Knowles, Cleanup Mappedfor Times Square, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1966, at
41. For an example ofthe homophobia during this period at the Tmes, see ALWOOD, supranote 63,
at 66-69 (recounting the dismissal of critic Stanley Kaufimann as a result of a mildly gay-tolerant
opinion piece).
71. See Rosen, supra note 68, at 168-70.
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2
dismissed all charges as unsupported by legally admissible evidence.
Tension between the police and gays came to a head in the June 1969
Stonewall riots. Although Stonewall was a defining moment in gay
liberation, it did not discourage police gay-bashing. To the contrary,
harassment escalated. In 1970, the police raided the Snake Pit and
arrested 167 gay people; one of the frightened arrestees jumped from the
second floor of the police stationhouse and was impaled on a spike-iron
fence. In response, GLF conducted a death vigil for him as he lay dying
in a hospital.73 Representative Ed Koch wrote to Commissioner Leary,
accusing him of illegal arrests (the charges against virtually all of the
Snake Pit defendants were dismissed) and harassment of gay people.74
Whitman Knapp, Chair of the Commission on Police Corruption, charged
that antihomosexual laws were a leading cause of police corruption in
New York.75 GLF protesters turned up the heat on the administration.
Commissioner Leary resigned in September 1970.76
Incidents of police brutality toward gay people and harassment of
their organizations, notably DOB and GAA (the successor to GLF),
continued into the 1970s.77 However, the scales shifted. Police beatings
of gay people now triggered detailed documentation, press coverage, and
often protests, followed by meetings with the mayor's office, police
officials, and the human rights office, whose first chair, Eleanor Holmes
Norton, was publicly progay.7' For the first time, gay groups gained
regular access to police chiefs and other officials, who proved increasingly responsive to gay demands for respecting their rights. After wellpublicized police intrusion into a community meeting and indifference to

72. See MARTIN S. WEINBERG & COLINJ.WILLAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR PROBLEMS
AND ADAPTATIONS, 33-34 (1974).
73. See Rosen, supra note 68, at 173.
74. See Koch Accuses Police Here of HarassingHomosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1970,
§ 1, at 30.

75. See David Burnham, Knapp Says Laws Spur Police Graft: Lindsay Appointee Explains
Objectives of Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1970, § 1, at 65. This was a theme in other cities, most

notably Chicago, where 19 police officers were convicted in 1973 of extorting payoff money from
53 bars, including 15 gay bars. See Police Official, 18 Other Cops Convicted in Chicago,
ADVOCATE, Nov. 7, 1973, at 5; see also St Louis Police Scandal,ADVOCATE, Apr. 21, 1976, at 12
(investigating kickback scheme associated with sodomy arrests). The Pennsylvania Crime

Commission in 1974 charged that victimless crimes such as "homosexuality" fueled police
corruption. See 'Cut Corruption,Revise Sex Laws, ADVOCATE, May 8, 1974, at 7.
76. See Rosen, supra note 68, at 174; Frank J.Prial, ProtestMarch by Homosexuals Sparks

Disturbancein 'Village, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1970, at 49.
77. See RuT SIMPSON, FROM THE CLOSETS TO THE COuRTS: THE LESBIAN TRANSITION 12229 (1976) (recounting police harassment of DOB).
78. Several vicious assaults on gay people, either by the police or with their acquiescence, are
described in Rosen, supra note 68, at 178-81. In 1973, gay community leaders were engaged in
regular discussions with the police commissioner, the mayor's office, and the human rights office.
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antigay violence during the summer of 1973, 300 demonstrators picketed
the Chelsea police station. GAA leader Bruce Voeller procured police
assurances that harassment would end.7 9
By the end of the Lindsay administration, police harassment had
abated. When Ed Koch became Mayor in 1978, one of his first acts was
a directive prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by all municipal
agencies, including the police department.8" Thereafter, Police Commissioner Robert McGuire established an Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity to investigate discrimination complaints within the department, including sexual orientation claims." The police union resisted
these initiatives, but the force became more gay responsive as it gained
openly gay officers. According to one account, "[b]y the end of the
decade, serious police harassment of gay people had become uncommon
in New York City. When it did occur the reaction was swift and
''
strong. 8
Washington, D.C., the nation's capital, had an even larger closeted
gay community, many of whose members were federal employees frightened of losing their jobs. The District Police Department's Morals Squad
sent spies and decoy cops into cruising areas to harass gay men and to
occasionally raid gay bars and bath houses. On the whole, its activities
were highly uneven,83 varying according to neighborhood and congressional political pressure, as well as occasional counterpressure by gay
rights groups. This latter phenomenon became pronounced in the 1970s,
when the post-Stonewall enthusiasm stimulated the formation of local
chapters of GLF and GAA, in addition to the District's move towards
home rule.
In late 1972, Morals Squad undercover work was netting twenty to
thirty arrests per week for sexual solicitation. In a public letter to city
officials, GAA objected to what it considered illegal entrapment of gay

79. See Gotham Cops to Be Nicer(), ADVOCATE, Sept. 12, 1973, at 3.
80. See Rosen, supra note 68, at 186; Maurice Carroll, BiasAgainst Homosexuals Banned by
Koch in All MayoralAgencies, N.Y. TomS, Jan. 24, 1978, at 1.
81. See Rosen, supra note 68, at 186 (citing Interim Order No. 40, N.Y. City Police Dep't
(Sept. 27, 1978)).
82. Id. at 188.
83. Compare GAY BLADE, Aug. 1970 (cruising untouched by police in the summer of 1970,
after a flurry of harassment earlier that year), and GAY BLADE, Dec. 1970 (heightened police action
against cruisers by sending more undercover officers into cruising areas), with GAY BLADE, Dec.
1971 (undercover police activity declining in D.C., but on an upswing in northern Virginia). The Gay
Blade was a one-page monthly information sheet started in October 1969; over the years it was
transformed into a gay community weekly newspaper. Back issues are on file at the Library of
Congress, Microform Department, No. 87/794.
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men by these officers.' In March 1973, GAA activists staged a sit-in
at police headquarters to protest harassment and entrapment.8 5 Arrests
fell back to about five per month, but zoomed back up in 1974 after gay
pressure subsided. 6 GAA had the last word, however. Once home rule
gave the District substantial control of its own budget in 1975, GAA
persuaded the council to eliminate funding for the Morals Squad. 7
While the police continued to harass cruising gay men and some gay
establishments, activity was episodic after 1975.
Most of the cities having sizeable gay populations followed the
same pattern of pressure-and-response, where an outrageous police raid
or series of raids would trigger publicity and organized response from the
gay community, followed by a dialogue and a deal with the police. Los
Angeles offers a dramatic example. As late as 1972, Police Chief Edward
Davis refused even to talk with gay leaders about police harassment. In
an open letter, he opined that "'open and ostentatious merchandizing of
the concept of homosexuality is a clear and present danger to the youth
of our community. It's one thing to be a leper. It's another thing to be
spreading the disease.', 88 Davis's views were representative of those of
his officers, who regularly and viciously raided gay clubs well into the
1970s. The turning point was the 1973 election of Burt Pines as district
attorney, with key gay support. Pines in April 1974 announced a new
policy of only prosecuting "serious crimes" and specifically not prosecuting lewdness cases where a lesbian or gay couple were only holding
hands, kissing, or dancing (traditionally considered lewd by L.A.
police).8 9 Although the police resisted Pines's progay policy, lewd
vagrancy arrests had fallen off 50% by late 1974." ° Police attitudes
remained hostile, but gay political pressure assaulted those attitudes from
various political angles after 1974: Pines in 1975 called for the hiring of
openly gay police (which occurred later), shockingly antigay internal
police memoranda were leaked to the press, the vice squad's budget
came under fire and was reduced in 1976, and a police liaison was
finally named in 1981. Although Los Angeles's police department

84. See Cruise News, GAY BLADE, Jan. 1973.
85. See GAY BLADE, Apr. 1973.
86. See Pat Kolar, Police Crackdown, GAY BLADE, May 1974, at 1.
87. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 61.
88. LAPD Chief Compares Gays, Lepers, ADVOCATE, Jan. 5, 1972, at 7.
89. See Joel Tlumak, No PoliceAgreement: PinesEases Gay Prosecutions,ADVOCATE, May
22, 1974, at 1. Pines's statement said his office "will only prosecute gay bar conduct cases that

involve grossly offending conduct, prostitution, minors, or violence. In short, activity that would be
unacceptable in straight bars will not be condoned in gay bars." Id. at 16.

90. See Hollywood Lewd Busts Off 48%, ADVOCATE, Oct. 9, 1974, at 5.
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continued to have a deserved reputation for abuse, by 1981 it was much
less capable of harassing gay people.
Without providing a detailed account, it can be said that the
dynamics of each city's gays/police accommodation differed in interesting ways. In Chicago, for example, police harassment of gay establishments did not become a serious problem until after police officers were
convicted of taking bribes from gay and straight bars. An outrageous raid
in 1979 led to a dialogue between police and gay organizations and a
formal police order limiting harassment and requiring sensitivity training
in 1980-81. 9' Still, the pattern suggested above was roughly characteristic of cities as different as Dallas, Philadelphia, Denver, Seattle, Boston,
Minneapolis, and Houston. Indeed, in these cities, as well as in New
York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, some progress
had been made by 1981 in alerting the police to violence against gay
people.
B.

Substantive Due Process and Repeal or Nullification of
Sodomy Laws (The Right to Privacy)

Both legal and medical experts, beginning in the 1950s, agreed that
consensual, adult sexual activity constitutes a realm of privacy that the
state should not invade. This was a theme of the American Law
Institute's ("ALr') Model Penal Code, which decriminalized consensual
adult sodomy.92 In 1961, a coalition of lawyers and medical experts,
chaired by Professor Charles Bowman of the University of Illinois,
persuaded the Illinois legislature to adopt the Model Penal Code, thereby
eliminating criminal sanctions for adult consensual sodomy. 3 Law
revision commissions in Maryland, Minnesota, and New York made
similar proposals which were considered and rejected by their state

91. See Chicago Police Orderto Curb Anfigay Bias, ADvOCATE, Feb. 19, 1981, at 9.
92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 & cmts. (1962, revised 1980); Louis B. Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLuM. L. Ray. 669 (1963).
93. The Illinois legislature was aware that it was repealing the sodomy law when it adopted
the Model Penal Code. The repeal was a matter of intense private debate. According to Abner
Mikva, a state legislative sponsor of the Code and later a federal judge and counsel to the President,

some members of the legislature objected to the Code on those grounds. Others, from both political
parties, took the libertarian position that the matter was private and not mete for state regulation.
Dr. Bowman later stated that potential opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to the
repeal of consensual sodomy prohibitions was headed off by his committee's agreement to narrow
the Code's abortion defenses. See Letter from Dr. Charles Bowman, Professor of Law, University

of Illinois College of Law, to the Florida Legislative Investigation Comm. (June 15, 1964) (on file
with the Florida State Archives, Johns Comm. Collection, Series 1486, Box 2, Folder 4).
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legislatures in the 1960s. 94 Florida and other states debated such a
move, with medical experts and law professors supporting it, while law
9s Illinois remained
enforcement officers and religious groups opposed it.
the only state to decriminalize consensual adult sodomy until 1969, when
Connecticut became the second state to do so. (Appendix A to this
Article sets forth court challenges to and legislative revisions of sodomy
laws.) Before 1969, however, Connecticut was the situs of another battle
over sexually repressive laws.
Connecticut prohibited the use of birth control devices since 1879
and, with Massachusetts, remained the last states to have such statutes in
1961. That same year, in Poe v. Ullman, 6 the Supreme Court used a
procedural dodge to avoid a constitutional challenge to the law, despite
a powerful dissent by Justice John Harlan. Harlan believed that the Due
Process Clause's "principle of liberty" afforded constitutional protection
for the most intimate details of the marital relation, including contraception. 97 Four years later, the Supreme Court finally struck down the
Connecticut law in Griswold v. Connecticut." Justice William
Douglas's majority opinion found a right to privacy in the shadows
("penumbras") of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.99 While the right to privacy announced in Griswold clearly
extended to consensual sexual intimacy, Griswold did not read like a
charter for homosexual emancipation. Because the plaintiffs were
married, Justice Douglas emphasized the marital features of the new right
of privacy.1" Quoting Justice Harlan's Poe dissent, concurring Justices
Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan explicitly distanced the right to marital
privacy from adultery and homosexuality, two foci of apparently
legitimate state regulation.' 0' Invoking his own antihomosexual Poe

94. See Robert G. Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland
Criminal Code: Should Private, ConsentingAdult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 MD. L.
REv. 91, 104-11 (1970).

95. See Minutes, Advisory Comm. to the Florida Legislative Investigation Comm. (June 29-30,
1964) (on file with the Florida State Archives, Johns Comm. Collection, Series 1486, Box 1, Folder
15), reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 6.

96. 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (denying declaratory relief based on Connecticut's decision not
to enforce the statute, creating a lack of justiciability).
97. See id. at 548-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In-depth discussions of the historical context of Griswold are found
in DAVID J. GARRow, LmERTY AND SEXuAurY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE
v. WADE cbs. 2-4 (1994), and WniAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR.& NAN D. HUNTER, SExuAUT, GENDER,
AND THE LAW ch. 1 (1997).
99. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
100. See id. at 485-86.
101. The concurring Justices stated:
"Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State for-
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dissent, Justice Harlan concurred only in the Court's judgment.1 2 With
four concurring Justices explicitly denouncing "homosexuality," two
Justices dissenting from the judgment,"°3 and the opinion of the Court
stressing contraception use within the marital context, Griswold did not
read like a promising precedent for protecting homosexuals.
Yet Griswold was important, in part because it announced a
constitutional privacy right. Opening the way for legal challenges to old
sexuality laws, Griswold came at a point in time when sexual privacy
was a metonym for tolerance of consensual same-sex intimacy. Griswold
also marked the occasion for a new ally to join the homophile cause: the
national ACLU. Local union chapters in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles,
San Francisco, New York, and Philadelphia had been supportive of
homophile initiatives, and the chapters had contributed lawyers and
publicity to challenges of particular state acts since the 1950s. Those
chapters pressed the national organization to reverse its 1957 position,
acquiescing in antihomosexual criminal and employment laws, and the
ACLU commenced serious reconsideration in 1964." 0 At the same
time, the central office was telling prohomosexual members that legal
action depended in large part on how the Supreme Court decided the
contraception challenge, which the ACLU was supporting. After
Griswold,in 1967, the ACLU revoked its previous position and adopted
the ALI's position that private consensual behavior between two people
of the same sex ought not to be illegal; the ACLU maintained that
sodomy laws criminalizing such conduct were unconstitutional infringements of the right to privacy."'5 Griswold did not impel the ACLU to
change its policy (that was effected by the local chapters), but it did fix
the rationale for the new policy and strongly encouraged the ACLU to
devote resources to constitutional challenges to state sodomy laws.
Due to Griswold and the ACLU's new prohomosexual position,
homophile leaders and individual defendants had a new weapon against
police harassment: they could not only argue about abusive police tactics
and the interpretation of the particular sodomy law, but they could argue
that the law was unconstitutional. However, the first test case was not

bids ... but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow,
but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected."

Id. at 499 (Warren, CJ., Brennan & Goldberg, JJ., concurring) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).

102. See id. at 499-502.
103. See id. at 507 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
104. See D'EMILIO, supra note 3, at 212-13.

105. See id. at 213.
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one engineered by the ACLU or a homophile organization. Rather,
Buchanan v. Batchelor'" was a complaint for declaratory judgment
filed by Henry McCluskey, a twenty-six-year-old Dallas attorney, one
month before the Stonewall riots. Although McCluskey was avowedly
heterosexual, his client, Alvin Buchanan, was gay and wanted to overturn
a five-year sentence for having oral sex with a consenting adult
male.'0° McCluskey's complaint charged that the Texas sodomy law
was overbroad under Griswold, for it criminalized marital as well as
nonmarital oral sex. 08 Federal Judge Sarah Hughes, writing for the
three-judge court, agreed with McCluskey and struck down the law for
that reason,' 9 but in 1971 the Supreme Court vacated that judgment
without explanation.110
Subsequent moves by the Supreme Court expanded the breadth of
the Griswold precedent. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"' the Court struck
down a Massachusetts law which criminalized the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried people. Justice William Brennan's opinion
for the Court held that Griswold was not limited to the marital relationship." 2 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.""1 3 For that proposition, Justice
Brennan cited Stanley v. Georgia,"4 where a unanimous Court ruled
that the invasion of a man's home and his subsequent arrest for
possessing illegal pornography was unconstitutional. The Court's decision
to overturn abortion statutes in Roe v. Wade" confirmed that the right
of privacy was not limited to married couples and suggested that this
right entailed a freedom for women not just to control their bodies, but

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); see also GARROW, supra note 98, at 398-99.
See Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 730.
See id.
at 732.
See hi.
at 736.
See Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971). Three months later, one of Buchanan's two

sodomy convictions was overturned on state appeal, see Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972). Buchanan went to jail for his second
conviction. McCluskey's fate was even more tragic. He was murdered in 1973 by William Hovila,

who claimed to be his lover. Hovila was convicted of murder and received a death sentence. See
Hovila Gets Death in Attorney's Murder, ADVOCATE, Mar. 27, 1974, at 6.
111.

405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).

112. See id.
at 453-55. Justice Brennan wrote for four Justices, three Justices concurred in the
judgment, and two Justices did not participate.

113. Id. at 453.
114. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an in-depth discussion of the Roe decision and its aftermath, see
GARROW, supra note 98, chs. 6-9.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:817

to enjoy previously unheard of sexual liberty. Roe also returned the right
to privacy to the Due Process Clause and formally abandoned Griswold's
experiment in penumbral reasoning.'
Encouraged by these precedents which read Griswold expansively,
the ACLU brought a class action lawsuit in 1973, Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney,"7 challenging Virginia's sodomy law. The
majority of the three-judge court rejected the ACLU's arguments,
however, choosing to read Griswold in light of Harlan's Poe dissent."'
Judge Robert Merhige, Jr. warmly dissented, rereading Griswold in light
of Eisenstadt. He interpreted those precedents as taking the ALI's
position that consensual adult sexual intimacy conducted in private ought
not to be criminalized." 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of

the three-judge panel without opinion,20 suggesting that the panel
majority was correct. Although the ambiguous precedential value of
summary affirmances left room for argument, in light of Griswold's
actual reasoning and the narrow majority in Eisenstadt (four to three,
with two conservative Justices not voting), it is not surprising that the
moderately conservative Burger Court would not have extended the right
of privacy to protect homosexuals.
Griswold had greater resonance at the state level, where defendants
asserted their right to privacy under state, as well as federal, constitutional law. Consistent with Doe, the large majority of judges-and every
state judge to address the issue in the traditionalist southern
states-rejected such challenges (Appendix A). Exemplary was the case
of Eugene Enslin, the manager of two bars, an adult bookstore, and a
massage parlor in Jacksonville, North Carolina.' 2 ' According to Enslin,
the local police in 1974 had little interest in enforcing state laws against
homosexual conduct but were engaged in a campaign to close down his
massage parlor. As part of that campaign, they enlisted the services of a
seventeen-year-old marine, who offered the massage parlor $30 for acts
of heterosexual prostitution. When Enslin refused, the marine countered
with the possibility of homosexual sodomy, which Enslin readily agreed

116. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover UnenumeratedFundamental
Rights? Cataloguingthe Methods of JudicialAlchemy, 19 HAIv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 795, 815

(1996).
117. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afid, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
118. See id. at 1201-02.
119. See id. at 1203.04 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
120. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
121. See 'Abominable Crime'LawHeadingfor Major Test, ADVOCATE, Nov. 20, 1974, at 17,
for background, as well as the court's opinion in State v. Enslin, 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct. App.

1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
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to do for free; the two retired to Enslin's private chambers. Although the
police staking out the massage parlor could not view the encounter, the
marine later testified that he and Enslin engaged in consensual oral sex.
For that episode, Enslin was prosecuted under North Carolina's "crime
against nature" statute, convicted, and sentenced to one year in jail. (The
marine was not prosecuted but did transfer to another unit outside North
Carolina.) The ACLU's new Privacy Project, founded in 1973 under the
leadership of Marilyn Haft, made Enslin's case a test case, for it presented a clean set of facts: oral sex by consenting adults in complete
privacy and without monetary compensation. Nonetheless, the ACLU lost
the case in North Carolina courts, and only Justices Breunan and
Marshall of the Supreme Court were willing to review the case.
By the time North Carolina's Court of Appeals rejected Enslin's
privacy and other constitutional arguments in 1976, similar arguments
had prevailed in seventeen other states (including California, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio), albeit in their legislatures and not in their
courts.1 2 Most of the states repealed their consensual sodomy laws as
part of a general recodification of their criminal codes along the lines
suggested by the Model Penal Code and its privacy philosophy. It
appears that many state legislators did not focus on the revisions'
allowance of consensual sodomy. Indeed, two states reinstated their
sodomy laws after it came to legislators' attention that the Model Penal
Code was (relatively) liberal on issues of sexual privacy. In both states,
antihomosexual feelings drove the reinstatements. Idaho reinstated its
entire criminal code within months of the new code's taking effect, in
response to an argument by the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day
'
Saints that the state would become a haven for "sex deviates."' 2
Arkansas was both more measured and more explicitly antihomosexual
122. The states were Arkansas (1975, reinstated 1977), California (1975), Colorado (1971),
Connecticut (1969), Delaware (1972), Hawaii (1972), Idaho (1971, reinstated 1972), Indiana (1976),
Iowa (1976), Maine (1975), New Hampshire (1973), New Mexico (1975), Ohio (1972), Oregon
(1971), South Dakota (1976), Washington (1975), and West Virginia (1976). For citations, see
Appendix A.
123. Idaho's criminal code reform in 1971 was specifically motivated by a legislative study

council's recommendation to decriminalize many sex crimes and by the experience of the reform's
sponsor, Republican Senator William Roden. Roden had been an assistant prosecutor during the
"Boys of Boise" homosexual witchhunt of 1955-56 and believed the craze had been "'a very
unfortunate situation."' Idaho Repeals New ConsentingAdults Code, ADVOCATE, May 10, 1972, at
3. When The Advocate published these views in 1971, Democrat Senator Wayne Loveless charged

that the revision would make Idaho a magnet for "sex deviates" and other undesirables. Loveless
spearheaded an effort in March 1972 to repeal the entire code and reinstate the old law. Roden was
philosophical. "'I still feel the same way,"' he told The Advocate after the repeal. "'The code was

repealed solely as the result of an emotional hysteria generated by some very right-wing church and
political groups."' Id

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:817

in its reaction. In 1976, when its criminal code revision took effect,
Arkansas legislators proposed to reinstate only sodomy prohibitions (not
the entire code), and only as a misdemeanor and only as applied to samesex sodomy.
The Arkansas compromise, enacted in 1977, was not a novelty. The
idea had originated in Kansas, which in 1969 decriminalized heterosexual
sodomy and reduced homosexual sodomy to a misdemeanor. The same
approach was followed in Kentucky (1974), Missouri (1977), Nevada
(1977), Tennessee (1989), and Texas (1973); Montana's revised code
(1973) maintained sodomy as a felony but, like these other states, limited
the felony to same-sex sodomy.124 The evidence from these states plus
Arkansas and Idaho suggests that in the Baptist South and the Mormon
West moralist opposition to homosexuality was a substantial barrier to
decriminalization of homosexual conduct, even when equally sinful
heterosexual conduct was decriminalized. This experience also shows
how gay rights issues in the early 1970s were already galvanizing
counteractivism among religious traditionalists. These traditionalists
correctly surmised that the privacy philosophy of the Model Penal Code
and gay rights advocates was on the whole antithetical to morals-based
criminal regulations.
The debate between the lawyers and the moralists was best reflected
in California. Gay rights attorneys and the California Committee for
Sexual Law Reform conducted a constitutional guerilla war against the
state "perversion" and "sodomy" laws in the early 1970s, regularly
winning dismissals of criminal prosecutions from trial judges and simultaneously pressing for state adoption of Representative Willie Brown's
(later Assembly Speaker and then Mayor of San Francisco) sex law
reform bill in Sacramento."2 Originally introduced in 1969, Brown's
bill was the first state legislative initiative that focused on reforming
sodomy law in particular. As such it drew the ire of traditionalists, who
argued, in their words, that "'homosexuality is a sin,' gay people 'molest
children,' [and] 'the growth of homosexuality will destroy California as
it did ancient Greece and Rome."'" 26 With the support of Governor
Jerry Brown, the Brown bill was enacted in May 1975, but only over the

124. Two states after 1981 accomplished the same result in the courts. See Schochet v. State,
580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied,479 U.S.

890 (1986). For analysis of this phenomenon generally, see Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 538-39 (1992).
125. Some of the unreported trial court opinions are discussed in Ruling Hits California'sOral
SexLaw,ADVOCATE,Oct. 11, 1972, at 1; and San Diego JudgeStrikes Felony Oral CopulationLaw,
ADVOCATE, Apr. 11, 1973, at 19.
126. Sex Bill Passes in HistoricSenate Tie-Breaker, ADVOCATE, May 21, 1975, at 4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

32

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
1997]

CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

opposition of a massive letter-writing and lobbying campaign by the
Concerned Christians of Sacramento and the National Association of
Evangelical Churches.
The dramatic climax of the struggle was an intense debate in the
state senate. Supporters led by Senator George Moscone (later the
martyred Mayor of San Francisco) emphasized that the bill would only
protect private consensual sex between adults. Opponents led by Senator
H.L. Richardson (later a California Supreme Court Justice) denied that
the bill's allowance of "homosexuality" could be confined to the private
sphere: homosexuals spread venereal disease and therefore were a public
health menace; courts would extend the bill's protections to "'the
beaches, the bushes and restrooms' (as California's high court had
already done); and impressionable children would receive the message
that 'homosexuality is okay."' 12 7 The bill passed the senate after a
dramatic tie-breaking vote by Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally.
Governor Brown's signing the bill into law only deepened the public
debate. In May 1975, the Coalition of Christian Ministers was formed by
evangelical religious leaders to procure enough signatures to force a state
referendum to repeal the law. Notably, mainstream Protestant, Catholic,
and Jewish churches had no part of the Coalition, and its petition drive
failed.' 28
The California sodomy repeal was a watershed in several respects.
First, it marked the end of the period where sodomy repeal could free
ride on general criminal code revision along Model Penal Code lines. In
1976 (the year California's reform took effect), five states repealed their
consensual sodomy laws as part of a general criminal code revision; 29
four states did so in 1977;30 two did so in 1978;1" none have done
so since 1978. After 1977, sodomy repeal efforts had to stand on their
own, and for that reason the successes were usually tied to judicial more
than legislative campaigns. For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's expansive view of the right to privacy pushed that state's legislature toward sodomy repeal in 1978. New Jersey was the last state to
repeal its sodomy law legislatively until Wisconsin did so in 1983, and

127. Id.
128. See Battle Lines Form in Sex Bill Referendum Fight, ADVOCATE, June 18, 1975, at 4.
129. The states were Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
130. The states were Nebraska, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. The Nebraska revision
was enacted over the veto ofGovernor James Exon, who objected to the revision on general moralist
grounds, but without specific reference to homosexuality.
131. The states were Alaska and New Jersey.
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it took another ten years for the next repeal, when Nevada did so in
1993.132

Additionally, the California debate exposed new fault lines in
American politics. The debate saw two previously unorganized groups
coalesce into a deathlock of moral combat: a prosex gay lobby versus an
evangelical Christian one. Each contended for the votes of the middle,
and when the evangelicals lost they, significantly, sought resort in the
popular referendum process, a move that foreshadowed Anita Bryant's
"Save the Children" campaign in 1977 and John Briggs's "keep
homosexuals out of the classroom" campaign in 1978. Finally, and most
significantly, the California debate sharply revealed new lines of
intellectual debate over the meaning of privacy. Progay legislators like
Brown argued for privacy as a right to be let alone by the government
in matters of personhood. Antigay legislators like Richardson went
beyond the moralist, Sodom-and-Gomorrah arguments that had prevailed
in Idaho in 1972. Instead, they argued that privacy was a canard, because
homosexual intercourse has dire public consequences: venereal disease,
encouragement of weak or immature people to adopt the homosexual
"lifestyle," and symbolic state approval of homosexuality. These were
more powerful arguments than the simple moralisms traditionally uttered
and were capable of persuading relatively neutral observers.
The new round of constitutional privacy challenges to consensual
sodomy laws yielded significant victories in New York and Pennsylvania,
both states with strong gay liberation movements and declining police
interest in enforcing antihomosexual laws.'33 The New York Court of
Appeals' decision in People v. Onofre was particularly significant, as it
represented a full-court press against New York's consensual sodomy
misdemeanor by the Bar of the City of New York, the ACLU, and the

132. After a decade of intense constitutional litigation and several years of political lobbying,
the District of Columbia repealed its sodomy law as part of a reform of sexual offense law in 1981.
The Reverend Jerry Falwell, head of the Moral Majority, launched a campaign to override the

District's law in Congress. "'This is a perverted act about perverted acts,"' he said at a news
conference, where he warned that the District could become .'the gay capital of the world"' or

"'another Sodom and Gomorrah."' Larry Bush, House Kills D.C Sex Law as Gay ProspectsDim,

ADVOCATF, Nov. 12, 1981, at 8. The antihomosexual theme was submerged during debate in the
House of Representatives, whose members focused on issues of rape and sexual assault. On October

1, 1981, the House cast a legislative veto of the District's action, by a vote of 281-119. This was
the first time since home rule was granted in 1975 that Congress had vetoed a District law. The next
year, the Supreme Court held that one-house legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. See Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The District in 1994 repealed its sodomy
law without congressional reaction. See Appendix A.
133. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d

47 (Pa. 1980).
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Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, all of which filed amicus
briefs. The court of appeals adopted the amici's central argument, that
the right to privacy is not limited to marriage and procreation-based
activities and is "a right of independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct oneself in
with those decisions, undeterred by governmental
accordance
restraint.''3
Onofre reflected a particular reading of the privacy right. The
majority judges not only expanded that right beyond the marriage and
procreation contexts of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, but also beyond
the intimate setting of the bedroom. Two of the couples prosecuted in the
case (one different-sex, one same-sex couple) had consensual sodomy in
parked automobiles. Consistent with the Fourth Amendment cases
protecting cars, as well as toilet stalls, from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the New York Court of Appeals found that this setting was
sufficiently private to merit protection.
Going beyond the Fourth Amendment cases, the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Uplinger135 summarily applied Onofre to invalidate a state law prohibiting loitering in a public place for the purpose of
soliciting another person for "deviate sexual intercourse." Other state
courts used Onofre-style reasoning to invalidate their public solicitation
laws or sodomy laws as applied to oral sex in quasi-public settings.' 36
This was a radical view of "privacy," reading the concept as one which
created a space of sexual freedom generally. The U.S. Supreme Court
37 but
would reject such a broad understanding in Bowers v. Hardwick,1
38
appeal.
have
to
continued
the Onofre understanding has
Indeed, the Onofre understanding of privacy can be said to have
triumphed even before Hardwick was handed down. By 1983, twentyfive states, representing almost 60% of the American population, had
decriminalized consensual sodomy; 139 twelve states representing about

134. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 939.
135. 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert dismissed as improvidentlygranted,467 U.S. 246 (1984).
136. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (solicitation of
undercover cop for sodomy); Commonwealth v. Waters, 422 A.2d 598 (Pa. 1980) (solicitation of
undercover cop); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (oral sex in adult nightclub).
Most courts rejected such challenges, however. See United States v. Carson, 319 A.2d 329 (D.C.
1974); State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio 1979).
137. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 487 (decided six years after Bowers).
139. The states were Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa (judicial invalidation followed by legislative repeal), Maine, Nebraska, New

Hampshire, New Jersey (judicial invalidation followed by legislative repeal), New Mexico, New
York (judicial invalidation), North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania (judicial invalidation), South
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15% of the population had reduced consensual sodomy to a misdemeanor
or to a misdemeanor-level sentence; 4 thirteen states and the District
of Columbia, representing about a quarter of the population, prohibited
consensual sodomy as a felony.4 1 Even in states that continued to
criminalize sodomy, the law was almost never applied in situations where
two adults were engaged in secluded sexual intercourse. Sodomy laws
were in these states overwhelmingly deployed in nonconsensual cases of
rape and sex with a minor, cases usually involving heterosexual
intercourse. As applied in consensual situations, sodomy laws Were used
as the legal basis to monitor gay cruising areas (like public rest rooms)
and to investigate or raid quasi-public forums-adult bookstores (the
situation in Leibman), sex clubs, gay baths, and massage parlors (the
situation in Enslin). The only reported case I have seen in the last
twenty-five years where a sodomy law was applied to criminalize sex
between consenting adults in a private home was Hardwick itself-where
the state withdrew the prosecution but civil liberties groups pressed for
a reported decision nonetheless.
C.

Vagueness and Statutory Obsolescence

The precipitous decline in the application of state sodomy laws to
consensual same-sex intimacy represented an advance, in part because it
removed the possibility of draconian sentences for consensual sex which
characterized the old regime. In the early 1970s, gay men were serving
life sentences in Oregon for engaging in consensual oral sex, and were
serving indefinite sentences in state mental institutions in other states,
where they were subjected to electroshock therapy and chemical
experimentation that replicated death experiences. 4 2 But the decline of
sodomy laws was not as big an advance as the gayocracy made it out to
be, for by the 1970s relatively few gay men and almost no lesbians were
actually prosecuted under such laws. Cruising gay men and butch
lesbians were, instead, arrested under laws criminalizing public vagrancy,

Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Appendix A.
140. The states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas (criminalizing only same-sex sodomy, but
at the misdemeanor level), Florida (sodomy law invalidated but misdemeanor for "unnatural and
lascivious conduct" left in place), Kansas (same-sex only), Kentucky (same-sex only), Minnesota
(misdemeanor-level penalty of one year maximum), Missouri (same-sex only), Nevada (same-sex
only), Tennessee (same-sex only), Texas (same-sex only), and Utah.

141. The states were Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
142. For the tip of the iceberg, consult Governor Rejects Lifer's Appeal on a Minor Crime,
ADVOCATE, June 19, 1974, at 12; and Rob Cole, InsideAtascadero-IV Lfe, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Treatment, ADVOCATE, Oct. 11, 1972, at 5.
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indecency, lewd or disorderly conduct, or dressing in attire not appropriate for one's sex. 4' Because these laws involved public or quasi-public
conduct, they were not as susceptible to privacy-based attacks.
A third line of due process jurisprudence proved more useful for
gaylegal challenges to miscellaneous sexual indecency laws. In a long
line of cases, the Supreme Court held that statutes which provide insufficient notice for citizens and police to ascertain precisely what conduct is
criminally proscribed violate the Due Process Clause on grounds of
vagueness." In addition to the obvious constitutional policy of fair
notice, the doctrine also implemented two subtler constitutional policies.
One is the policy against arbitrary enforcement of broad criminal laws
against disfavored status groups. 4 A vice of vague criminal laws is
the large discretion they vest in law enforcement officials, and the
concomitant danger that the discretion will not be applied neutrally.Y
Hence, the void-for-vagueness doctrine helped rein in excessive police
and prosecutorial discretion, precisely the sort of claim made by
defendants of color such as those in Maldonado.47
The final and most subtle policy underlying the vagueness doctrine
lies in a need to weed out obsolescent crimes. Statutory commands, clear
once upon a time, might grow muddier as time passes and the meaning
conveyed to the original audience is lost upon new audiences. At some
point, judges have an obligation to sweep such statutes off the books and
insist that the legislature update its commands into something more

143. These laws are examined in Eskridge, supra note 1. For example, thousands of gay men

were arrested every year in Los Angeles County for violating § 647(a) of the California Penal Code,
prohibiting "lewd vagrancy." See Jon J. Gallo et al., Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and
the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA
L. REV. 643 (1966); Barry Copilow & Tom Coleman, Report and Investigation of Enforcement of
Section 647(a) ofthe California Penal Code by the LosAngeles Police Department, ADVOCATE, Feb.

14, 1973, at 2.
144. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that due process requires

that criminal laws must "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute"); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (holding that
due process requires that there "must be ascertainable standards of guilt
in criminal laws); Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (stating that a statute "must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable"); see also
Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960).
145. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits application of criminal sanctions to the mere status of being a drug addict).
146. See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373 (1886) (holding that an ordinance which
bestows arbitrary power on municipal authorities is unconstitutional).

147. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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intelligible to the average citizen. 4 ' Many of the once-clear commands
that grew muddier over time were statutory crimes targeting people
considered deviant or even dangerous in the nineteenth century, but who
were no longer considered a social menace.
All of these policies were important to the Court in Papachristouv.
City of Jacksonville,149 which invalidated a Jacksonville, Florida
vagrancy ordinance. In language widely used by state and municipal
vagrancy laws, the ordinance made it a crime to be "vagabonds, or
dissolute persons who go about begging, ... lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons,... persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly
persons," and so forth. 5 The lead defendants (Margaret Papachristou,
Betty Calloway, Eugene Melton, and Leonard Johnson) were two white
women and two black men who were doing nothing more sinister than
riding around together in an automobile. One's suspicion is that they
were arrested for being an interracial group of women and men, a
suspicion reinforced by other cases involving people of color and downand-out folks who were not doing anything apparently unlawful.' 5'
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court held that the vagrancy law was
not intelligible to "[t]he poor among us, the minorities, the average
householder," criminalized ordinary lawful conduct considered an
amenity of normal life, and seemed to be52 enforced mainly against
"nonconformists" and "suspicious persons."'
The Court's main concern in Papachristou was the abuse of
antiquated vagrancy laws against the poor and people of color. Gay
litigants seized upon the precepts of the void-for-vagueness decisions and
argued their applicability to obsolete sodomy laws and turn-of-thecentury sexual solicitation laws. The anti-obsolescence pitch was

148. Alexander Bickel suggested that statutes might violate due process by reason of their
desuetude, by which he meant disuse as well as obsolescence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 148-56 (2d ed. 1986).

Rather closely to the proposition in text, but more provocatively, Guido Calabresi has argued that
courts have authority to "overrule" obsolescent statutes. See GuiDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 17-24 (1982).

149. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
150. Id. at 156 n.l.

151. See, e.g., NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that injunctive
relief was a proper remedy to bar interference with peaceful protests by civil rights activists).
152. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162-63, 169, 170. Notwithstanding the usefulness of such

dragnet laws to the police, the unanimous Court held the ordinance contrary to even-handed due
process. "The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as
the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together." Id. at 171.
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surprisingly successful in deregulating same-sex intimacy even beyond
the traditional ALI-type privacy position.153
1. Sodomy Laws
Many state sodomy laws were prime candidates for Papachristou
challenges, for they were adopted in the nineteenth century, criminalized
only the "crime against nature" (a term perhaps understood in 1800 but
much less clear by the 1960s and 1970s), and were enforced in arbitrary
and resource-wasting ways.1 " Nonetheless, vagueness challenges to
sodomy laws had repeatedly been rejected in the 1950s and early 1960s.
That string was broken in the same year as the Stonewall riots, by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Harrisv. State. 55
The court held that "crime against nature" had little meaning to the
typical citizen and that the "decisions in other states [were] in hopeless
contradiction about the scope of the term." 15 6 According to the court,
the very term reflected the statute's obsolescence, for "natural law" is a
sectarian rather than secular basis for regulating sexuality.157 In addition, the court invoked John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Freud and modem
sexology, the ALI's Model Penal Code, as well as the Wolfenden Report,
as justification for clearing the statutory decks.15 "[T]he widening gap
between our formal statutory law and the actual attitudes and behavior
of vast segments of our society can only sow the seeds of increasing
'
disrespect for our legal institutions."159
Although an eloquent opinion, Harris had only limited judicial
impact. It applied solely to the "crime against nature" phrase, and not the
reference to "sodomy" in the Alaska law."6° Only two state supreme

153. See, eg., Balthazar v. Superior Court, 428 F. Supp. 425,434 (D. Mass. 1977) (holding that
a statute prohibiting unnatural and lascivious acts was unconstitutionally vague as applied), affd,
573 F.2d 678 (1st Cir. 1978); State v. Sharpe, 205 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1965) (holding that a
statute forbidding solicitation to commit unnatural sexual acts was void as unconstitutionally vague).
154. See generally Paula A. Brantuer, Note, Removing Bricksfrom a Wall of Discrimination:
State ConstitutionalChallengesto Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495 (1992) (illustrating
how sodomy laws adversely impact rights such as child custody, obtaining security clearance, and
freedom of sexual expression); Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History,Homosexuality, and Political

Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinatesof Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ.1073 (1988)
(discussing selective enforcement of sodomy laws against homosexuals).
155. 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969).

156. Id. at 641.
157. See id. at 645.
158. See id. at 644-46.
159. Id. at 645.
160. The opinion had only limited impact for the appellant in Harris as well--his conviction
was affirmed. The case was remanded for an amended judgement to reflect a "conviction for the
crime of sodomy and not a crime against nature." Id. at 649. Alaska repealed its sodomy law in Act
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courts followed Alaska's example. The Florida Supreme Court invalidated that state's "crime against nature" law on grounds of vagueness,
observing that "the law, to be vibrant, must be a living thing, responsive
to the society which it serves.' 6 1 Oddly, the Florida court declined to
apply this reasoning to the state's less severe criminal penalty against
"unnatural and lascivious conduct," a statutory command that seems just
as vague as that in the "crime against nature" law.'t The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reinterpreted, rather than invalidated, an
"unnatural and lascivious acts" law to edit out consensual adult
intimacy1 63 but (oddly in light of the Alaska and Florida decisions) left
the "crime against nature" law untouched.
Some federal judges were attracted to the Harris reasoning. The
Fifth Circuit applied Papachristou to invalidate a conviction under
Florida's "crime against nature" law, but the Supreme Court reversed,
because the Justices believed the term provided sufficiently clear notice
given the extensive judicial construction and prosecutorial enforcement
of the law over the years. 6' In Rose v. Locke, 6 the Court held that
Tennessee's "crime against nature" law was not vague as applied to
cunnilingus, because that term was "no more vague than many other
terms used to describe criminal offenses at common law and now
codified in state and federal penal codes."'" Coming only a few years
after Papachristou,where the same reasoning had been rejected, Rose
bears a whiff of judicial squeamishness about sexual perversion. The
Burger Court regarded sodomy as the love that need not speak its name
very clearly.
Although neither privacy nor vagueness arguments persuaded the
Supreme Court that "crime against nature" or sodomy laws were ever
unconstitutional, these arguments had a more receptive audience among

of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, § 21, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 118-19.

161. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21,23 (Fla. 1971) (per curiam). The decision was eventually
implemented by the legislature, which repealed the "crime against nature." See Act of May 31, 1974,
ch. 74-121, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 372.
" 162. In Florida, an "abominable and detestable crime against nature" was punishable as a second
degree felony, see Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 777, 1971 Fla. Laws 858, but neither
Franklinnor the 1974 repeal affected Florida's misdemeanor for "unnatural and lascivious acts." See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1992); see also Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975)
(applying lascivious acts law to oral sex).

163. See Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974). Balthazarnarrowed the
application of Massachusetts's two "unnatural and lascivious acts" statutes, but left the "abominable
crime against nature" statute untouched. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.272, §§ 34, 35, 35A (West
1990).
164. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), rev'g 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.).
165.

423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975); accord Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 22.

166. Rose, 423 U.S. at 50.
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legislators, prosecutors, and police chiefs. Even conservatives agreed with
the idea that criminal statutes ought to tell the citizens more precisely
what they were not supposed to do, and the ALI's medical term "deviate
sexual intercourse" (with a legalistic definition telling exactly which body
parts were not supposed to come into contact with which other body
parts) replaced "crime against nature" and "sodomy" prohibitions in most
but by no means all state codes. 67
2. Lewdness and Sexual Solicitation Laws
As noted above, most arrests of gay people occurred under broadly
phrased vagrancy, lewdness, disorderly conduct, and solicitation laws.
Most states and municipalities in 1961 had such laws, and that did not
change in jurisdictions adopting the Model Penal Code. Although the
Code decriminalized consensual adult sodomy in a private place, it
criminalized public homosexual (but not heterosexual) solicitation for
such activity."6 Hence, Illinois, Ohio, and many other states that
adopted the Model Penal Code continued to criminalize homosexual
solicitation; many municipal ordinances made sexual solicitation illegal
generally. Defendants and their ACLU allies challenged these laws, with
frustrating results. Ohio courts, for example, struck down municipal
ordinances prohibiting sexual solicitation169 but upheld (though narrowly construed) the state homosexual solicitation prohibition against
vagueness attack. 7 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals invalidated one clause of its lewd or indecent act law (used to prosecute
homosexual solicitors, mainly) on vagueness grounds in 1974, but upheld

167. Among the big states bucking the ALI trend, however, were Georgia (calling the crime
"sodomy" but specifying rather precisely what conduct constituted the crime), Florida (which, even
after Franklin, criminalized "unnatural and lascivious acts"), Maryland (criminalizing "perverted
practices"), Massachusetts (criminalizing the "abominable crime against nature"), Michigan
(criminalizing "gross indecency" between two men or two women), and North Carolina
(criminalizing "crimes against nature").
168. For a definition of the crime of "loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations,' see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.3 & explanatory note (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1980) ("IT]his
offense is not directed against private homosexual behavior but against the public nuisance created
by the conduct proscribed."). See also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 251.3 cmts. 1-3
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (noting that "at the time the Model Code was drafted,
every American state punished deviate sexual relations, at least as between persons of the same gender"). For a definition and discussion of the concept of "deviate sexual relations," see id. § 213.2
cmts. 1-3. Deviate sexual relations, found within the general definition of deviate sexual intercourse,
included both oral and anal intercourse. The Code excepted from criminal sanction such relations
between consenting adults "where they conduct their relations in private and create no public
nuisance." Id. at cmt. 2.
169. See City of Columbus v. Scott, 353 N.E.2d 858, 860-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
170. See State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ohio 1979).
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the remainder of the law one year later.17 1 Other high courts rejected
such challenges altogether."r
Even when legal challenges prevailed, the police often continued to
enforce invalid laws. In 1971, Colorado adopted the Model Penal Code,
thereby repealing its consensual sodomy law but retaining an offense for
"loitering for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to
engage in prostitution or deviate sexual intercourse." Denver Judge Irving
Ettenberg declared the loitering law unconstitutionally vague, and the
district attorney dismissed all pending cases in late 1972. Yet the police
continued to arrest gay men for lewd solicitation, allegedly under
authority of Denver ordinances prohibiting offers to commit lewd acts or
loitering in a public place for the purpose of lewdness or prostitution. In
April 1972, Judge Ettenberg declared the municipal loitering law
unconstitutional for the same reasons the state law was invalid. Not only
did the police continue to arrest gay men for lewd solicitation, but arrests
"soared" from sixty to seventy per month in 1971 and 1972 to 125 in
February 1973.' Concerned citizens formed a gay coalition that year
to protest this pattern of arrests. Negotiations with the police went
nowhere, so the coalition sued the city to enjoin police harassment, both
because it was pursuant to invalid ordinances and because it discriminated against gay men. After the trial judge denied the city's motion to dismiss and the state supreme court invalidated the state's lewd loitering
law, the city came to terms with the gay coalition, promising that gay
people would not be targeted for arrest, and arrests under the ordinances
immediately fell to minuscule levels. 74
The same process of grass-roots politics and aggressive litigation,
backed up by factual studies, characterized gay challenges to California's
broad array of sexual regulations. In the famous Carol Lane case decided
in 1962, the California Supreme Court held that municipal laws
regulating sex and lewdness were preempted by the state's comprehensive regulation of these issues. 7 This was a critical development,
171. Compare District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (striking

down the phrase in a law criminalizing "any other lewd, obscene, or indecent act"), with District of
Columbia v. Garcia, 335 A.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding the part of that law criminalizing the
making of a "lewd, obscene and indecent sexual proposal").
172. See, eg., State v. Cota, 408 P.2d 23, 26 (Ariz. 1965); Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354
A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. 1976); State v. Roberts, 421 P.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Wash. 1966).
173. See Dilemma in Denver: As Laws Fall,Arrests Soar,ADVOCATE, Mar. 28, 1973, at 15.
For another example of police refusal to abide by judicial invalidations of antihomosexual solicitation

laws, see Tampa Police Ignore Cour; Go Ahead with Arrests, ADVOCATE, Mar. 14, 1973, at 18.
174. See Denver Free: Months ofLegal and PoliticalManeuvering Pay Off as Police Chief
Signs Accord to Halt Harassment, ADVOCATE, Nov. 6, 1974, at 3.
175. See In re Lane, 372 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1962).
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because it eliminated the detailed sex codes adopted in most California
municipalities. As the California Supreme Court and legislature
proceeded substantially to deregulate consensual same-sex intimacy, there
were no fall-back local laws as there had been in Colorado. In 1966, a

state appeals court struck down the state's "public indecency" law as
vague.

76

In 1975, the legislature repealed the sodomy law, leaving the

crime of "lewd vagrancy" as the main basis for arrests of cruising gay
men.'" The ACLU, Gay Rights Advocates (a San Francisco firm), and
other attorneys representing gay defendants attacked the lewd vagrancy

law as unconstitutionally vague in the same manner that had proved
successful against the public indecency law. The National Committee for
Sexual Civil Liberties offered expert evidence and data in such cases.
appellate courts rejected such
Nevertheless, California's intermediate
17

arguments throughout the 1970s.

1

The California Supreme Court overruled this line of cases in Pryor
v. Municipal Court.179 The defendant, Don Pryor, was arrested for
soliciting an undercover Los Angeles cop to engage in oral intercourse.

This was a time-tested scenario for lewd vagrancy arrests, but Pryor and
his attorneys sought a declaration from the courts that the lewd vagrancy
law was fatally vague. Justice Mathew Tobriner's opinion for the court
held that the terms "lewd" and "dissolute" were hopelessly vague and
that their vagueness was not narrowed by the law's legislative back-

ground."' Efforts by lower courts to give more definite content to the

176. See In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702, 716 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (invalidating CAL. PENAL
CODE § 650). Judge Kaus's opinion invalidated the law as applied to Jeanne Davis's bare-breasted
modeling at a private fashion show run by her and her husband. See id. at 704. Judge Kaus marked
the irony that the court was invalidating a statute that was usually "used as an instrument of mercy
rather than of harshness," id. at 716 n.21, for homosexual defendants in particular. The judge's
experience, coupled with evidence compiled by an independent study, see Gallo et al., supra note
143, at 772-75, established that pleading guilty to this provision was the plea bargain of choice by
sex offenders, as it was virtually the only sex offense that did not subject the offender to public
registration. See In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 716 n.21.
177. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Comm. for Sexual Civil Liberties, Pryor v. Municipal
Court, 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979) (LA 30901). The brief included two privately printed studies as
attachments, Toy, UPDATE: ENFORCFMENT OF SECTION 647(a) OF THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE

BY THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1974); Copilow & Coleman, supra note 143, which
the court recognized as suggesting that there had been a deliberate effort to target male homosexual
offenders. See Pryor, 599 P.2d at 644 n.8.
178. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 130 Cal. Rptr. 460,463 (Ct. App. 1976); Silva v. Municipal
Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 (Ct. App. 1974); People v. Deyhle, 143 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1977); People v. Rodrigues, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976).
179. 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979).
180. See id. at 641. The 1961 revision of section 647(a) had converted "lewd vagrancy" from
a status to a behavior crime. The legislative materials, however, indicated an intent to continue the
old status crime policy in the new law, see id., a policy at war with the Due Process Clause as
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lewd vagrancy provision had been unsuccessful, and defendants were
basically left to the unpredictable sympathies of juries and prosecutors.
Justice Tobriner noted that "male homosexuals" constituted the bulk of

the prosecutions,18 an obvious violation of Papachristou'swarning
against laws whose application was arbitrarily limited to unpopular
minorities. Having found the law unconstitutionally vague, the court

declined, however, to strike it from the books." Instead, Justice
Tobriner limited the law to the solicitation of sexual conduct that occurs
in a public place, or to sexual touching if the actor knows or should
know of the presence of persons who would probably be offended by

that kind of conduct. 8 3 This interpretation narrowed police discretion
and, more importantly, empowered local gay rights coalitions in their
negotiations with local police forces and prosecutors.

The legal equilibrium reached in California was almost the same as
that in New York, but in New York it was the legislature and not the
courts that clarified vague solicitation laws. Traditionally, homosexual
solicitors were arrested under New York's broadly worded "disorderly
conduct" and "vagrancy" laws, which were applied with full force by the
New York State Court of Appeals to any kind of homosexual solicitation
or suggestive conversations." s The legislature repealed both laws in the
mid-1960s 85 and replaced them with more narrowly tailored statutes

that criminalized specific acts of public disorder 186 and public loitering
with intent to solicit "deviate sexual intercourse."'" Applying Onofre's
privacy rationale and following the leads of courts in Colorado, the
District of Columbia, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, the New York

construed in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). In 1960, Arthur Sherry
advocated a change in the old California vagrancy laws which helped lead to their revision. He noted
that "[t]he abandonment of the concept of status as a basis for the imposition of penal sanctions... marks a break from the traditional vagrancy pattern and ... will be responsive to the needs
of and in accordance with the legal and social standard of contemporary society." Arthur H. Sherry,
Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CAL. L. REV. 557, 572
(1960).
181. See Pryor,599 P.2d at 644.
182. See id. at 645.
183. See id. at 647. Ohio's Supreme Court similarly limited that state's homosexual solicitation
law in State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ohio 1979).
184. See People v. Hale, 203 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. 1960) (applying N.Y. CalM. PROC. LAW
§ 887(4) (McKinney 1937) to homosexual solicitation); People v. Lopez, 196 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y.
1959) (applying N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(8) (McKinney 1944) to homosexual loitering).
185. See Act of Apr. 27, 1967, ch. 681, 1967 N.Y. Laws 828 (repealing § 887(4)); Act of July
20, 1965, ch. 1030, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1030 (repealing § 722).
186. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1989).
187. See id. § 240.35(3).
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Court of Appeals invalidated the latter statute in Uplinger.This move left
no criminal provision in New York that targeted same-sex intimacy.
3. Cross-Dressing Ordinances
The most successful invocation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
came in the lawsuits challenging laws which criminalized crossdressing."S The earliest law targeting cross-dressing was an 1864 St.
Louis ordinance providing that no person "shall... appear in any public
place in a state of nudity, or in a dress not belonging to his or her sex,
or in an indecent or lewd dress." 89 Dozens of municipalities adopted
similar ordinances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.' Antimasquerade statutes in New York and California were
interpreted by the police and judges to make cross-dressing illegal
statewide. 9' In these jurisdictions, the laws were applied against
"butch" lesbians and men impersonating females. By the 1960s they were
also applied to transsexuals, people who not only cross-dressed but also
wanted to change their anatomical sex. 92
Cross-dressers became bolder after Stonewall, and Papachristou
gave drag queens, transsexuals, and their ACLU allies winning arguments
against police harassment. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in City of
Columbus v. Rogers'93 was a leading case reflecting this transformation. Columbus had a cross-dressing prohibition copied from those
adopted in the nineteenth century. Rogers was convicted for female
impersonation. Chief Justice O'Neill invoked the controlling federal
precedents and found, as a factual matter, that dress is a particularly

1978) (involving transsexual);
188. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (111.
City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1970) (same).

189. ST. Louis, Mo., REV. ORDINANCES No. 5421 (Misdemeanors), art. II, § 2 (1864). The
ordinance was codified in subsequent revised codes of St. Louis until it was eventually invalidated

by D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986).
190. These municipalities included Charleston (West Virginia), Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus,
Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Lincoln, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Minneapolis,

Nashville, Newark, Oakland, Orlando, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Barbara, and West Palm
Beach. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Homosexual: American
Regulation ofSame-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1940, IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 1997). See generallyNan
D. Hunter, Gender Disguise and the Law (1989) (identifying three distinct modes of cross-dressing-gender fraud, gender play, and gender migration--and tracing their legal history) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
191. See, e.g., People v. Gillespi, 202 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1964).
192. See Bob Robertson, Big He-She Law Problem, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 1966, at 1; Bob
Robertson, Jurors' 'Diana'Verdict, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1966, at 1; see also Doe v. McConn, 489
F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
193. 324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[VCol. 25:817

malleable social convention, indeed one that was more sexually
indeterminate than ever before.
At the present time, clothing is sold for both sexes which is so similar
in appearance that "a person of ordinary intelligence" might not be able
to identify it as male or female dress. In addition, it is not uncommon
today for individuals to purposely, but innocently, 9wear
apparel which
4
is intended for wear by those of the opposite sex.
In light of these social developments, "the terms of the ordinance, 'dress
not belonging to his or her sex,' when considered in the light of
contemporary dress habits, make it 'so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."" 95 This reasoning strikes me as hard to dispute, especially
given the strong relevance of Papachristou's concerns with adequate
notice, police discretion, and selective enforcement against unpopular
minorities.
Rogers-type reasoning was invoked by judges to strike down crossdressing ordinances in Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Fort Worth, Miami
Beach, St. Louis, Toledo, and other cities. 96 I have found only one
reported case that rejected due process challenges to cross-dressing laws.
Richard Mayes, a transsexual (later Rachell Mayes), was arrested a dozen
times for cross-dressing in Houston, Texas. Represented by the ACLU,
Mayes challenged the constitutionality of Houston's law. Mayes lost in
Harris County court, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an
appeal."9 In 1981, eight transsexuals successfully challenged the same
law, on the ground that cross-dressing is needed therapy for them. After

194. Id. at 565.
195. Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
196. See D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986); City of Chicago v. Wilson,
389 N.E.2d 522 (IlL 1978); City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974);

Cross-DressLaw Falls,ADVOCATE, Sept. 24, 1975, at 10 (state trial judge invalidates Detroit crossdressing law based in part on expert testimony about the blurring of male and female fashions); Fort
Worth Judge Raps DragArrests, ADVOCATE, Dec. 19, 1973, at 14 (judge throws out drag queen

arrests at behest of Awareness, Unity, and Research Association, a Fort Worth gay group); Toledo's
'Pervert Drag' Law Voided, ADVOCATE, Nov. 7, 1973, at 16 (federal judge voids Toledo law

prohibiting any 'homosexual, lesbian, or other perverted person"' from appearing in clothing of the
opposite sex); Unconstitutional: Court Voids Miami Beach DragBans, ADVOCATE, July 11, 1972,
at 4 (federal judge accepts ACLU invitation to void several Miami Beach cross-dressing laws used
to harass female impersonators).

197. See Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). Only Justice Douglas voted to take certiorari.
Texas defended the cross-dressing law as protecting the survival of the human race by banning
"'homosexual disguises."' See Unheard, "No-Merit" Ruling: Supreme Court Upholds Drag Ban,

ADVOCATE, Apr. 24, 1974, at 10.
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the federal district court decision accepted their arguments, Houston
repealed the ordinance.' 98
This deployment of the Due Process Clause underlines the error of
viewing the clause as nothing more than a repository of static tradition.
If due process invokes tradition at all, it is only the general principles
confirmed by tradition (for example, the criminal law must give fair
notice of its commands) and the application of those principles in light
of ever-evolving social conventions (for example, dress of one's sex is
unclear today in ways it would not have been unclear in 1864). Like the
sodomy and sexual solicitation cases, the cross-dressing cases also illustrate the way in which state and federal constitutional law reflects
changing social power. It was only after lesbians and gay men came out
of the closet in great numbers that sodomy laws began to be repealed or
nullified, and it was only after transvestites and transsexuals were
emboldened that cross-dressing laws followed suit. The vagueness line
of cases was a convenient vehicle for these groups to translate their
social message and power into legal terms.

II.

ASSURING SPACE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY SUBCULTURES:
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Gay and lesbian subcultures had existed in many cities before World

War II but grew like brushfires after the war. l9 Their growth was
fueled by demographic factors, including increased urbanization and
economic opportunities for women to work outside the home. When
cities became known as centers for lesbian and gay subcultures, gay

people gravitated to them from everywhere. Once a critical mass of
people congregated in a city, social and educational institutions formed.
Just as public cruising and cross-dressing by gay people grated mainstream society, so did homophile institutions, even the tamest. Municipal,
state, and federal efforts to suppress institutions of gay subculture inten-

sified after World War II. In my view, there was not much the state
could do to destroy these institutions, absent an all-out war, but state
repression surely retarded their development and drove many of them
underground. Homophile resistance was tepid in the 1950s, bolder in the

198. See Short Takes, ADVOCATE, Aug. 20, 1981, at 12.
199. Leading accounts include GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN
CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); D'EMLIO, supra note
3; LILLIAN FADER.im, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1991); ELIZABETH KENNEDY & MADELAINE DAVIS, BOOTS OF
LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1993); STRYKER & VAN

BUSKIRK, supra note 63.
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1960s, and defiant in the 1970s. Constitutional law played an important
role in the increased boldness of defenders of gay subcultural turf.
As the negotiations following the CRH raid 00 and the crossdressing cases suggest, due process requirements of fairness provided
some protection for lesbian and gay subcultures, that is, the spaces in
which lesbian and gay communities could be fostered: bars, restaurants,
baths, churches, newspapers, confessional literature, erotica, clubs, and
associations.2 1 However, the main lines of protection for lesbian and
gay subcultures were afforded by the First Amendment, particularly their
rights of free speech, press, and association. Gay rights litigation, in turn,
afforded growth opportunities for an evolving First Amendment.
The Supreme Court of Chief Justice Earl Warren inherited an
anemic First Amendment and gave it blood by invoking its jurisprudence
of free speech and association to protect alleged Communists, leftwing
subversives, and hated civil rights groups.2" None of the Warren
Court's leading First Amendment decisions of the 1950s involved openly
homosexual litigants, 0 3 but homophile groups and their lawyer allies

seized upon the First Amendment principles and doctrines to insist that
gay people should be tolerated at least as much as Communists. This
insistence came in response to unprecedented efforts in the late 1950s

and early 1960s by postal inspectors, alcoholic beverage control agents,
and censors to suppress homophile association, publication, and speech.

200. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
201. See Don Romesburg, Twelve Tips for Meeting Other Young Queers, in OUT IN ALL
DIRECnONs: THE ALMANAC OF GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICA 294 (Lynn Witt et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter OUT IN ALL DIRECIONS] (discussing various locations and methods for meeting

homosexuals).
202. In the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the Court crafted First Amendment inspired rules to
overturn convictions for membership in the Communist Party. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961) ("[Tjhe mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching
of... a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action."); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 326-27 (1957) (same); see also NAACP v. Alabama es rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that compelled disclosure of the NAACP's member lists
may constitute a restraint on members' freedom of association); cf.Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 253 (1961) (affirming a conviction relating to membership in an organization advocating
overthrow of the government on a finding that an "advocacy of action' was engaged in"). See
generallyNorman Dorsen, The SecondMr.JusticeHarlan:A ConstitutionalConservative,44 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 249, 263-65 (1969) (discussing Justice Harlan's role in the Communist Party cases).
203. Although One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), a summary disposition, did. On the
authority ofRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision
upholding the Postal Service's refusal to mail the October 1954 issue of One, a homophile magazine,
on the ground that it was obscene. See One Inc., 241 F.2d at 772. As evidence of obscenity, the
Postal Service cited a short story about a young woman who falls in love with an older lesbian, a
bland poem about titled homosexuals in England, and a simple advertisement for a French homophile
magazine. See id. at 777.
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As a federal appellate judge stated: "Even homosexuals and reprobates
who prey upon their hapless condition are entitled to find refuge in [the
Constitution's] dictates. Freedom of association is one of them. Freedom
of expression is another."2"
First Amendment litigation was relatively successful.2 °5 By 1981,
gay literature, including erotica, was available nationwide. Most locales
were forced to tolerate lesbian and gay newspapers, radio programs, bars,
churches, student clubs, and other institutions of homophile association
and community. First Amendment lawsuits were relatively successful, in
part because the gay or gay-friendly parties were institutions that were
able to devote substantial resources to litigation. Unlike the schleps the
police hauled in from public rest rooms and bar raids, at least some of
the gay bars and publishers of gay erotica were monied enough to
compete with the state as repeat litigation players. As repeat players,
these institutions developed longer term legal strategies, retained very
good attorneys, and attracted useful allies. 20 6
The ACLU served as gays' best ally, and largely contributed to their
success in First Amendment cases. Although, and perhaps because, it had
waffled on issues of political, as well as sexual subversion in the
1950s, °7 the ACLU and its allied attorneys were keenly interested in
helping gay litigants and groups litigate First Amendment cases in the
1960s and 1970s. Homosexuals were better than Communists as a means
of establishing a strong First Amendment, because homosexuals were
even more villainized. If even the intensely hated and feared homosexuals could find protection in the First Amendment, then its principles were
truly universal and robust against popular sentiment. Thus it was that the
homophile and gay liberation movements became part of the great First

204. United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873, 883 (7th Cir. 1963) (Swygert, J., dissenting)

(citation omitted).
205. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.L.
REV. 1551, 1595-1600, 1619-21 (1993); David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From HandHolding to Sodomy: FirstAmendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 329-30 (1994); see also Scott D. Wiener, Recent Developments, Same-Sex
Intimate and Expressive Association: The Pickering BalancingTest or Strict Scrutiny?, 31 HAiV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 561, 583-84 (1996).
206. On the advantages of repeat-playing institutional litigants, see Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculationson the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REv. 95

(1974).
207. In1957, the national ACLU adopted a resolution approving laws that criminalized samesex intimacy and excluded homosexuals from government employment. See David Cole, Are You

Now or Have You Ever Been a Member of the ACLU?, 90 MICH.L. REv. 1404, 1414 (1992) (book
review). On the other hand, the ACLU insisted that homosexuals enjoy the same due process and

free speech rights as other Americans, and ACLU-affiliated attorneys regularly represented gay
defendants in the 1950s.
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Amendment tradition, whereby the most hated groups (usually) found
themselves free to organize and say things the majority of Americans
despised. The freedom of the most despised to say what they thought
reassured mainstream Americans that their freedom was that much more
solid. In turn, the First Amendment provided legal protection for the
institutions of the gay subculture at the very point, in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, when their expansion and public visibility provoked
heightened local, state, and national censorship. In part because of the
assumptions of immunity created by First Amendment jurisprudence, gay
subculture grew from nests of local bars, a few publications, and assorted
romance and physique magazines in 1961 to a rainbow of organizations,
churches, publications, and social clubs in 1981.
A.

The Right of Association

The Supreme Court first recognized people's freedom of association
in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.0 8 Overturning Alabama's subpoena of the NAACP's membership lists, the Court held that the First
Amendment protects people's right "to pursue their lawful private
20 9
interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing."
The Court reiterated that right in Gibson v. FloridaLegislativeInvestigation Committee,"' which protected the Miami branch of the NAACP
from identifying its members to Florida's race-baiting, red-baiting, and
gay-bashing Johns Committee. Although the right of association originated in civil rights membership-list cases, no court limited the right to such
cases. This constitutional right of anonymity had direct and important
relevance for homophile organizations, whose members were so
frightened of publicity that they often used pseudonyms even within the
organizations.2" This assurance that the state could not obtain membership lists provided some space for homophile organizations to attract
members. Moreover, the NAACP v. Alabama right of association was not
limited to cases protecting membership lists.21 2 Lesbians and gay men

208. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
209. Id. at 466; see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (state cannot force
publisher to disclose identifies of book purchasers).
210. 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963).
211. See Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: FreeSpeech, Disclosure and the Devil,

70 YALE LJ. 1084 (1961). For example, Edward Sagarin ceased using his pseudonym, Donald
Webster Cory, after losing control of the Mattachine Society in 1965 to its more militant members.
Sagarin went on to write scathing criticism of the Society and sociological works that characterized
homosexuals as deviants. See D'EMIuo, supra note 3, at 168.
212. Griswold, for example, cited NAACP v. Alabama as upholding a peripheral First

Amendment right whose shadow contributed to the penumbral right of privacy. See Griswold v.
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associated for the same social, political, and educational reasons as other
people, and attorneys for gay bars, organizations,
and clubs invoked this
21 3
right repeatedly, even before Stonewall.
1. Gay Bars and Bathhouses
The traditional situses of homosexual socializing were the tavern or
bar, the dance hall, and the bathhouse.2 14 The state's primary response
to these institutions was either benign neglect or harassment through
occasional police raids. Police raids, especially when newspapers printed
the names of those detained, were probably effective enough in
communities with small lesbian and gay populations. A more powerful
regulatory weapon emerged after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.
Rather than prohibiting liquor, the state became the vendor or the
licensor of liquor sales in bars, taverns, hotels, and other establishments.
In most states, liquor licensing statutes or agency regulations required
that licensees be of "good moral character" and that licensed establishments not permit "disorderly" behavior on the premises. Violation of
these conditions meant that a liquor license-and hence the
establishment's main source of income-could be suspended or revoked
by the liquor commission or alcoholic beverage control board. Inevitably,
these conditions were applied in antihomosexual ways in states with
visible gay subcultures.
By 1961, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and
other states actively monitored bars and revoked their licenses for
tolerating lesbian and gay customers. However, it was California's
activist regulation that generated the first important cases, partly because
California gay bars were the most profitable and partly because the
California Supreme Court (the court of the legendary Justice Roger
Traynor) was the most bold. In overturning the license revocation of a
gay bar, the California Supreme Court in 1951 held that "[m]embers of
the public of lawful age have a right to patronize a public restaurant and
bar so long as they are.., not committing illegal or immoral acts."2 5"
The court did not clearly state that this was a constitutional right, but the

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
213. See Rivera, supra note *, at 908-34; see also Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas,
Queens, andLezzies: The Construction ofHomosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 33, 33 (1995); Cain, supra note 205, at 1579-80.

214. For historical introductions, see CHAUNCEY, supra note 199, at 207-26 (gay bathhouses),
331-51 (gay bars); KENNEDY & DAvIS, supra note 199 (lesbian bars); Allan Bfrub6, The History
ofGayBathhouses,in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLTICS AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS AcTIVISM
187-221 (Dangerous Bedfellows eds., 1996).

215. Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951).
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legislature forced the issue when, in 1955, it passed a law requiring the
revocation of the liquor license of any establishment that is "a resort
for... sexual perverts. 2 16
In the test case of Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control,217 Mary Azar and Albert Vallerga, co-owners of the First and
Last Chance Bar in Oakland, conceded that their bar was a "resort for
homosexuals" and argued that the 1955 amendment was unconstitutional.
Their position was supported by an amicus brief prepared by Morris and
Juliet Lowenthal, ACLU attorneys who specialized in gay rights cases.
In its 1959 decision, the California Supreme Court unanimously but
cautiously invalidated the 1955 amendment. The court emphasized that
the regulatory department did not rely on investigative reports of lewd
conduct or its revocation authority under a pre-1955 statutory prohibition
of a bar being used as a "disorderly house or place in which people abide
or to which people resort.., for purposes which are injurious to the
public morals."2 8" "Conduct which may fall short of aggressive and
uninhibited participation in fulfilling the sexual urges of homosexuals,
reported in some instances, may nevertheless offend good morals and
decency by displays in public which do no more than manifest such
urges."219 The court concluded with the suggestion that if the department had relied on police reports of "women dancing with other women,
and women kissing other women," it would have sustained the revocation
as consistent with the rights of the customers." °
Although it was the first decision to strike down a statute targeting
"sexual perverts" as unconstitutional, Vallerga was not revolutionary. It
was a compromise that established a closet on terms unfavorable to
homosexuals: they had a theoretical right to congregate, but not if they
touched or kissed one another, as that would be offensive to the
hypothetical heterosexual. The only offended heterosexuals who were
likely to frequent these bars, however, were undercover investigators,
revealing that Vallerga acquiesced in the closet culture. Same-sex
dancing and kissing in a gay bar threatened the morals of a society that
would never see it except through the eyes of its undercover investigators, who could bust such an establishment at the drop of a stool pigeon.
Nonetheless, Vallerga was no more restrictive than any other state rule.

216. Act of June 23, 1955, ch. 1217, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 2230 (repealed 1963).
217. 347 P.2d 909, 909-10 (1959).

218. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25601 (West 1985). Violation of this prohibition subjected
a bar to the loss of its liquor license. See id. § 24200(a).
219.

Vallerga, 347 P.2d at 912 (citation omitted).

220. Id. at 913.
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Before 1967, no judge in America was willing to say that the NAACP v.
Alabama right of association allowed the homosexuals to dance together
in a gay bar. When pressed into litigation, courts in New York, New
Jersey, Florida, and Louisiana upheld similar measures by state liquor
authorities. On the other hand, the proprietors, as well as customers of
gay bars were stimulated by these actions to resist through organized
political and legal activism.
The last years of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s
witnessed the most intense crackdown on gay bars in American
history. 21 Consider how this scenario played out in Miami. Florida's
Legislative Investigation Committee served as a clearinghouse for antihomosexual law enforcement in that state, particularly in the years from
1958 to 19 6 3 .222 The committee shared police surveillance and its own
investigatory files with the Florida Beverage Control Board, which closed
many lesbian bars especially, all with little legal challenge. Miami was
the center for one of the largest gay communities and in 1954 had
adopted an ordinance making it
unlawful for an owner, operator, manager or employee of a business
licensed to sell intoxicating beverages to knowingly sell to, serve to or
allow consumption of alcoholic beverages by a homosexual person,
lesbian or pervert, as the same are commonly accepted and understood,
or to knowingly allow two or more persons who are homosexuals,
lesbians or perverts to congregate or remain in his place of
business.'
Invoking this and other municipal ordinances, the Dade County Sheriff,
the Miami and Miami Beach Police Departments, and the Beverage
Control Board combined to harass all of Miami's gay and lesbian bars
out of existence in 1960. Not a single official protested this campaign.
For the late 1950s and early 1960s, there is no reported decision in
Florida, or in any other southern state, reversing a gay bar's loss of its
license. On the other hand, gay bars in Miami came back like heads on
the hydra: for every bar closed by the authorities, two new ones were
opened. Because gay bars were highly lucrative, the risk of raids and

221. See BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 56-60 (Irwin T.
Sanders ed., 1987); Fernando J. Gutierrez, Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving Equal
Protection, 4 L. & SEXUALITY 195, 242 (1994). See generally DENNIS ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL:
OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION (1971).
222. See, e.g., FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMM., HOMOSEXUALITY AND
CmZENSHIP IN FLORIDA (1964), reprintedin GOVERNMENT VERSUS HOMOSEXUALS (Jonathan Katz

ed., 1975).
223. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-13 (1956).
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closure were offset by the possibility of huge profits, profits which could
also justify hiring attorneys. One bar owner challenged the 1954
ordinance in the mid-1960s, but a state appeals court ruled that the city
policy was justified "to prevent the congregation at liquor establishments
of persons likely to prey upon the public by attempting to recruit other
persons for acts which have been deemed illegal." 4 The appeals court
did not even mention the right of association. Sporadic harassment and
closures continued through the 1960s but were abated when a bar
owners association, formed in 1971, won a ruling from Municipal Judge
Donald Barmack that the "congregating homosexuals" ordinance was
constitutionally invalid.'
The Miami experience was replicated in most other cities with large
lesbian and gay populations: around 1961, the police sought to terrorize
gay bars and baths with periodic raids and name-taking, while state or
local alcoholic beverage rules prohibited even "congregating" by gays
and lesbians in bars and enforced such rules by license revocations or
suspensions based upon the reports of undercover investigators; 6 in
the 1960s or 1970s bar owners formed law reform coalitions or organizations to resist those policies by challenging them as a matter of law and
by bargaining with the police as a matter of community politics, and in
the 1970s deregulation of consensual adult sodomy reduced pressure on
authorities to police gay baths, which also came to be left alone; by
1981, gay bars and baths proliferated like mushrooms after a spring rain.
The right of association recognized by the Supreme Court played a small
but key role in empowering bar associations to discredit "congregating
homosexuals" policies such as Miami's. Consider how this struggle
played out in San Francisco, New York, and New Jersey.
After Mayor George Christopher was politically smeared for
allegedly making San Francisco a magnet for homosexuals in that city's
1959 election, he and his police chief hounded gay bars and cooperated

224. Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

225. See Miami Bar OrdinanceHeld Void, ADVOCATE, Jan. 5, 1972, at 2. Later that year, the
police department suspended enforcement of the ordinance and promised the bar owners that police
harassment would diminish. See Miami Bars Open Dialogue with Lawmen, ADVOCATE, Aug. 16,

1972, at 10.
226. These rules tended to be particularly explicit in the South. In addition to the 1954 Miami
ordinance, see 1956 Va. Laws, ch. 521 (permitting license suspension of bars that become "a
meeting place or rendezvous for... homosexuals"); and Kotteman v. Grevemberg, 96 So. 2d 601,
603 (La. 1957) (allowing license revocation for bar "in which perverts and sex deviates
congregated"). But they were hardly limited to the South. See, eg., Murphy's Tavern, Inc. v. Davis,
175 A.2d 1, 2, 5 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (suspending bar license because owner allowed
female impersonators and homosexuals "to frequent and congregate" there; suspension justified as
a prophylactic to thwart "sexual misconduct..

.

in its embryonic stages").
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with the state's Alcoholic Beverage Control ("ABC") Board in getting
liquor licenses revoked for most of the lesbian and gay hangouts.
Following the roadmap laid out in Vallerga, license revocations were
based upon reports by undercover police and ABC agents that they were
solicited for "unnatural acts" and witnessed "fondling or kissing between
male patrons" as well as "lewd conversation."' Twelve of the thirty
gay bars lost their licenses in 1960-61, and most of the remainder lost
their licenses in 1962-63. Some of the bars challenged the revocations in
court. Distinguishing Vallerga, the California appellate courts upheld
revocations for the Black Cat, the 585 Club, and the Paper Doll, based
upon decoy cop testimony about kissing, dancing, and advances by
As in Miami, the San Francisco bars came
homosexual patrons'
back, only much more quickly. Not only were there more bars and many
more patrons, but the bars became a major center of political activity
(leaf-letting, get-out-the-vote drives, etc.). In 1962, bar owners formed a
Tavern Guild that protected their interests. By 1965, gay bars in San
Francisco had turned the comer with regard to licensing. In the 1970s,
bars remained controversial, but the ABC and penal code problems
shifted from cross-dressing and campy behavior to nude dancing and
prostitution. 229
In October 1959, egged on by a press campaign, the New York
State Liquor Authority ("SLA") Chair, Thomas Rohan, announced that
the SLA would revoke the licenses of all bars "'patronized by prostitutes
and homosexuals."'"2 In the next year, virtually all of the thirty or
more gay bars in the city were closed down, typically for "'permitting
homosexuals and degenerates to loiter,"' even when bar owners
(implausibly) claimed unawareness of the customers' sexual orientation. 3 1 None of the closings resulted in reported litigation to overturn
the SLA action. On the other hand, new bars opened up to replace the
closed ones, sometimes in the same location under ostensibly new
management. 2 There was then a regulatory lull before enforcement

227. Revoking Evidence Sought: Special Copsfor "Gay" Bars, S.F. EXAM'R, Oct. 12, 1961,
reprinted and analyzed in MATrACHIWE REV., Nov. 1961, at 4-7.

228. See Stoumen v. Munro, 33 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Morell v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 22 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Benedetti v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 9 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).

229. See, e.g., Rob Cole, Bar Bares Ban Bolstered, but Backers Bristle, ADVOCATE, Jan. 3,
1973, at 2.
230. Dal Mclntire, Tangents, ONE, May 1960, at 18; see CallingShots: New York Bars Hit by

Liquor Authority, MATTACHINE REV., Dec. 1959, at 4-5.
231.

Dal Mclntire, Tangents, ONE, Apr. 1960, at 18.

232. See Dal Mcntire, Tangents, ONE, Aug. 1961, at 22.
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picked up again in the mid-1960s. For example, in March 1967, the SLA
revoked the license for Tony Pastor's, a Greenwich Village bar, because
it "permitted the licensed premises to become disorderly in that it
permitted homosexuals, degenerates and undesirables to be on the license
premises 233and conduct themselves in an offensive and indecent
'
manner.
By 1967, however, owners of these establishments were emboldened
by an important legal victory that year. In Kerma Restaurant Corp. v.
State Liquor Authority,2' a closely divided New York Court of
Appeals overturned a license revocation which rested upon nothing more
than dubious instances of cross-gender attire and allegations of lewd
solicitation among the patrons. The court found that this was not
sufficient evidence of "general disorder"-the statutory standard. On the
other hand, in December of 1967, the court upheld a license revocation
where there was evidence that there was extensive "feeling of private
parts," with apparent acquiescence of the management. 235 This thoroughly mixed message nonetheless empowered gay bars to require the
SLA to expend more resources in order to close them; this legal respite
came just as gay political power was crystallizing in the state. After the
1969 riots at the Stonewall, a bar operating without a liquor license, the
SLA gradually shifted its efforts toward regulating (monitoring lewd
conduct) rather than closing gay bars under its "disorderly place" powers.
The most dramatic litigation was in New Jersey, whose ABC
Department energetically investigated gay bars and revoked their licenses
under the Department's Rule 5, which, as amended in 1950, required
licensees to police their premises against any "'lewdness' and 'immoral
activity,' ...

[or] 'foul, filthy, indecent or obscene language or

conduct,"' or "'any disturbances, brawls, or unnecessary noises. '236
Adopting arguments advanced in a Mattachine Society amicus brief, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control237 held that bars could not be
disciplined simply because gay people congregated in them and engaged
in campy or gender-crossing behavior and dress. Justice Jacobs's opinion
applied and reinterpreted Vallerga in light of subsequent Warren Court
233.
234.
235.
236.

LiquorLicenseIs Revoked at Tony Pastor'sNight Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,1967, at 15.
233 N.E.2d 833, 835 (N.Y. 1967).
Becker v. New York State Liquor Auth., 234 N.E.2d 443, 444 (N.Y. 1967).
One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d

12, 14 (NJ. 1967) (quoting New Jersey's A.B.C. Rule 5). An example of this rule in practice was
Re Louise G. Mack, A.B.C. Bulletin 1088, Item 2 (Nov. 2, 1955) which suspended a bar's license
because the licensee allowed the establishment to operate as a congregating place for homosexuals.
237. 235 A.2d at 19.
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decisions. He started with the proposition that homosexual status cannot
be criminalized, and held that homosexuals have "the equal right to
congregate within licensed establishments such as taverns, restaurants,
and the like." 8 Relying on Griswold and NAACP v. Alabama, Justice
Jacobs required the ABC Department to show strong reason to invade
"rights of the homosexuals to assemble" and the bar's corresponding
right to serve them.2 3 9 After this remarkable introduction, the court
dismissed the usual third-party effects---nonhomosexual patrons who
wander in would be shocked by effeminate behavior, homophobes might
attack patrons, the public would lose confidence in the liquor industry---as insufficiently established in the record. 24° The court believed
that less restrictive regulations could deal with the third-party effects
without sacrificing patrons' rights.
Similar to Kerma and Vallerga, One Eleven Wines & Liquors
invalidated an explicitly antihomosexual liquor policy which directly
infringed gay people's rights of association. None of these decisions
ended state harassment of gay bars, for all three cases left room for
liquor commissions to investigate lewd conduct, however defined. The
key variable became how much of its resources a liquor board was
actually willing to invest in vendettas to close down particular bars. The
answer in the 1970s for New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C. was virtually none, for political as well
as fiscal reasons. As a result of legal deregulation and the post-Stonewall
social revolution, bars and baths boomed in the 1970s. Chicago, which
had about a dozen recognized gay bars in the mid-1960s, sported
between sixty and seventy-five gay bars ten years later; San Francisco
and Los Angeles--the chief battleground of the bar wars of the 1950s
and early 1960s-had 130 and 300 gay bars, respectively; New York's
bar culture doubled in that period; multiple bars opened in cities
previously without places for lesbian and gay socializing. It was
estimated in 1976 that there were 2,500 gay bars generating $100 million
each year, as well as 150 gay bathhouses pulling down $20 million per
year.24 These numbers would not have been possible without an
emerging regulatory consensus that gay people are entitled to associate
with, and have private sex with, one another at institutions of their own
creation.

238. Id. (citing Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (1951)).
239. Id.
240. See id. at 18-19.
241. See Randy Shilts, Big Business: Gay Bars and Baths Come Out of the Bush Leagues,
ADVOCATE, June 2, 1976, at 37.
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Notwithstanding these changes, bars and baths continued to be risky
businesses. In only a few states were there "congregating homosexuals"
prohibitions.2 42 Most of the regulatory attention focused on issues of
rowdy conduct by patrons, nude dancing, and drugs and prostitution. In
Californiav. LaRue,2 3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that nude dancing
and other lewd activities were amenable to broad state regulation. Indeed,
the states were empowered to regulate bar activities more extensively
than other associational activities, pursuant to extra authority granted to
states to regulate the sale of liquor by the Twenty-First Amendment.
Although the state offered few formal barriers to gay and lesbian
socializing, Big Brother was watching the show and deciding how much
fun gays would be permitted.
2. Gay Organizations and Churches
Even before NAACP v. Alabama, state actors realized that they
could not prevent homosexual men and women from creating the
Mattachine Society and lesbians from establishing DOB. The homophobic FBI, for instance, recognized gays' rights to organize for political and
informational purposes. That recognition, of course, did not prevent the
FBI and local police from spying on these organizations, leaking the
names of known members to employers, and on occasion, raiding
meetings on trumped-up pretexts. 2' In August 1960, for example, Philadelphia police raided a Mattachine reading group held in a private house
and detained over eighty persons, including several married couples (all
but two of whom were released without arrest).245 Worse yet was the
New York Police Department's harassment of the New York chapter of
the DOB in 1970 and 1971. According to the chapter's president, Ruth

242. The best example is Virginia, whose ABC law prohibited liquor licensees from allowing
their premises to "become a meeting place or rendezvous for users of narcotics, drunks,
homosexuals, prostitutes, pimps, panderers, gamblers, or habitual law violators," VA. CODE § 437(a)(2)(c) (Michie 1950). In the early 1970s, Virginia's ABC Board sought to close down the Cue
Club, Norfolk's most popular gay bar, because it was a 'congregating place for homosexuals"' and
a situs for "'lewd and disorderly conduct."' Virginia Bar Under Seige Because It Caters to Gays,
ADVOCATE, Nov. 22, 1972, at 14. This ongoing regulatory battle stimulated the formation of the
Tidewater Gay Freedom Movement, the area's first gay rights organization. By the late 1970s, the
ABC Board, under legal and political seige, retreated from its policy. See Fred Parris, Va. Gays Fight
Archaic LiquorLaws, GAY BLADE, June 1978, at 1. The explicitly antihomosexual statute was not
repealed until the 1990s, however.
243. 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (affirming the authority of California's ABC Board to prohibit
explicitly sexual live entertainment or films in licensed establishments).
244. See Cede Ware, Hello and Goodbye to the FBI,GAY BLADE, Apr. 1977, at 12 (reporting
that the police and the FBI were spying on D.C. gay leaders, illegally tapping their phones, and
breaking into their offices).
245. See Dal McIntire, Tangents, ONE, Nov. 1960, at 17.
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Simpson, police intrusions into DOB meetings and harassment of the
group's leaders, including herself, contributed to the group's dissolution.2' No one went to jail, because Simpson and other DOB leaders
had access to lawyers who guided them through the criminal justice
system. Note that police organizational raids operated disproportionately
against lesbians (bar raids operated mostly against gay men).
Notwithstanding police harassment, gay fights organizations
flourished in the 1960s, in part because the Warren Court's precedents
had created a libertarian regime under which the state could not directly
suppress such organizations. After 1960, these organizations grew more
politically militant-insisting that "Gay Is Good" and not just tolerable,
publicly picketing and otherwise protesting antigay policies, and forming
relationships with civil liberties lawyers across the country. New kinds
of gay organizations formed, most notably the Metropolitan Community
Church ("MCC"), a lesbian and gay congregation established in Los
Angeles in 1968 by Reverend Troy Perry.2 47 Insulated from attack by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the implied
right of association, MCC spawned almost 100 sibling congregations in
other cities during the 1970s. Additionally, gay-friendly groups formed
within major religions, including the United Methodist Gay Caucus,
Dignity (Roman Catholics), Evangelicals Concerned, The Friends'
Committee for Gay Concerns as well as the Committee of Friends on
Bisexuality (both Quakers), Integrity (Episcopalians), Unitarian-Universalist Gay Caucus, Lutherans Concerned for Gay People, Presbyterian
Gay Caucus, Congregation Beth Chayim Chadashim and Congregation
Beth Simchat Torah (Jewish congregations founded in Los Angeles, New
York, and Washington, D.C. in the 1970s).248 These groups provided
counseling for gay individuals and couples, places for social and
intellectual events, and programs for issues of coming out, alcoholism,
venereal disease, and sexual harassment.
After Stonewall, hundreds of new organizations formed, most
notably GLF (Gay Activists Alliance) and its successor GAA (the Gay
Liberation Front). These organizations were more radical and militant
than those of the 1960s, including even MSW (Mattachine Society of
Washington). Like MSW, they could not be suppressed and were willing
246. See SIhpsoN, supra note 77, at 122-30. DOB was beset by other problems more serious
than a single police raid, which was most likely the straw that broke the camel's back.
247. See Deb Price, Gay PreacherKnows God CalledHim,S.F. ExAM'R, Mar. 14, 1995, at C7
(offering a brief history of the church's funding and its founder); Advocate Survey-Religion: A
Guide to the SpiritualMainline, ADVOCATE, Oct. 6, 1976, at 18 [hereinafter Advocate Guide] (by
1976, 50 chartered MCC congregations, with 43 affiliates).
248. See Advocate Guide, supra note 247, at 19.
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to go to court to resist police harassment.249 Realizing this,
antihomosexual state officials did not try to destroy or censor these
organizations directly. (An exception was the North American Man-Boy
Love Association, formed in 1977 and harassed by the police.) Rather,
as they had previously done with gay bars, officials often used the
licensing or benefit process as an indirect mechanism of censorship. The
first target was MSW, and the brief struggle between it and the
licensocracy set a pattern frequently replicated in the metropolitan states
during the 1970s and the rural states during the 1980s.
In 1962, MSW registered as an educational organization under
District of Columbia law, so that it could solicit funds. 210 Representative John Dowdy (D-Texas) introduced a bill to revoke MSW's license
to solicit funds in 1962. His rationale was: "The Mattachine Society is
admittedly a group of homosexuals. The acts of these people are banned
under the laws of God, the laws of nature, and are in violation of the
laws of man."' This bill was reintroduced in 1963. The August 1963
hearings before Representative Dowdy's District of Columbia subcommittee were a donnybrook. Kameny openly defied Dowdy, who made a
series of disparaging remarks about "queers" and "fairies." 25 2 Assistant
Corporation Counsel for the District Robert Kneipp and Professor
Monroe Freedman, representing the National Capitol Area Civil Liberties
Union, testified that the Dowdy bill was an unconstitutional burden on
Mattachine's First Amendment rights to speech and association. 3 Still,
the Dowdy bill rolled through the House of Representatives on a 301-81
roll-call vote, although it was politely ignored by the Senate. Later in the
249. See, e.g., Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (denying a motion to dismiss
a lawsuit, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, which asserted that the Fort Worth Police
Department spied on a 1974 Texas Gay Conference and leaked names of the participants to
newspapers).
250. The account that follows is drawn from documents reprinted in MATrACHINE REV., Sept.
1963, at 4-10. See also Johnson, supra note 3, at 57-58.
251. Amending Districtof Columbia CharitableSolicitation Act: Hearings Before Subcomm.
No. 4 of the Comm. on the District of Columbia House of Representatives, 88th Cong. 2 (1964)
(statement of Hon. John Dowdy).
252. Dowdy: "In my part of the country... if you called [a man] a 'queer' or a 'fairy,' a black
eye is the least you could expect..
Id. at 28. Kameny riposted that Texas (Dowdy country) had
plenty of homosexuals. Dowdy: "I haven't heard any of them bragging about it if they are [in
Texas]" Idr
253. Dowdy also demanded a list of Mattachine members, which Kameny refused to disclose,
because they would lose their jobs and suffer other kinds of discrimination if their identities were
known. Freedman supported that position, arguing that under Rumely and NAACP v. Alabama the
subcommittee had no right to a membership list. (For his trouble Professor Freedman was grilled
about his own personal life. Dowdy asked him whether his superiors at George Washington were
aware of his defense of homosexuals. "Not to my knowledge," he replied, "I am sure they will be
shortly." Id.)
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month, the District of Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections
proposed to revoke MSW's license because its officer list contained
pseudonyms, a fact that Kameny had conceded at the Dowdy hearings.
Those proceedings, too, ended inconclusively, but not without further
publicity for MSW, which before 1963 had been resolutely ignored by
the mainstream media. "'By virtue of the energetic efforts of Representative Dowdy... we are now known throughout the informed Washington
community--heterosexual as well as homosexual-and known in the best
possible light,"' bragged Kameny.2
Would a judge in 1963 have agreed with the critics of the Dowdy
bill? An answer is not entirely clear. Even in the early 1970s, judges
were typically unwilling to intervene when administrators interfered with
gay people's efforts to organize. While the First Amendment protected
gay organizing from direct state censorship, it did not necessarily
guarantee gays any affirmative state recognition. For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Secretary of State to disallow
the Greater Cincinnati Gay Society's Articles of Incorporation as against
public policy: "We agree with the Secretary of State that the promotion
of homosexuality as a valid life style is contrary to the public policy of
the state." 5 On the other hand, the previously unsympathetic New
York Court of Appeals ordered its Secretary of State to incorporate GAA
and rejected any public policy objection to incorporating gay organizations 16 States like New York and California were more likely to
accommodate the post-Stonewall rush to organize because the political
equilibrium in those jurisdictions had already shifted toward recognizing
gay power. States like Ohio were still shocked by the post-Stonewall
visibility of gay people. This was even more true in southern, border, and
western states, where gay groups generally did not even petition for state
recognition or incorporation until the 1980s, at which point it was clear
that the state had no legal basis to deny gay groups regular rights
associated with incorporation.'

254. Frank Kameny, Message to the Members of the Mattachine Society of Washington from
the President of the Society on the State of the Society, (Apr. 1964) quoted in Johnson, supra note

3, at 57-58.
255. State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ohio 1974) (per curiam).
256. See Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. 1973).
257. While Mississippi may not be typical even of the South, it reflects the different equilibrium
there. The state balked at giving charters to the Mississippi Gay Alliance ("MGA") and the Friends
of Lesbians/Gays Mississippi, which sought charters in 1984. Upon threat of litigation, the parent
group of the organizations got its charter in July, but the state refused MGA a charter. The reason

given was that MGA was likely to encourage people to violate the state's "crime against nature" law.
The Attorney General finally acquiesced, again only after pressure of a lawsuit that probably would
have been successful, in the summer of 1985. See LAMBDA UPDATE, Winter 1985, at 1.
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In another example, the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc. petitioned the New York courts for approval as a legal assistance
corporation in 1972. Lambda's stated purposes were "'to promote the
availability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and
attracting homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to homosexuals general information concerning their legal rights and obligations;
and to render technical assistance to any legal services corporation or
agency inregard to legal issues affecting homosexuals."'258 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court denied the application on
the grounds that the corporation was "neither benevolent nor charitable,"
as required by law, and that there was no need for the organization. "A
supplemental affidavit does indicate a lack of desire on the part of some
attorneys who work pro bono publico to take the cases of homosexuals,
but this appears to be no more than a matter of taste, and it is not
established that lawyers are completely lacking." '59 A fractured New
York Court of Appeals reversed the decision as "unsupportable" (without
saying why or how) and remanded to the lower court to rethink, in light
of criteria that were left unsaid.2 On remand, the appellate division
grudgingly approved the application, but only after striking one clause
from Lambda's statement of goals: 'to promote legal education among
homosexuals by recruiting and encouraging potential law students who
are homosexuals and by providing
potential assistance to such students
26 1
school.'
law
to
after admission
A similar waffling strategy was adopted by the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). Educational and charitable organizations are entitled to
exemption from federal income tax, and their contributors are entitled to
tax deductions.262 The IRS had granted tax-exempt status to organizations not having "gay" in their names, most prominently the University
Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches described above, and
had been willing to give "gay" groups exemptions if they stipulated that
they did not "promote" homosexuality or if they accepted homosexuality
as a "diseased pathology." Accordingly, the IRS denied tax exempt status
to the Gay Community Services Center of Los Angeles in January 1973.
In an important turnabout and after a series of meetings with gay
representatives, the IRS reversed itself in August of that year, giving
258. In re Thorn Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (App. Div.
1972) (citing Petitioner's Application for Approval as a Legal Assistance Corp.).
259. Id.

260. See In re Thorn, 301 N.E.2d 542, 542 (N.Y. 1973).
261. In re Thorn, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1973).

262. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994) (deduction for contributions to charitable organizations); Id.
§ 501(c)(3) (exemption for charitable organizations).
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exempt status for the first time to an organization with "gay" in its
name.263 Lambda Legal Defense got surprisingly quick approval the
next year, but the IRS then denied exempt status to the Pride Foundation,
a progay educational and legal organization.
The IRS found that the Pride Foundation's "efforts 'toward the
elimination of unjustified and improper discrimination or treatment, or
toward violations of the privacy of adult individuals, are insignificant
when compared to the possible detriment to society,"' specifically,
"'advancing the unqualified and unrestricted promotion of the alleged
normalcy of homosexuality"' which the IRS feared would have the effect
"'in the general prevalence of what is still generally regarded as deviant
sexual behavior."' 26 As legal authority for its position, the agency
cited the Supreme Court's disapproval of "perverted" sexuality in its
obscenity opinions and state sodomy laws against homosexual conduct.
Once such a justification was out in the open, gaylegal representatives
were able to ply the IRS with arguments and information undermining
its premises. Lawyers for the Fund for Human Dignity in New York
worked with the IRS for two years and persuaded the agency to grant
exempt status to gay educational groups, without any disclaimer, in a
September 1977 ruling 65 As constitutional icing on the cake, the D.C.
Circuit held in 1980 that the IRS's old rule violated due process
antivagueness requirements as applied to a feminist journal that favorably
discussed lesbianism 266
Gay religious, educational, and legal organizations were not nearly
so numerous as were gay bars and baths by the end of the 1970s.2 67
Also unlike the bars and baths, their growth was not slowed by police
harassment or state suppression, certainly not by direct censorship, and
probably not by hassles over licensing and certification. IRS's refusal to

263. See IRS Grants Tax Exemption to a 'Gay' Group; a First,ADVOCATE, Sept. 11, 1974, at

24.
264. IRS DeniesExemption to Pride. Calls Activities 'Detrimental',ADVOCATE, Nov. 6, 1974,
at 27. The IRS characterized Pride's dinner-lecture series as a format that "'encourages or facilitates
homosexual practices to a substantial degree,"' and thereby "'readily contribute[s] to increased
personal relationships among homosexual individuals."' Id.

265. See IRS Reverses Policy on Tax Exemptions, ADVOCATE, Oct. 5, 1977, at 11 (describing
IRS policy reversal in September 1977); see also Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (formal rule
embodying new exemption policy for gay educational organizations).
266.

See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

267. One report found about 125 religious organizations-fewer than the number of gay bars
in Los Angeles alone-with a combined membership of more than 20,000, and 110 secular,
nonstudent organizations with a combined membership of 9,873-about the same as that of the
Polish Army Veterans Association of America. See Sasha Gregory-Lewis, A Profile:Gay Organiza-

tions, PartHI,ADVOCATE, Dec. 1, 1976, at 7.
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grant tax exempt status stymied any organization wanting to raise money,
but any organization willing to persevere was able to obtain the
exemption, which was routinely available after 1977. The political and
legal battles over state recognition were symbolic politics by and large:
the state conceded that the First Amendment prevented it from directly
suppressing gay organizations, but believed that the Amendment did not
require the state to apportion its benefits and approved forms to gay
groups on a par with other groups. In short, antihomosexual discourse
shifted from "let's harass gay organizations and expose the names of
members" (the Dowdy approach) to "no promo homo" (no promotion of
homosexuality). 2" The First Amendment contributed to this shift, as
the former was clearly in violation, and the latter an open question.
3. Gay Student Clubs
Before Stonewall, very few homosexual college students were out
of the closet. Only a few colleges had homophile student groups; the
earliest known group was formed at Columbia University by Rita Mae
Brown and others in 1966. After Stonewall, lesbian and gay college
groups grew like weeds in a vacant lot. The main goal of such groups
was to create a gay-friendly community within the university that would
be a center for social as well as educational exchanges. There was little
that college administrations could do to keep students from forming their
own clubs and organizations, except to deny college or university
recognition and funding for the groups. Like other gay organizations that
were denied such equal rights, the student groups found homophile and
ACLU attorneys eager to litigate their cases under the First Amendment's
right of association.
The Supreme Court in 1972 held that students have a First
Amendment associational right to form a Students for a Democratic
Society chapter at a public college or university.269 Although the Court
cautioned that a university has residual power "to assure that the
traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded" and to promulgate
reasonable rules and regulations,2 70 the decision augured against a state
educational institution's refusal to recognize gay student groups. Such
nonrecognition would usually be content-based, a virtually impossible

268. Ironically, at the moment discourse was shifting, former Representative Dowdy was sent
to jail for bribery. Dowdy blamed his troubles on "'homosexuals and urban renewal interests,"' who
were intent on silencing hin. Dowdy Says Gays Behind Conviction, ADVOCATE, May 10, 1972, at
4.
269. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 172, 194 (1972).
270. Id. at 194 n.24.
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regulation to justify under stringent First Amendment standards. For
instance, public universities in the South and Midwest often denied
recognition to gay student groups for openly content-based reasons, and
the groups won recognition in even the most conservative federal
courts.2 7 1

272
The hardest such case, Gay Students Organization v. Bonner,
was also the first federal appellate decision. The University of New
Hampshire recognized its Gay Students Organization ("GSO") in 1973,
but encountered outside political pressure when GSO sponsored a dance
on campus. Bowing to the pressure, the university's board of trustees
banned further social events by GSO, although it did allow the group to
put on a play, which exposed the university to further publicity and
pressure from the governor.2 73 Federal appeals Judge Frank Coffin held
that the university could not censor GSO's activities. So long as the gay
students advocated no illegality, and their literature was not obscene, the
university was required to treat them the same as other student
groups.2 74 Bonner was a remarkably gay-friendly opinion, because it

271. See, e.g., Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (University
of Arkansas at Fayetteville); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.
1984); Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of Students
v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976) (Virginia Commonwealth University); Student Coalition
for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Wood v. Davison,
351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (University of Georgia).
272. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
273. After the play, gay literature was distributed, and that generated even more press. The
Bonner court recounted Governor Meldrim Thomson's response, who
wrote an open letter to the trustees after the play, warning that if they did not "take firm,
fair and positive action to rid your campuses of socially abhorrent activities," he would
"stand solidly against the expenditure of one more cent of taxpayers' money for your
institutions." Dr. Thomas N. Bonner, President of the University, then issued a public
statement condemning the distribution of the homosexual literature and announcing that
a repetition of the behavior would cause him to seek suspension of the GSO as a student
organization.
Id. at 654. This was not an empty threat. A few years later, Florida conditioned university funding
on their refusal to recognize any student organization advocating or encouraging sexual relations
outside of marriage. The Florida Supreme Court struck down the condition in Department of
Education v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982). A recent decision striking down a similar effort by
the Alabama legislature is Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ala.
1996).
274. The court assumed that
a university, so minded, would not be powerless to regulate public petting (heterosexual
or otherwise), drinking in university buildings, or many other noncriminal activities which
those responsible for running the institution rightly or wrongly think necessary "to assure
that the traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded.' Thus, if a university chose to
do so, it might well be able to regulate overt sexual behavior, short of criminal activity,
which may offend the community's sense of propriety, so long as it acts in a fair and
equitable manner.
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not only assured that gay student groups would have breathing room for
their homophile activities, but also because it rejected the "heckler's
veto" argument in the educational setting.275
The principles Judge Coffin articulated in Bonner only applied to
state colleges and universities. Judge Coffin's articulations might,
however, apply more broadly. One case involved a high school prom,
which was forced to allow a gay couple to attend in 1980.276 A more
complex case involved a private university, Georgetown. Lesbian, gay,
and bisexual students formed an informal group at that Roman Catholic
university and its law center in 1977 and petitioned for recognition as a
student club in academic year 1978-79. The organizations' statements of
goals emphasized education and information about homosexuality, policy
and legal issues, and the larger gay community. Georgetown refused to
recognize the groups. "'This situation involves a controversial and
complex matter of faith and moral teachings of the Catholic Church,"'
explained the law center's Dean David McCarthy, and "'official subsidy
of a gay law students organization would be interpreted by many as
endorsement of the positions taken by the gay movement on a full range
of issues."' 2 " Although the First Amendment would have invalidated
a public university's action for such reasons, Georgetown was private and
therefore not governed by the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, the students sued in 1980, pursuant to the District's
Human Rights Act. Originally adopted in 1973 and passed as a home
rule statute in 1977, the Human Rights Act prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation by private employers, public accommodations, and educational institutions, such as Georgetown.27 s Thus it was

Bonner, 509 F.2d at 663 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 n.24 (1972)).
275. See id. at 661-62. "The heckler's veto perverts [the First Amendment] by denying

protection on the theory that expression may so incense listeners that they will harm the speaker."
Brent Hunter Allen, Note, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an
Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1094 (1994).
276. Aaron Fricke petitioned Rhode Island's Cumberland High School to bring a male date,

Paul Guilbert, to the prom. Citing the danger of disruption and even threats to Fricke, the principal
denied the request. Represented by the ACLU, Fricke sued and won. Judge Pettine granted an

injunction, extending Bonner'sdisapproval of the heckler's veto to a high school setting. See Fricke
v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R1I. 1980). For an account of the uneventful prom that followed, see
AARON FRICKE, REFLECONS OF A RocK LOBSTER (1983).

277. Mary Anne McCarthy, Gays Sue GULC Over Charter,GEO. L. WKLY., Mar. 10, 1980, at
1; see also Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d
1, 10-14 (D.C. 1987) (Mack, J.) (recounting the defendant's argument that recognition of gay student
groups might lead to the possible perception of university endorsement).
278. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp 1996). The students relied on

§ 1-2520(1), which prohibits educational institutions from denying or restricting "the use of, or
access to, any of its facilities or services" because of sexual orientation and other discriminatory
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Georgetown, and not the gay students, that relied on the First Amendment-specifically, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause as well as the
Free Speech Clause. Ultimately, the District's Court of Appeals ruled that
Georgetown had to provide equal access and services to the gay groups
but did not have to "recognize" the groups formally.279
The Georgetown case was exceptional, but it reflected the trend:
every legal challenge to university exclusions of gay student groups was
successful, and almost every major university had such a group, even in
the South, where such groups sometimes had to sue the legislatures
threatening to withhold funds from colleges that were prepared to
recognize gay groups. 28" By 1976, there were more than 300 gay
groups on college and university campuses, having between 8,000 and
10,000 members. 281 Although the student groups by the late 1970s
showed little of the barnburning political activism of those in the late
1960s, they were among the most important gay organizations, because
they provided emotional and social support for lesbian and gay youth at
a critical period in their lives, put on valuable educational and social
functions benefiting the larger university and local community of gay
people and some straights, and often served as centers for local reform.
Stanford, Princeton, University of Southern California, and Michigan
adopted university nondiscrimination policies as a result of gay student
petitions. East Lansing and Ann Arbor, Michigan; Yellow Springs, Ohio;
Pullman, Washington; and Chapel Hill, North Carolina adopted gay
rights ordinances in large part because of support from the universities
located in those towns? 2
B. Freedom of the Press
Although no value is more deeply enshrined in the First Amendment
than its protection of a free press, courts throughout this century have
held that the protection does not extend to obscene publications.2 83 But

reasons. For other such laws, see Appendix B.
279. See Gay Rights Coalition,536 A.2d at 5 n.2 (opinion of Mack, J., setting forth the court's
judgment and the alignment of judges).

280. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ala. 1996);
Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982).

281. See Randy Shilts, Gay Campus Movement: Trading Picketsfor Proms, ADVOCATE, Sept.

8,1976, at

6. By 1981, 26% of all colleges and universities had recognized such groups; the figure

was 80% for public colleges and universities. See Recognitionfor Gay Students, ADVOCATE, Nov.
26, 1981, at 10.
282. See Shilts, supra note 281, at 7.
283. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum); see also
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971);
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what makes a publication "obscene"? During the 1950s, many censors,
prosecutors, and judges believed that any favorable mention of homosexuality or description of sex between people of the same sex was obscene.
Allen Ginsberg's poem Howl, celebrating nonconforming and specifically
homoerotic love, was seized by Customs officials on grounds of
obscenity in March 1957.2 4 When the books were released, the San
Francisco police arrested a bookstore owner and his clerk for violation
of the state's law criminalizing the sale of obscenity. The censorship of
Howl reflected the double regulation of allegedly obscene publications:
they could be seized by federal officials, and if they escaped the federal
net state and local police often went after them. 285 At the federal level,
the Customs Office only had jurisdiction to seize obscene publications
arriving from overseas. 286 Domestic mailings fell under the jurisdiction
of the Postal Service, which was also authorized to seize obscene mailings.2 1 Pursuant to these powers, and after two years of close monitoring, the Postal Service seized the October 1954 issue of One, the first
homophile publication circulated in the U.S. mail, believing that a poem,
an ad for a French magazine, and a short story entitled Sappho Remembered, which depicted love between two women, were obscene. The
lower federal courts upheld the Postal Service's position, implying that
any discussion of homosexual love that was not disapproving was obscene. 21 Although the Postal Service seized no other issues of One, it
reportedly kept lists of the people who subscribed to the magazine and
gay pen-pal clubs, opened the mail of people on those lists, and shared
their names with employers. 8 9
Some judges and commentators thought that the broad understanding
of obscenity was unconstitutional. In 1957, Judge Clayton Horn
overturned the San Francisco police seizure of Howl because he thought
the First Amendment protected serious literature, however nonconforming
and randy it might be.290 In the same year, the Supreme Court in Roth
v. United States confirmed that obscene speech is not protected by the

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
284. The legal history is documented in ALLEN GINSBERG, HoWL (Barry Miles ed., 1986).
285. Movies were subject to a third level of censorship: the private Motion Picture Code of
1934 prohibited any depiction of homosexuality or mention of sexual perversion.
286. See The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 4, § 305 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994)).
287. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1463-1464 (1994).
288. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772,777-78 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd,355 U.S. 371 (1958).
289. See D'EMIuo, supranote 3, at 47,214; Robert Gregory, Postal Censorship: Why the Post
Office Has No Thunefor Your Mail, ONE, Aug. 1961, at 5. For a successful prosecution of a gay penpal club, see United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1963).
290. See the account of the Howl case, reprinted in GINSBERG, supra note 284, at 173.
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First Amendment, but narrowed the definition of obscenity to include
only "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest."2'91 Roth opened up a new area for First Amendment litigation
and signaled a constitutional standard of moderate tolerance. Its application to homosexuality was immediately confirmed by the Court's
summary reversal, on authority of Roth, of the lower court opinions
upholding Postal Service censorship of One.2" The implication that
favorable discussion of sexual orientation was constitutionally protected
was revolutionary. The First Amendment directly and importantly
facilitated the development of subcultural literature, erotica, and media.
It also assured that lesbian and gay subcultures would be the subject of
mainstream literature and media attention. On the other hand, the courts
remained suspicious of sexual materials generally (treating these less
favorably than hateful racist or sexist speech) and homosexual materials
in particular (sometimes treating them less favorably than sexist

materials).
1. Lesbian and Gay Literature and Print Media
Roth and One, Inc. v. Olesen did not answer all questions regarding
sexual references in literature. In A Book Named "John Cleland's
2 93 the Court
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General,
invalidated state censorship of Fanny Hill, a ribald eighteenth-century
novel which included episodes of prostitution, same-sex female and male
intercourse, female masturbation, and different-sex flagellation. Justice
William Brennan's plurality opinion refined the Roth test to require that
"(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appealol to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material [be] patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material [be] utterly without redeeming social value." 2' Three other Justices concurred under
approaches more protective of erotic publications.2 95 Three Justices
dissented. Supporting more stringent censorship, dissenting Justice
Thomas Clark relied on an expert opinion that "obscenity, with its
exaggerated and morbid emphasis on sex, particularly abnormal and
perverted practices,... may induce antisocial conduct by the average
291. 354 U.S. 476,487 (1957).
292. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam), rev'g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957).
293. 383 U.S. 413,415-17 (1966).
294. Id. at 418 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
295. See id. at 421 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring in the reversal); id.at 424 (Douglas, J.,

concurring in the judgment).
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person." 296 He invoked J. Edgar Hoover, who "ha[d] repeatedly emphasized that pornography is associated with an overwhelmingly large
number of sex crimes." 2'
Any other result in Memoirs would have been a threat to serious
literature about the variety of sexual experiences. If FannyHill could not
be censored, it seemed probable that other tales of sexually unconventional lives likewise could not be, including the lesbian romances of
Ann Bannon and other authors popular in the 1950s and 1960s. On the
other hand, because Fanny Hill was considered a literary classic and
because its description of same-sex intimacy was more colorful than
anatomically specific, Memoirs did not necessarily forbid censorship of
literature with less literary merit or more explicit sexuality. On the same
day it decided Memoirs, the Court (also in opinions by Justice Brennan)
decided two other cases which confirmed the censors' authority.
At issue in Mishkin v. New York 298 were fifty different paperback
pulps, some depicting what Justice Brennan termed "normal heterosexual
relations, but more depict[ed] such deviations as sado-masochism,
fetishism, and homosexuality," with others depicting "'scenes in which
women were making love to women.""'2 The key issue in the case
involved the meaning of the Roth-Memoirs "prurient appeal" test. The
appellants argued that most of the pulps, especially those depicting
flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism, had little apparent prurient interest
to the average person, yet the Court insisted that they could be censored.
Hence, Justice Brennan refined the prurient appeal test in the following
way:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the
prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest
in sex of the members of that group. 00
The final case decided that day, Ginzburg v. United States,30 ' involved
the censorship of arguably nonobscene material. Finding that it was
created and distributed "entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient
interests," especially those of impressionable adolescents, the Court held
that "in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 452 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
383 U.S. 502 (1966).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 508.
383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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to the 2nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth
' 30
test.
Notwithstanding the analytical ambiguities of Roth as modified by
the Memoirs, Mishkin, and Ginzburg trilogy (themselves later modified
by the Court and interpreted in various ways by state courts), the
obscenity cases created a legally safe space for most lesbian and gay
literature. The Court's per curiam opinion in One, Inc. v. Olesen
insulated informational publications from censorship, even when they
depicted lesbians and gay men favorably. Memoirs protected publications
that could plausibly claim literary or scientific merit. Mishkin could be
distinguished as allowing censorship only when sex was explicitly
described, without any intellectual agenda. Gone were the days when
Customs officials, Postal Service personnel, and local police could simply
decree what would be available to citizens. There was still a fair amount
of censorship, to be sure. For instance, a lower court in New York found
the description of lesbian sex in Flesh Worshippers"sick" and, therefore,
obscene under Mishkin." 3 On the eve of Stonewall, however, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the censorship.
Not only were there substantive obstacles to press regulation, but
more importantly the Supreme Court also took away censors' procedural
advantages. Before the 1960s, censors could seize publications exparte;
the publisher would have to sue for return of the materials, which
gave the state all the advantages of inertia.3" These were precisely the
kinds of prior restraints that the Warren Court disapproved in other
contexts. In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 5 the Court held that seizure
of allegedly obscene materials (including a publication called Sexual
Deviation), based upon an ex parte petition to a magistrate, was
unconstitutional, because under Roth it would have a chilling effect on
the promulgation of protected materials. This prohibition was expanded
to include even informal prior restraints by state actors against allegedly
obscene materials in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.3 Two years later,
the Court extended Bantam's strong presumption against prior restraints
to protect allegedly obscene movies in Freedman v. Maryland."7

302. Id. at 474.
303. See People v. Weingarten, 271 N.Y.S.2d 158,161-62 (Crim. Ct. 1966), aft'd,286 N.Y.S.2d
429 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 254 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1969).
304. See, e.g., Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1945) (ruling on filmmakers'
suit to recover material).
305. 367 U.S. 717, 731-33 (1961).
306. 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963).
307. 380 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1965).
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence contributed to
the decline of the censor and the explosion of lesbian and gay publications. The three homophile publications founded in the 1950s--One,
Mattachine Review, and The Ladder-had no problems with censors
during the 1960s. Testing the limits of censorship, new and more
militantly progay publications were founded in the mid-1960s, including
Philadelphia's Drum and San Francisco's Vector in 1964, Washington,
D.C.'s Homosexual Citizen in 1966, and Los Angeles's The Advocate in
1967208 Along with The Ladder, whose editor Barbara Gittings kept
that publication in the avant-garde of the gay press, these new magazines
explicitly aimed to build lesbian and gay subcultures that would exercise
increased political power. Drum and The Advocate, in particular, also
embraced gayradical prosex values consonant with the "do your own
thing" philosophy of sixties subculture.3" Gay and lesbian sex was
celebrated as a positive human good, not something to be merely
tolerated. These magazines and Vector included explicitly erotic
photographs and advertisements.31 Drum was the first gay journal to
publish frontal male nudity, which earned publisher Clark Polak a federal
indictment for obscenity. As part of a plea agreement in 1969, Polak
agreed to terminate Drum.3 '
Drum's cautionary experience with censorship's still lively sex
negativity was overwhelmed by Stonewall, which unleashed the
counterculture in full force. With postal and other censors at bay, dozens
of lesbian-feminist and gay magazines were founded in the wake of
Stonewall. Many of these new publications were radical, advocating
positions such as lesbian separatism (The Furies), free love (Gay), and
gay political militancy (Gay Power). Community-centered newspapers,
such as The Gay Blade in Washington, D.C., and the Bay Area Reporter
in San Francisco, were established in this period, identifying political
points of contest. These magazines became a forum for debates within

308.

See RODGER STREITMATTER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN PRESS

INAMERICA 58-61, 64-65, 87 (1995). Other less significant journals included Tangent, a spin-off of
Mattachine Review, and CruiseNews and World Report.

309. See id. at 89-95.
310. The most amusing example was TheAdvocate's publication of a Twentieth CenturyAdonis,
an almost nude publicity photo taken of actor Ronald Reagan in 1940 for the film, The Life ofKnute
Rockne. See ADVOCATE, Jan. 1969, at 20.
311. See STREITMATrER, supra note 308, at 112.
312. Among the journals started up in 1969-1972 were COME OUT (1969, N.Y. City); GAY
BLADE (1969, D.C.); GAY POWER (1969, N.Y. City); GAY DEALER (1970, Phila.); GAY SUNSHINE
(1970, S.F.); SIsTERS (1970, S.F.); FocuS (1971, Boston); LAVENDER WoMAN (1971, Chicago);
LESBIAN TIDE (1971, L.A.); AMAZON QUARTERLY (1972, Oakland); FAGGOTRY (1972, N.Y. City);
FuRiEs (1972, D.C.); LESBIANS FIGHT BACK (1972, Phila.); and TRts FEMMES (1972, San Diego).
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lesbian and gay communities, publicized social events, conducted dating
services (the personals), and carried advertisements for openly gay and
gay-friendly businesses. These newspapers helped displace the bars as the
local center of gay subculture. By 1975, there were 300 identifiably gay
or lesbian publications, with a combined circulation estimated at between
200,000 and 350,000 readers.3 13
Serious gay literature flourished like azaleas in April. Writers such
as James Baldwin, Mary Renault, and Christopher Isherwood, who had
written about homosexual themes in the 1950s, wrote rich, nuanced
books exploring sexual variety during the 1960s.3 14 As established
writers and highly independent thinkers, they would have written their
classics regardless of the state of censorship in the United States during
this period, but it is not clear that they would have been able to find
mainstream publishers." 5 John Rechy's stark depiction of sexual
restlessness and hustler anomie in City of Night, published in 1963,
would probably not have been publishable in the 1950s. Audre Lorde's
poetry, lyrical in the 1950s, became more openly autobiographical and
lesbian feminist in the 1960s and 1970s.316 Baby boomers avidly consumed gay and lesbian literature, and some were inspired by that
literature and by feminist work to add their descriptions to the richness
317
of human sexuality.
Most of these writers, Adrienne Rich and Edmund White in
particular, contributed to the deepening of gay intellectual culture, and
also to the divides between lesbian and gay intellectuals. Lesbian intellectuals such as Kate Millett tended to focus more on gender expectations
and the persistence of patriarchy; 318 Rich's essay on "compulsory
heterosexuality" is the classic work of this genre. 319 Lesbian intellectuals contributed important essays criticizing the institution of marriage, the

313. See STEITMATrER, supra note 308, at 185.
314. See JAMES BALDWIN, ANOTHER COuNTRY (1962); CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD, A SINGLE
MAN (1964); MARY RENAULT, THE PERSIAN BOY (1972).
315. For example, Baldwin's classic exfoliation of the closet, Giovanni's Room, published in
1956, was not picked up by Knopf, which had previously published his acclaimed Go Tell It on the
Mountain in 1953. Instead, the book was placed with an unknown, Dial Press, which also published
Another Country. See DAVID LEEmN, JAMES BALDWIN: A BIOGRAPHY 116 (1994).
316. See, e.g., AUDRE LORDE, USES OF THE EROTIC: THE EROTIC AS POWER (1978).
317. Leading authors who published outstanding works in this period include RrrA MAE
BROWN, RuBYFRUIT JUNGLE (1973), ANDREW HOLLERAN, DANCER FROM THE DANCE (1978),
LARRY KRAMER, FAGGOTS (1979), ADRmNNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED
PROSE, 1966-1978 (1979), PATECIA NELL WARREN, THE FRONT RUNNER (1974), and EDMUND
Wm-InE, A Boy's OWN STORY (1982).
318. See KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLmCS 23-39 (1970).

319. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, reprinted in
BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985, at 23 (1986).
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persistence of gender stereotypes, and violence against women. 2 Gay
male intellectuals focused more on individual sexual experience and
evolution."' Although second-level censorship of these works continued in public schools and libraries, first-level censorship disappeared.
The collapse of censorship made it possible for a slew of feminist and
gay publishing houses to emerge after Stonewall revealed and created the
large demand for gay literature.3
The literature produced by these writers was read by lesbian and gay
adolescents trying to come to terms with their sexuality, college students
in literature as well as gay or women's studies courses, and adults of all
sexualities. By 1981, the First Amendment had decisively contributed to
some prominence of gay intellectuals in the public culture.
2. Homoerotica
If censorship of gay literature, magazines, and newspapers was a
lost cause by the 1960s, the same could not be said for gay pornography.3" The average American, and presumably therefore the average
censor, was scandalized more by homoerotic images than by verbal
descriptions of homosexual intimacy. So was the average Supreme Court
Justice. Although the Court's precedents were generally hostile to
homoerotica and local officials were often eager to confiscate it,
censorship only marginally reduced its availability. Many more gay men
consumed pornography than read gay newspapers or novels.
Nonetheless, the Court's first homoerotic image case was a victory
for the publisher of mail-order gay erotica. In Manual Enterprises,Inc.
v. Day,324 the Court held that the Postal Service could not constitutionally refuse mail services for male physique magazines. The
magazines in dispute (MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild Pictorial)
contained photos of seminude male models, sometimes in pairs, usually
posed provocatively. The plurality opinion by Justice John Harlan (author
of the antihomosexual privacy dissent in Poe) assumed correctly that
f

320. See MARILYN R. FARWELL, HETEROSEXUAL PLOTS & LESBIAN NARRATnVES 45-49, 6768
(1996).
321. See CLAUDE J. SuMMERs, GAY FICTIONS: WILDE TO STONEWALL 172-214 (1990)
(discussing Baldwin's Giovanni's Room and Isherwood's A Single Man).

322. Such publishing companies included Alyson Press (Boston, 1980), Feminist Press (New
York, 1970), Firebrand Books (Ithaca, 1984), Gay Sunshine Press (San Francisco, 1977), Naiad Press

(Tallahassee, 1973), and Spinsters, Ink. (Duluth, 1978).
323. I am using the term pornographyto mean erotic pictures or pictures-and-words, but not
words alone. Also note that I advert only to gay (male) pornography. There was little photographic
pornography aimed at lesbians; most images of two women making love were in products marketed
for heterosexuals, as woman-woman lovemaking is highly erotic to many straight men.

324. 370 U.S. 478, 492-94 (1962).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

74

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions

19971

CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

such magazines had a "prurienf' appeal to male homosexuals, but held
them nonobscene because they were not "patently offensive" to
community standards." Although Mishkin made clear that Manual
Enterprisesdid not protect erotica simply because it only appealed to
"deviant" minorities,326 the earlier decision cleared male physique
magazines, which were the main form of gay erotica in the early 1960s
and could be obtained by mail as well as at newsstands. Once a line was
drawn protecting that form of erotica, publishers felt freer to press the
envelope, and they did. The seminude figures allowed in Manual
Enterprises gave way in the early 1960s to nude models, at first posing
alone and then (mid-1960s) in pairs, and then Qate 1960s) to depictions
of men having sex with men, and women with women.
After the Memoirs, Mishkin, and Ginzburg trilogy of 1966, the
Supreme Court decided cases by ad hoe memoranda, affirming or
reversing lower court determinations of obscenity vel non.327 Those
decisions often focused on homoerotica. In Maryland, for example, most
of the published state court obscenity opinions in the late 1960s involved
homoerotic materials. The Maryland courts refused to censor movies and
photographs of nude men or even boys under the authority of Manual
Enterprises, but readily censored depictions of homosexual fellatio,
masturbation, bondage and discipline, and nude pictures accompanied by
"hard core" written commentary under the authority of Mishkin.328 In
its most agonized decision, a divided Maryland Court of Appeals held
that The Boy Lovers was not obscene, because the nude males did not
carry erect penises and the commentary was a serious discussion of
homosexuality.329 The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and
remanded the case in light of a series of obscenity decisions (all authored
by Chief Justice Warren Burger) handed down on June 21, 1973.
In two decisions, the Court sweepingly sustained Congress's power
to prevent the importation of obscene material, and to prevent such

325. See id. at 482. Only one Justice joined Harlan's opinion, however. Four Justices concurred

in the result, two Justices did not participate in the decision, and only Justice Clark dissented.
326. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966).
327. This practice was first initiated in Redrup v. New York 386 U.S. 767 (1967). See also
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 391 U.S. 53
(1968), vacating 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47

(1967), rev'g United States v. 56 Cartons Containing 19,500 Copies of Magazine Entitled Hellenic
Sun, 373 F.2d 635 (4th Cir.).
328. See, e.g., Village Books, Inc. v. State's Attorney, 282 A.2d 126 (Md. 1971), vacatedsub
nom. Village Books, Inc. v. Marshall, 413 U.S. 911 (1973); Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of

Censors, 254 A.2d 203 (Md. 1969); B & A Co. v. State, 330 A.2d 701 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975);
Donnenburg v. State, 232 A.2d 264 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967).
329. See Village Books, 282 A.2d at 134.
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material from entering the stream of commerce.33 ° In three other
decisions, the Court also upheld substantial state regulatory authority. In
ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,331 the Court sustained a civil injunction
against a gay adult theater, solely because of the state interest in order
and morality. In Kaplan v. California,332 the Court upheld a state
obscenity conviction for selling a book that described "[a]lmost every
conceivable variety of sexual contact, homosexual and heterosexual. 333
This decision was the first post-Roth case where the Court upheld an
obscenity conviction for a book on the basis of words alone, without
illustrations (Mishkin involved explicit illustrations accompanying verbal
descriptions). Finally, in Miller v. California, 4 the Court modified the
Roth-Memoirs test by applying the "community standards" prong to
local, rather than national, values and by broadening the "utterly without
redeeming social value" prong to eliminate "utterly."
The key opinion was Miller, whose analytic style echoed the
antihomosexual consequences of its substantive redefinition. Miller and
its companion cases were a direct political response to the growth of
pornography after the Warren Court's procedural and substantive
decisions. 335 An inexorable consequence of the decision was to encourage local crackdowns on gay erotica, which was significantly more likely
to violate Miller's "community standards" test than straight erotica.
Ironically, Chief Justice Burger's opinion insisted on closeting the
deviant features of the case even as his opinion sought to suppress that
form of eroticism. Thus the Chief Justice described the censored
materials vaguely as "pictures of men and women in groups of two or
more engaging in a variety of sexual activities."33 6 The materials were
more accurately described in the state's brief as "depictions of cunni-

330. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
331. 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
332. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
333. Id. at 117.

334. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
335. Dissenting in Miller were four Warren Court stalwarts-Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, and Marshall. The majority consisted of four appointees of President Richard Nixon-Chief
Justice Burger (the author of all the opinions) and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist-and
Justice White, a frequent dissenter from the Warren Court's relatively liberal decisions. The decisions

came a few years after the Report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
(1970), which had demonstrated the growth of the pornography industry. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (same five Justices upholding the convictions of gay pornographers for
the homoerotic brochure advertising an "illustrated" version of the Report). The Commission's

criticism of state obscenity laws as a means for regulating pornography was rejected out of hand by
conservative groups in the 1970s.
336. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
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lingus, sodomy, buggery and other similar sexual acts performed in
'
groups of two or more."337
The opinion aspired to a double closet:
suppression of discourse about sexual deviance as well as the erotica
itself.
The Supreme Court was partly successful, for the decisions
emboldened local censors to go after gay erotica. In the year after the
decisions, police in Texas cracked down on gay adult bookstores, censors
in Los Angeles seized several gay porn films, and a judge in New
Mexico ordered an adult bookstore to cease "'exhibiting or distributing
to anyone any movies or periodicals which portray homosexuality,
including lesbianism, masochism, sadism, or which portray violent crimes
without punishment thereof."'3 38 The new First Amendment test at least
initially chilled bookstores and filmmakers even from carrying informational and nonerotic gay materials such as The Advocate."'
Applying the new standards, the Supreme Court leaned heavily on
antihomosexual animus. For example, the year after Miller, the Court
sustained the convictions of publishers of a homoerotic brochure
publicizing an "illustrated" version of the Report of the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, on the same day that it
unanimously overturned the conviction of a defendant who displayed
Carnal Knowledge, a sexually explicit movie about promiscuous
heterosexuals. 340 In Ward v. Illinois,3 4' the same five-Justice majority
upheld the application of Illinois's obscenity law to two books about
sado-masochism. To refute the charge that the publisher had insufficient
notice that such books were criminally obscene, Justice White's opinion
for the Court relied on three Illinois state court opinions that defined
obscenity in Illinois as anything "abnormal," lumping consensual sadomasochism with both rape and with same-sex intercourse or foreplay.342
337. Brief for Appellee at 26, Miller (No. 70-73) (discussed in Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767,

781 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
338. Adult Bookstore Can't Sell Gay Matter: Judge, ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 1974, at 13; see
Problems Already Starting:Porno ProducersGirdforBattle,ADVOCATE, Aug. 15, 1973, at 11; see
also Dallas Theatres Lose Appeal to U.S. High Court, ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 1974, at 17; 3 Films

"Arrested" at L.A. Theatre, ADVOCATE, Jan. 2, 1974, at 6.
339. See Problems Already Starting: Porno ProducersGirdfor Battle, supra note 338, at 11.
340. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974). Jenkins can be distinguished from Hamling insofar as its nudity was not combined with

ultimate sex acts. On the other hand, the conviction in Hamlingwas for a very short brochure, while
the reversal in Jenkins involved an erotic and highly sexist motion picture.

341. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
342. See id. at 771-72 & nn.3-5 (describing People v. Sikora, 204 N.E.2d 768 (111.1965)
(censoring three stories with homosexual as well as sadomasochistic themes); City of Chicago v.
Geraci, 264 N.E.2d 153 (ill. 1970) (censoring materials with explicit accounts of "lesbianism, and
sadism and masochism"); City of Blue Island v. DeVilbiss, 242 N.E.2d 761 (Ill.
1968) (censoring
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Where the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was squeamishly
antihomosexual, Justice White was forthrightly so, and put booksellers
as well as filmmakers on notice that "lesbianism" and "flagellation" and
"homosexual necking" were potential danger signs of obscenity.
Read together, Miller, Kaplan, and Mishkin not only bristled with
antihomosexual rhetoric or associations and encouraged local authorities
to censor homoerotica, but provided rules that facilitated convictions. The
decisions, for example, allowed states to present homoerotica to
heterosexual juries and exploit their disgust: under Miller prosecutors
could play on juror revulsion against or ignorance of homoerotic material
to prove violation of community standards and insufficient redeeming
social value,343 but under Mishkin defense counsel could not rely on the
material's strangeness to defuse prurient appeal. 3" Following Kaplan,
Texas courts, which have produced more reported decisions on homosex345
ual erotica than all the other states combined in the last generation,
interpreted Mishldn-Millerto allow judges to preservejuror ignorance by
excluding expert testimony on issues of sexual deviation. "[ijt is not
necessary for jurors to have an understanding of deviant group interests;
' 3 46
the pornography speaks for itself.
Miller, Paris Adult Theatre I, and Kaplan enabled southern
jurisdictions to go after homoerotica, but their impact was complicated
by the practicalities of a national marketplace in pornography that had
developed by 1981. Even if Texas prohibited the sale of explicitly
graphic magazines, Texas citizens could still obtain them, either by
traveling outside the state's borders or by simply ordering them through
the mail. 7 The partial deregulation of pornography helped create a
nationwide market that could only be regulated effectively by the federal
government, which for political reasons had lost interest in suppressing
most such material. An exception was child pornography, which triggered
nationwide interest in the late 1970s. After extensive hearings, Congress
and virtually every state enacted special statutes regulating and severely

books containing "homosexual acts" as well as "masochism and sadism")).

343. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-31.
344. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966).
345. See, e.g, T.K.'s Video, Inc. v. State, 871 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Smith v. State,
811 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Video News, Inc. v. State, 790 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990); Parrish v. State, 521 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).

346. Coon v. State, 871 S.W.2d 284, 288-89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); see also T.K. 's Video, Inc.,
871 S.W.2d at 524; Knight v. State, 642 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); cf.Commonwealth
v. McCool, 563 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (mirroring the reasoning of Texas decisions by
excluding expert testimony).
347. See Randy Shilts, Plain Brown Wrappers:Peddling Gay Pornby Mail Is a Million Dollar
Business, ADVOCATE, June 30, 1976, at 16.
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penalizing the production, distribution, or sale of child pornography.348
Twenty states, but not the federal government, regulated child pornography regardless of its obscenity, a practice largely ratified by the Supreme
Court in New York v. Ferber.349 Because a significant fraction of child
pornography is homoerotic and because the only organized adult-minor
sexuality association was the North American Man-Boy Love Association, these developments represented a new frontier in the censorship of
gay erotica.
We need to be cautious about any simple causal relationship
between the First Amendment and the availability of homoerotica. On the
one hand, the Warren Court's liberalization of obscenity law coincided
with an expansion and even an explosion in such materials, and the
Burger Court's retrenchment and antihomosexual reasoning coincided
with more aggressive censorship. On the other hand, the Warren Court's
antihomosexual signals in Mishkin had no discernible effect, and gay
porn continued its upward spiral after a brief period of chill in 1973-74.
The legislative deregulation of sodomy in most urbanized states, the
stingy funding of vice squads in most major cities, the Post Office's
disinclination to enforce its censorship authority aggressively, and the
increasing leisure time for urban gay and bisexual men were all probably
more important to the growth of gay porn than the Supreme Court's
decisions. Compare and contrast the lesbian and gay media during this
period, which developed with much less input from the jurisprudence of
the First Amendment.
3. The Lesbian and Gay Media
The electronic media (movies, radio, television) have been heavily
regulated by the federal government, but it was self-censorship rather
than any federal action that kept homosexuality deeply in the closet
during the 1950s. The private Motion Picture Production Code's
prohibition of any reference to "sex perversion" silenced cinematic
homosexuality, and radio and television stations showed no interest in
tackling the subject. During most of this period, the Supreme Court was
prepared to allow significant federal regulation of the electronic media,
including regulation of nonobscene but sexually indecent speech, but the
regulatory authorities played a small role in the development of lesbian
and gay media. By 1981, homosexuality was out of the closet, usually
depicted stereotypically but increasingly depicted realistically by gay or
348. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1994); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.2
(1982) (isting statutes dealing with child pornography from 47 states).
349. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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gay-friendly artists. Although government regulation played a little role
in this development, its contribution was more positive than negative.
a. Movies

The year 1961 was an ambiguous breakthrough year for media
depiction of gay people. The Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA") decided to rescind the Motion Picture Code's prohibition

against any cinematic reference to homosexuality, in response to pressure
from several important directors who wanted to make gay-themed films
and from critics who pointed out that several movies in the 1950s had,
in effect, already broken the taboo."' The MPAA explained that "'[i]n
keeping with the culture, the mores and the values of our time, homosexuality and other sexual aberrations may now be treated with care,
discretion and restraint."' 31 As a private censorship group, MPAA was

not directly responding to First Amendment jurisprudence, but its action
may have been facilitated by the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1950s
that announced, for the first time, that movies were protected under the
First Amendment.3 52
Apparently, a condition of letting homosexuality out of the celluloid
closet was depicting homosexuals as pathetic victims. Thus, the Motion
Picture Code's seal of approval was immediately given to pending
projects by William Wyler 353 and Otto Preminger,3 54 both of whom
featured suicides by homosexual characters. It was withheld from Basil
Dearden's Victim, a British thriller which sympathetically depicted gay
people. 35 The appropriation of lesbian and gay characters followed this
dreary pattern through the 1960s. Virtually all of the American movies
350. See, e.g., SUDDENLY, LAST SUMMER (Columbia 1959) (although handled quite subtly, the

main character is homosexual); TEA AND SYMPAATHY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1956) (exploring a
school boy's problems with his sexual identity without explicitly mentioning homosexuality).
351. Announcement of the Motion Picture Association of America (Oct. 3, 1961), in VITO
Russo, THE CELLULOID CLOSET: HOMOSEXuALITY IN THE MOVIES 121-22 (rev. ed. 1987). The

MPAA supplemented its October amendment to assure that "'sexual aberration could be suggested
but not actually spelled out."' Id. at 129.
352. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690
(1959); U.S. 684, 690 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (overruling
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)).
353. See THE CHILDREN's HOUR (United Artists 1961) (suicide of a closeted lesbian teacher).
354. See ADvISE AND CONSENT (Columbia 1962) (suicide of a closeted and married gay

character).
355. In VICTIM (Allied Film Makers/Parkway 1961), Melville Farr (portrayed by Dirk Bogarde)
was an eminent, married barrister who developed feelings for a working class youth. Insistent that
he not violate his marriage vows, Farr had a sexless relationship with the youth, until blackmailers
threatened to expose the two. After the youth's suicide, Farr publicly exposed the blackmailers, and
himself, in an effort to seek decriminalization of consensual homosexual intimacy.
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depicted their lesbian and gay characters as sick, predatory, or violent,
and often as all three. 56 Homosexuals typically ended up dead by their
own hands or at the hands of disgusted heterosexuals or, if they were
lesbians, seduced and cured. 7 The abolition of the Production Code
in 1968 reflected Hollywood's shift toward more treatment of sexuality,
including homosexuality, but more was not necessarily better.358
In the 1960s, only movies made abroad were able to depict
homosexual attraction in a realistic manner. British directors Sidney J.
Furie35 9 and Roy Boulting 6 created remarkably deep explorations of
the naturalness of homosexuality and the fragility of bourgeois manhood.
Jean Delannoy's Particular Friendships was a loving depiction of
romance between two boys, scathingly contrasted to the self-loathing of
a priest whose similar feelings were closeted by the repressive
church.3 6' A box office success in the United States, John Schlesinger's
Darlingfeatured an attractive Italian waiter, who was a love interest for
both Julie Christie and her gay photographer buddy. 62 In Persona,by
ngmar Bergman, the relationship between a mute actress and her chatty
nurse was lovingly, sensitively, and ambiguously carried out. 363 Robert
Aldrich's The Killing of Sister Georgewas a tragic depiction of society's
erasure of the distinctive persona of a butch lesbian portrayed by Beryl
Reid-she dared speak the name of her lesbian love and was, literally,
silenced for it2 4
No American movie depicting homosexuals as predators or killers
was censored by the state for violence, obscenity, or group libel, but

356. Homosexual characters often killed either the objects oftheir desires, see THE MAFU CAGE
(Clouds Production 1978) (Carol Kane); REFLECTIONS IN A GOLDEN EYE (Warner Brothers & Seven
Artists 1967) (Marion Brando), innocent third parties, see DEATHTRAP (Warner Brothers 1982)
(Michael Caine and Christopher Reeve); LOOKING FOR MR. GOODBAR (Paramount Pictures 1977)
(Tom Berenger); No WAY TO TREAT A LADY (Paramount 1968) (Rod Steiger), or themselves, see
THE CHILDREN'S HOUR (United Artists 1961) (Shirley MacLaine); THE SERGEANT (Warner Brothers
and Seven Artists 1968) (Rd Steiger). See the excellent discussions in AUDREA WEISS, VAMPIRES
AND VIOLETS: LESBIANS IN FILM (1994), and RUSsO, supra note 351.
357. See, e.g., GOLDFINGER (United Artists 1964) (the sexiest of the James Bond thrillers, in
which Sean Connery seduces the amazon Pussy Galore); Lnzmi (Columbia 1964) (in which Warren
Beatty seduces a mental patient he finds embracing another woman).
358. See generally Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of

Expression Versus the Desireto Sanitize Socieo--FromAnthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 741 (1992) (studying the organized campaigns which sought to restrict sexually
explicit material).
359. See THE LEATHER BOYS (Lion-Garick 1964).
360. See THE FAMILY WAY (Warner Brothers 1966).
361. See PARTiCULAR FRIENDSHIS (Progefi-CCF-Lux 1964).
362. See DARLNG (Embassy 1965).
363. See PERSONA (Svensk Filinindustri 1966) (Liv Ullmann and Bibi Andersson).
364. See THE KILLING OF SISTER GEORGE (Cinerama Releasing Corp. 1968).
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some of the more realistic foreign films were censored. The Killing of
Sister George was found to be in violation of Massachusetts's and
Connecticut's obscenity and film licensing laws, and required editing of
any lesbian sexuality. 65 California courts allowed censorship of Jean
Genet's film Un Chant d'Amour because of its depiction of homosexual
masturbation, sodomy, oral copulation, sadism and masochism, and
voyeurism, all within a dreary prison context.3 6 Because the film went
"far beyond customary limits of candor in offensively depicting certain
unorthodox sexual practices and relationships," the court found it violated
the limits set by Manual Enterprises and One, Inc. v. Olesen and was
similar to the material censored in Mishkin. 67 The Supreme Court
affirmed.
After Stonewall, more gay-affirmative cinema began to develop. The
drying up of censorship had little to do with this development. It was,
rather, occasioned by Hollywood's acknowledgment of a significant gay
and lesbian audience. The first "gay" American movie was a slavish
adaptation of Mart Crowley's play, The Boys in the Band.3 6 Although
the gay male characters were a menagerie of popular stereotypes (the
sissy, the dumb hustler, the acid wit concealing guilt, the tolerant but
shocked heterosexual), the movie also included a well-adjusted gay
couple who displayed obvious physical affection and dramatically
reaffirmed their love at the end. Also, the film gave even the stereotyped
characters human depth and sympathy. Just as Radclyffe Hall's 1929
novel Well of Loneliness was both depressing and liberating for some
lesbians, Boys in the Band was similarly moving for some gay men.
Indeed, it could be viewed as a searing indictment of the closet culture,
for the unhappiness the film documents is, in part, a product of the
outlaw status of gay relationships.
The remainder of the 1970s saw a fair number of movies-the most
interesting of them made in Europe, but permitted in the United69
States-reflecting a gay sensibility, as well as openly gay characters.
365. See Russo, supra note 351, at 173.

366. See Landau v. Fording, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), affd sub nom.
Landau v. Addison Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
367. Id. at 181, 182.
368. See THE BoYs IN THE BAND (Cinema Center/Leo 1970).
369. As examples, consider John Schlesinger's SUNDAY, BLOODY SUNDAY (United Artists
1971), an amazing film and this Author's favorite; Mervyn Nelson's SOME OF MY BEST FRIENDS
ARE ... (American International Pictures 1971); Luchino Visconti's DEATH IN VENICE (Alfa

Cinematografica & Productions et Editions Cinematographiques Francaises 1971); Bob Fosse's
CABARET (Allied Artists 1972), a highly ambivalent adaptation of Christopher Isherwood's THE
BERLIN STORIES (1954); Christopher Larkin's A VERY NATURAL THING (Montage Creations Inc.
1974); Sidney Lumet's sensationalist DOG DAY AFERNOON (WVarner Brothers 1975); George
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Apart from brilliant exceptions such as Bob Fosse's Cabaret,American
movies continued to treat gay characters as sissies or predators. Even as
the evil homosexual was depicted in more complicated roles, homosexuals were coming under increasing public scrutiny. Gay organizations
insisted on more gay-friendly treatment. In 1973, GAA and the National
Gay Task Force ("NGTF") developed a guide for the film industry's
treatment of homosexuality and gay people. 3 0 Gay groups agitated for
gay-friendly depictions and protested stereotypical ones. Three homophobic clunkers released in 1980371 provoked angry protests from gay
organizations such as NGTF and from individuals frustrated with
Hollywooden stereotypes. 37 Although these movies showed how far
moviemakers had to go, they were sensitive to the bad box office the
protests 73threatened. Films in the 1980s grew increasingly gay3

friendly.

b. Radio
The movies' depiction of sexual orientation had little to do with the
law, for the cinema is largely self-regulating and movies remained
antihomosexual even after the law ceased to be. Television and radio, in
contrast, are pervasively regulated by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"). Thus, the legal discourse about the acceptability
of sexual references and characters was centralized within one federal
agency, not the state courts and private associations regulating the movie

Schlatter's amusing NORMAN... IS THAT YOu? (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/George Schlatter
Production 1976); Richard Lester's THE RITZ (,Varner Brothers 1976), a bad adaptation of the much
wittier Terrence McNally play; Wolfgang Petersen's THE CONSEQUENCE (Solaris Film Production
and Westdeutscher Rundfunk 1977); Richard Benner's OUTRAGEOUS (Fil Consortium of Canada,
Inc. & Canadian Film Development Corp. 1977), a terrific forum for female impersonator Craig
Russell, as well as the same director's sensitive HAPPY BIRTHDAY, GEMINI (United Artists 1980);
and the Mariposa Film Group's gay-affirming WORD Is OUT (Mariposa Fil Group 1978), which

was electrifying for many of the lesbians and gay men who saw it.
370. See Some GeneralPrinciplesforMotionPictureand Television TreatmentofHomosexuality, reprintedin THE GAY ALIANAC 200-01 (compiled by the National Museum & Archive, Lesbian

& Gay History, 1996). The overriding theme of the various principles was that movies should not
reinforce popular myths and stereotypes about homosexuality and should, instead, present gay
characters as natural, complex human beings. For example, principle three exhorted censors to "[u]se

the same rules you have for other minorities. If bigots don't get away with it if they hate Catholics,
they can't get away with it if they hate gays. Put another way, the rights and dignity of homosexuals
are not a controversial issue." Id.
371. See Paul Schrader's AMERCAN GIGOLO (Paramount Pictures 1980), William Friedkin's
CRUISING (United Artists 1980), and Gordon Willis's WINOws (United Artists 1980).
372. See Russo, supra note 351, at 239-40.

373. See THE GAY ALIANAC, supra note 370, at 207-08 (positive gay characters), 208-09 (gaythemed screenplays), 209 (films made by gay directors).
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industry. Under the circumstances of the 1960s, centralized regulation did
not seriously impede the development of radio programs targeting the
lesbian and gay subculture and was, therefore, probably a better regime
than decentralized state and local regulation.374
In 1930, KVEP radio in Portland, Oregon was reprimanded by the
Federal Radio Commission for allowing a politician to accuse a newspaper of shielding "sodomites"; the mere mention of homosexuality on the
air was taboo before World War R." That changed after the war,
albeit slowly. The pioneer was the Pacifica Foundation, created in 1946
as an alternative source of information from that provided by corporate
radio. At the instigation of gay activist Randy Wicker, Pacifica's New
York affiliate (WBAI) broadcast Live andLetLive on July 16, 1962. The
program was a discussion of homosexuality by Wicker and seven other
openly gay men-the first time on radio that gay people76were able to
present themselves without any moderator or other filter.
Several weeks later, the program was rebroadcast on KPFA,
Pacifica's Berkeley affiliate, which had previously broadcast readings of
Howl by Allen Ginsberg in 1957; two informative one-hour panel
discussions on The Homosexual in Society in 1958 ;1 7 and readings of
his homophile poetry by Lawrence Ferlinghetti in 1959. Live and Let
Live provoked angry protests and a petition to revoke Pacifica's license
for KFPA and other stations because the program, along with those
previously aired, were "obscene" or "indecent." The FCC in 1962 had
ruled that Roth's narrowing definition of obscenity did not govern FCC
regulation because "broadcast material is available at the flick of a switch
to young and old alike" and is delivered in a medium infused with a
general public interest.3 78 Hence, the FCC could punish a licensee for
"patently offensive" programming. Pacifica defended Live and Let Live

374. There were a few local efforts at censorship-most prominently Cincinnati's indictment
of radio journalist John Zeh (host of a regular show called "Gaydreams") and station WAIF-FM for
a humorous program on lubricants and sex toys, which the prosecutor claimed was "'material
harmful to juveniles."' 'Obscene'RadioShow BringsFelony Charges,ADVOCATE, Apr. 2, 1981, at
10. The Greater Cincinnati Gay Coalition established a legal defense fund, and Zeh's ACLU lawyer
got the charges dismissed. See ChargesAgainst Gay Radio Show Dismissed, ADVOCATE, Oct. 15,
1981, at 10.
375. See OuT INALL DIRECTONs, supra note 201, at 125.
376. See ALWOOD, supra note 63, at 46-47.
377. The program was described in Del Martin, 2-Hour Broadcast on Homophile Problem,
LADDER, Jan. 1959, at 7. A transcript is reprinted in MATrAcHm REV., Aug. 1960, at 9-25.
378. Palmetto Broadcasting Co. (WDKD), 33 F.C.C. 250,258 (1962), affd sub nom. Robinson
v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court ultimately ratified the FCC's power to

regulate indecency, as well as obscenity, on the air. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
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under this standard, arguing that "so long as the program is handled in
good taste, there is no reason why subjects like homosexuality should not
'7
be discussed on the air." 1
The FCC agreed that Pacifica exercised reasonable discretion and
renewed Pacifica's licenses. The Constitution itself countenances no
censorship here, the agency concluded-otherwise "only the wholly
inoffensive, the bland, could gain access to the radio microphone or TV
camera."3 ' The agency also emphasized, however, that Live and Let
Live was a tiny portion of KPFK's overall programming and was
scheduled for late evening (after 10 p.m.), "when the number of children
in the listening audience is at a minimum."' Commissioner Robert E.
Lee, concurring separately, emphasized that he considered Live and Let
Live to be irresponsible broadcast journalism, "nothing but sensationalism." He complained that "a panel of eight homosexuals discussing
their experiences and past history does not approach the treatment of a
delicate subject one could expect from a responsible broadcaster. A
microphone in a bordello, during slack hours, could give us similar
information on a related subject."3"
Pacifica took this FCC ruling as a green light to further gay
programming. KPFA and Pacifica's other affiliated networks in Los
Angeles (KPFK), Houston (KPFT), New York City (WBAI), and
Washington, D.C. (WPFW) ran gay-informative programs throughout the
1960s and eventually adopted regularly scheduled programs in the
1970s.'8 3 Pacifica's primary regulatory problems in the 1970s grew out
of its broadcast of George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue, not
its gay programming."
The feminist and lesbian-feminist movements of the 1960s
stimulated the creation of women's programming as well. Reflecting its
aversion to "vulgar" language, the FCC initiated license revocation
proceedings in the early 1970s against a Seattle station for playing the
song Every Woman Can Be a Lesbian over and over on its show Make
No Mistake About It-It's the Faggot and the Dyke. Although the station
ultimately retained its license, Make No Mistake was dropped. 385 So

379. In re Pacifica Found. (KPFK), 36 F.C.C. 147, 149 (1964).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 152-53 (Lee, Comm'r, concurring).
383. These included KPFA's Fruitpunchin 1973, KPFK's IMRU in 1975, and KPFT's Wilde
'N Stein in 1975. See OuT iNALL DIRECriONS, supra note 201, at 124-25.
384. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC order banning "seven
dirty words" against First Amendment attack).
385. See OuT INALL DmEcnos, supra note 201, at 128.
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long as feminist programs steered away from what the FCC considered
vulgar language, lesbian themes were tolerated. Frieda Werden and
Katherine Davenport produced what seems to have been the first
syndicated multi-part series on homosexuality, What's Normal, in 1975
and sold it to the Longhorn Radio Network in Texas. Washington, D.C.'s
Media Collective produced Sophie's Parlorbeginning in 1972, and after6
38
1977 this show was broadcast over the Pacifica affiliate, WPFW.
Another Pacifica affiliate, Los Angeles's KPFK, ran Lesbian Sisters. The
show's producer, Helen Rosenbluth, recalled how empowering lesbian
programming was-many listeners called the station to say how the
program helped them deal with their sexuality: "'They didn't feel crazy
anymore, like they were the only ones. The power of radio is
,387
amazing."
Perhaps even more important were organized gay efforts to persuade
private as well as public regulators to support more accurate depiction of
homosexuality and gay people. NGTF and two gay media organizations
petitioned the National Association of Broadcasters to revise its television
as well as radio codes to discourage antihomosexual slurs and defamations. 318 The Association declined to amend its radio and television
codes but maintained that existing code provisions protected against
homophobic slurs and defamations and that gay people were welcome to
file complaints with the respective boards. 9 Gays also pressed the
FCC to require its radio licensees to be more sensitive to the needs of
gay groups. After the agency adopted a "community ascertainment"
checklist of groups that licensees were supposed to consult (racial
minorities and women, for example), NGTF and 143 local organizations
in forty-nine states petitioned the FCC to include gay groups. 9 °
c.

Television

Television programmers in the 1960s were less willing to deal with
issues of homosexuality than their counterparts in radio. Hence, issues of
access rather than censorship were most prominent, for television, like

386. See id.
387. Id. at 129.
388. The codes provided: "'Special sensitivity is necessary in the use of material relating to sex,

sexual orientation, race, color, creed, religious functionaries or rites, or national or ethnic
derivation."' NGTF proposed to add "sexual orientation" after "sex." "CodeIsAdequate" T Radio
Boards Reject Bias Ban, ADVOCATE, Aug. 14, 1974, at 20. NGTF also proposed affirmative steps
to hire openly lesbian and gay reporters, to let gay people speak for themselves rather than through
ignorant filters, to cover gay events, and to add gay programs. See Id.
389. See id.
390. See Gay Leaders Go to FCC, ADVOCATE, Sept. 21, 1977, at 13.
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radio, offered gay people opportunities to present their perspectives
directly to America. The first television program dealing with gay issues
to reach a nationwide audience was The Rejected on September 9, 1961,
a public television program produced by KQED in San Francisco and
carried by forty other stations."' Freelance producers John Rearvis and
Irving Saraf set up the program to debunk gay stereotypes by presenting
expert testimony (anthropologist Margaret Mead and psychiatrist Karl
Bowman) and compelling interviews with openly gay men themselves
(members of the Mattachine Society).
In striking contrast to this informative show was the first major
network documentary, The Homosexuals, broadcast on CBS in 1967.'1
What started as a sympathetic examination gradually evolved into a
mishmash of disconnected interviews with openly gay men (women were
never interviewed on these shows), homophobic psychiatrists Irving
Bieber and Charles Socarides, and a closeted gay man whose face was
obscured by a potted plant and who opined that he was emotionally sick.
Commentator Mike Wallace proclaimed the "average homosexual" to be
"promiscuous" and essentially incapable of committed relationships.3 93
The program, combining determined ignorance with confused stereotypes,
was a giant step back from the friendly viewpoint of The Rejected.
The networks were timid about presenting issues of sexual
orientation because they were big businesses which depended on
sensitive corporate advertisers, not because they feared the FCC. What
is more remarkable is the success with which the networks' news
divisions kept homosexuals in the closet-ignoring homophile picketing
of various U.S. government agencies from 1965 to 1968, the Stonewall
riots of 1969, and the Lesbian Nation movement during the early 1970s.
Apart from an episode of ABC's N.YP.D. in 1967 and a Phil Donahue
program on lesbians in 1968, television programs in the 1960s eschewed
gay and lesbian characters or situations.
Stonewall's in-your-face activism shook the networks' complacency,
as gay people demanded both visibility and fair treatment. In 1972 and
1973, Mark Segal, a "Gay Raider," protested network distortion of the
gay experience by "zapping" (disrupting) the 11:00 news of a Philadelphia ABC affiliate, NBC's Tonight Show and Today Show, and The CBS

391. The Rejected and reactions to it are described in TV Critics Praise 'Rejected, LADDER,
Oct. 1961, at 17; CallingShots: KQED(9) to Show The Rejected, MATTACONE REV., Sept. 1961,
at 2, 12-13, 15; and ALWOOD, supra note 63, at 41-42.
392. See ALWOOD, supra note 63, at 69-74.
393. See id. at 73.
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Evening News with Walter Cronkite.3 Cronkite was unfazed by
Segal's entrance and even spoke with the young man during his trial for
trespassing on CBS property. Segal persuaded Cronkite that CBS had
distorted coverage of gay issues, and on May 6, 1974, Cronkite devoted
a considerable segment of the evening news to a report on gay rights
ordinances adopted in various cities.395
More important in the long run was Loretta Lotman's establishment
in 1973 of an organization that would ultimately be called Gay Media
Action, which monitored television programs and protested antigay
stereotyping.3 96 Lotman's first success was to mobilize a national
grassroots campaign for affiliates to cancel a homophobic episode of
ABC's Marcus Welby, M.D. Although the show aired as scheduled, on
October 8, 1974, most of the sponsors withdrew their ads, and seventeen
ABC affiliates decided not to carry the episode. Gay Media Action and
the NGTF continued to apply similar pressure on the networks, and in
1975 Lotman addressed the National Association of Television Program
Executives, urging them to treat gay characters more realistically. Slowly
during the 1970s, the balance shifted, from occasional shows which
bashed (Marcus Welby in 1974) or sympathized with (That Certain
Summer in 1972) gay characters, to those which had recurring gay
characters on several shows (Alice, BarneyMiller, and The Nancy Walker
Show), to NBC's announcement in 1981 that Tony Randall would star in
Love, Sydney, a comedy based on a play about a gay man who becomes
a surrogate father to a child whose abortion he prevents. 3"
Most important, gay rights advocates finally began to make progress
in challenging distorted treatment of gay issues. The Media Access
Project in Washington, D.C., for example, persuaded the FCC to apply
its fairness doctrine to sustain a complaint by the Dallas Gay Political
Caucus to require WFAA-TV to provide equal time for gays to respond
to antihomosexual invective in a show featuring evangelical James
Robinson.398 The most important test case did not involve the FCC,
however. It dealt with a show aired by CBS in 1980, Gay Power, Gay
Politics.3 Although ostensibly about a neutral subject, the attempts to
increase gay political power, the show was alarmist and graphically
suggested that gay power meant S&M and sexual kink as a way of life.
394. See id.
at 143-47.
395. See id. at 145-47.
396. See id.at 147-54.
397. See id. at 195. In response to protest from Clean Up TV and the Coalition for Better
Television, both traditionalist advocacy groups, NBC completely closeted Sidney's sexuality. See id.
398. See FCC Denies Appeal byAntigay Preacher,ADVOCATE, Apr. 16, 1981, at 9.
399. See ALwOOD, supra note 63, at 184-91.
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Gay reporter Randy Alfred documented forty-four examples of serious
distortion or misrepresentation as the basis for a complaint filed with the
National News Council. CBS denied all but one example, where the
producers deliberately spliced different segments of a recorded event to
suggest wild applause for an apology delivered by San Francisco Mayor
Diane Feinstein for antigay remarks. This made the gays in the audience
appear to gloat over the apology, when the applause was actually in
response to Feinstein's condemnation of antigay violence. The Council
voted nine to two that most of Alfred's allegations were true. On October
21, 1980, CBS reported the rebuke it had received and acknowledged
that it had violated its own standards with the applause splicing.
C. Freedom of Speech (The Right to Come Out)
As the media cases reflect, the easiest First Amendment right for
lesbians and gays to assert during the period 1961 to 1981 was the right
to express themselves through public speech. That was the lesson of One,
Inc. v. Olesen, in which the Supreme Court refused to allow the Postal
Service to censor a homophile journal for including gay-sympathetic articles, and of Pacifica Foundation, in which the FCC refused to censor
KFPA for airing a discussion of homosexuality by homosexuals themselves. The insight implicit in those rulings was that, for gays and
lesbians, identity speech ("I am gay") was both personal and political.
Conversely, the most difficult First Amendment issue for the same
period was the right of a public servant to speak about gay rights and
issues of sexual orientation or to come out of the closet professionally.
These were hard cases because American law's libertarian baselines make
it much harder for the state to deprive citizens of free speech than to
condition state benefits, such as employment, on citizen restraint. In the
gay speech cases, this distinction linked up with the idea of the closet;
even if the state could not hunt down and imprison homosexuals, it could
discourage them from becoming open about their sexuality by denying
them employment if they were too far "out."
The First Amendment applies to any state actor, including the state
as employer, and the Warren Court recognized that public employees
enjoy substantial protection for their public speech. O'° In Pickering v.
Board of Education,40i the Court held that a high school teacher could

400. See, for example, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,480-81,490 (1960), which invalidated
a state statute that required teachers, as a condition of employment, to file an affidavit listing every
organization to which he or she belonged or contributed to within the preceding five years.
401. 391 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1968).
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not be dismissed simply because he made erroneous statements while
criticizing the school board's handling of a local bond issue. Because
there was no showing that the statements undermined the teacher's effectiveness or the operation of the schools generally, Justice Thurgood
Marshall's opinion found no legitimate state interest that could justify
penalizing the teacher for speaking on issues of public concern. Robinson
v. California,4°2 which held that the state could not criminalize the
status of being a drug addict, read together with Pickering, created an
analytical basis for the personal right of individuals not to be penalized
by the state for coming out of the closet as gay people. Robinson
protected the expression of their status, and Pickeringsuggested that such
speech was protected if it were of public concern. Most judges did not
read the cases in this manner, however. The member of the armed forces,
the public school teacher, and even the university librarian who stated his
or her homosexuality received scant First Amendment protection. (Recall
the obscenity cases.)
In one case, James M. McConnell accepted a librarian position with
the University of Minnesota in May 1970. The Board of Regents voted
to withdraw that offer, in light of media publicity accompanying his
application to marry another man, Jack Baker. Already suing the clerk of
the Hennepin County Court for refusing him a marriage license, McConnell then sued the Regents for refusing him the job and lost both
lawsuits. °3 In the employment litigation, the federal court characterized
McConnell as seeking "the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded
homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of this socially
repugnant concept upon his employer."' '
Analytically, the court
transformed McConnell's identity speech claim into activist conduct,
unprotected by Pickeing. The court also transformed McConnell's
libertarianclaim (the state cannot penalize me) into an antilibertarian
claim (the state must implement my unconventional ideas), a claim with
which the First Amendment had no concern. These rhetorical transpositions were typical in First Amendment cases involving public employment.
Even odder was the case of Joseph Acanfora, III. When he was a
student at Pennsylvania State University, Acanfora joined the Homophiles

402. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
403. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 194 (8th Cir. 1971) (employment litigation),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.V.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
404. McConnell,451 F.2d at 196.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

90

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
19971

CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

of Penn State, an organization founded to develop public understanding
about homosexuality. Upon graduation, the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Education held up his certification as a teacher because of that membership. Meanwhile, Acanfora was hired as a junior high school teacher in
Montgomery County, Maryland. When Pennsylvania "outed" Acanfora
at a public press conference, to announce that the state would certify him
as a teacher, Montgomery County transferred him away from contact
with students. Acanfora sued, and lost.04 ° The trial judge found no
evidence that Acanfora's sexual orientation affected his teaching
effectiveness, but faulted him instead for granting press and television
interviews after his transfer.4 6 This "sensationalism" went beyond the
"bounds of propriety which.., must govern the behavior of any
teacher" and rendered his transfer nonarbitrary.0 7 Having been outed
by state officials in Pennsylvania, Acanfora lost because he engaged in
too much expression. This holding was in tension with Picketing,and on
appeal the Fourth Circuit so held.04 8 But the appeals court affirmed the
lower court on the ground that Acanfora had withheld material information--his homosexuality-from his original teaching application and,
hence, could be disciplined for engaging in too little speech.40 9 This
holding was in tension with Shelton v. Tucker,410 which protected
teachers against being required to disclose their organizational activities.
Acanfora's case illustrates the limited reach of the First Amendment.
It clearly protected his rights to join homophile political organizations,
but did not prevent the state from penalizing him from such activities,
either by denying him a teacher's certificate or a job teaching minors.
The case also reveals the instability of the closet. For homosexuals and
moderate lawyers in the 1950s (such as ALI and ACLU members), the
closet was mutually protective: so long as they were not seen or heard,
homosexuals were to have private spaces free from police harassment.
The mutually protective closet was always unstable, however, because
eventually a state or private actor was going to pry open the door and
push some denizens of the closet out. Moreover, other denizens came to
recognize the closet as a masquerade that not only compromised their
personal integrity, but also created the political conditions which made
witchhunts and selective prosecution possible. By the 1960s a band of
405. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), a'd,491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir. 1974).
406. See id. at 845-46, 856-57.
407. Id. at 857.
408. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 1974).
409. See id. at 499.
410. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

91

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:817

openly gay people rejected the closet, and during the 1970s masses of
lesbians and gays came out of the closet. The media and the state were
pushing or pulling people out of the closet as well. Joseph Acanfora was
halfway out of that closet in 1972; Pennsylvania, Montgomery County,
the media, and the Fourth Circuit completed that job by pulling him the
rest of the way out within the next two years.
The state had several choices in such situations. In the 1960s, it
fostered an expanded closet. Gay people were increasingly allowed to
freely engage in consensual sex in their homes, socialize within their bars
and clubs, and create their own subculture; they were not encouraged to
participate in the mainstream public culture, however. This represented
political progress for gays, from a Dred Scott regime where the
homosexual was presumptively an outlaw, to a Plessy regime of
"separate but equal" rights. But this was a friendlier apartheid than that
of Plessy for one reason: gay people could choose the form of their
segregation-physical segregation for openly gay people versus
emotional segregation for those who chose the closet. As the 1970s wore
on, the state increasingly acquiesced to a post-closet regime, where
openly gay people could participate in the public culture. The First
Amendment played little role in this transition, but the transition affected
First Amendment doctrine, pressing Pickeringtoward greater protection
for gay public employers or employees advocating gay-friendly
ideas.1
The judicial opinion that best reflected this transition was Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.41 1 Several

individuals, the Society for Individual Rights, and the Gay Law Students
Association sued Pacific Telephone & Telegraph for alleged harassment
and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The California
Supreme Court found their lawsuit actionable on either constitutional or
statutory grounds. As to the latter, the court applied the state labor code,
which prohibited workplace discrimination on the basis of "'political
activities or affiliations.""'13 The court found that "the struggle of the

411. As an example, Richard Aumiller, an admitted homosexual, granted three interviews
expressing his views on homosexuality to a local newspaper. The United States District Court in

Delaware upheld his First Amendment claims and reinstated him to his former teaching position at
the University of Delaware, primarily by using a strict reading of Pickering. See Aumiller v.

University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977); see also National Gay Task Force v.
Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S.

903 (1985) (striking down Oklahoma law prohibiting school teachers from advocating or
encouraging "homosexual activity," as inconsistent with "core" First Amendment principles).
412. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
413. Id. at 610 (quoting § 1101(b) of California's Labor Code).
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homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in the field of
employment, must be recognized as a political activity.' ' 14 The court
continued:
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling
that homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual worker must
conceal from his employer and his fellow workers. Consequently one
important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual individuals to "come out of the closet," acknowledge their sexual
preferences, and to associate with others in working for equal

rights.415

This reasoning was remarkable, for it explicitly linked identity speech
with political activism, which was the whole point of gay liberation's
invocation for gay people to come out of the closet. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph also illustrates how the libertarian model of gay rights was
giving way to an egalitarian model. Once openly gay people became too
numerous and too respectable to lock up, the state not only came to
tolerate their liberty but was pressed to treat them with equal dignity as
heterosexuals.
Ill.

ALLOWING OPENLY GAY PEOPLE SPACE IN PUBLIC CULTURE:

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

Acanfora and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph illustrated the
philosophical incompleteness of arguments based on privacy, procedural
due process, and freedom of association. Until openly lesbian, gay,
transgendered, and bisexual persons were understood to be equal citizens
who could not be discriminated against because of their sexual orientation, their private and subcultural spaces would remain vulnerable.
This theme was sounded early on by Dr. Franklin Kameny, the
founder of MSW. In June 1962, Kameny wrote to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy for the purpose of introducing himself and the society:
We feel that, for the 15,000,000 American homosexuals, we are
in much the same position as the NAACP is in for the Negro, except
for the minor difference that the Negro is fighting official prejudice and
discrimination at the state and local level, whereas we are fighting
official prejudice and discriminatory policy and practice, as ill-founded,
as unreasonable, as unrealistic, and as harmful to society and to the
nation, at the Federal level. Both are fighting personal prejudice at all
levels. For these reasons, and because we are trying to improve the

414. Id.
415. Id.
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position of a large group of citizens presently relegated to second-class
citizenship in many respects, we should have, if anything, the assistance
of the Federal government, and not its opposition. 6
In August 1962, MSW made similar points in a press release which it
circulated to the media, members of Congress, and other government
officials. The release argued that "it is time that a strong initiative be
taken to obtain for the homosexual minority--a minority in no way
different, as such, from other of our national minority groups-the same
rights, provided in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence,
as are guaranteed to all citizens." 4"7
Kameny was not alone in these views. The First National Planning
Conference of Homophile Organizations, held in Kansas City on
February 19-20, 1966, adopted the following resolution:
Homosexual American citizens should have precise equality with
all other citizens before the law and are entitled to social and economic
equality of opportunity.
Each homosexual should be judged as an individual on his
qualifications for Federal and all other employment.
Homosexual American citizens have the same duty and the same
right to serve with the armed forces as do all other citizens; homosexuality should not be a bar to military service....
For too long, homosexuals have been deprived of these rights on
the basis of cultural prejudice, myth, folklore, and superstition....
...It is time that the American public re-examine its attitudes
and its laws concerning the homosexual.18
This homophile agenda was a pipe dream in 1966, yet fifteen years later
it stood substantially achieved-usually through legislation, executive
order, or judicial decisions that applied substantive due process concepts.
These advances not only reflected gay political power but helped create
its political dopplegdnger: a family values coalition of religious
fundamentalists, antihomosexual citizens, and traditionalist parents.

416. Letter from Dr. Franklin E. Kameny, President, the Mattachine Society of Washington,
D.C., to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States I (June 28, 1962) (on file with
the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6,Serial No. 88). Earlier expressions
of this egalitarian view are in DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A

SUBjECTvE APPROACH (1951).
417. News Release from the Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. I(Aug. 28, 1962) (on file
with the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 90X).
418. US. Homophile Movem ent GainsNationalStrength, LADDER, Apr. 1966, at 4. Fifteen gay
organizations signed onto this statement, including six Mattachine groups, three chapters of DOB,
SIR, CRH, and One, Inc.
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A.

Employment Exclusions

In addition to personal privacy and access to the gay subculture,
equal gay citizenship depended most upon assurances that homosexuality
would not be the basis for losing one's job. In 1961, virtually all state
and federal government agencies discriminated against employees thought
to be gay or lesbian, a discrimination aped by the private sector.4 9 The
first target for gay equality claims was, therefore, government employment discrimination. Outside of the armed forces and southern states, that
goal was substantially advanced by 1981. Surprisingly, many urban
jurisdictions also adopted laws affirmatively protecting against sexual
orientation discrimination in the private sector.
1. Federal Civil Service Exclusions: Collapse
The formation of MSW was the direct result of the federal civil
service's exclusion of homosexuals. Dr. Kameny's chosen career had
been as an astronomer with the Army Map Service, but he had been
cashiered in 1957 as a result of an arrest for lewdness the year before.
He not only lost his government job, but also any prospect of employment in the private sector because security clearances were also closed
to those guilty of "sexual perversion. '
Shocked and then angered,
Kameny sued. Initially, his challenge deemphasized homosexuality and
stressed neutral criteria and asserted procedural violations; the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected these arguments in
1960.421 Writing his own petition for review by the Supreme Court,
Kameny emphasized egalitarian arguments and asserted that the civil
service's action and allied federal policies reduced homosexuals like
himself to second-class citizenship.4z2 Discrimination based upon
homosexual orientation was "no less illegal and no less odious than
discrimination based upon religious or racial grounds."' 3 The Supreme

419. For background, see Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1738 (1969).
420. Pursuant to an executive order issued in 1960, federal security clearances were required
for federal and private employees dealing with secret or sensitive information. See Exec. Order No.
10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959-1963). As implemented, security clearances were to be denied when
there was evidence of "criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful
conduct,... or sexual perversion." 32 C.F.R. § 155.3-2(p) (1966). For background, see Note,
Security Clearancesfor Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973).
421. See Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
422. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (No. 676).
423. Id. at 56.
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Court denied the petition without comment in 1961,424 and Kameny
founded MSW shortly thereafter.
The central goal of MSW was to end federal employment discrimination in the civil service, the armed forces, and in grants of security
clearances. Following Kameny's Supreme Court petition, MSW's
position was egalitarian as well as libertarian. "Discrimination against the
homosexual is based upon the same kind of prejudice, misinformation,
ignorance, and erroneous stereotyping as is discrimination against other
'
minorities, and is therefore equally invalid."4A2
In 1962, the Civil
Service Commission ("CSC") refused either to meet with MSW or to
provide a justification for its policy, and Kameny's tiny, ragtag band of
homosexual activists and lawyers mounted a full-court press against the
policy. Kameny's strategy was a nice synthesis of the developing right
to privacy and the ultimate goal of equality. At the retail level, MSW and
the East Coast Homophile Organizations prepared a mimeo sheet on How
to Handle a FederalInterrogationby FBI agents, military investigators,
or civil service questioners.426 The main advice was to offer no
cooperation:
If you are asked any questions at all on homosexuality, in any
aspect, your ONLY answers should be: "These are matters which are
of no proper concern to the Government of the United States under any
circumstances whatever," and "This is information which the
Government does not have the need to know." 7
The final advice was to contest, 'first administratively, and then in
the courts, as high as need be, all firings, less-than-fully honorable
discharges, and security clearance denials based upon homosexuality. To
the fullest extent possible, challenge not the mere allegations of fact, but
the policies, laws, and regulations involved."428 The sheet urged

424. See Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
425. Memorandum from the Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C., Discrimination Against
the Employment of Homosexuals, to the D.C. Advisory Comm. of the United States Civil Rights
Comm'n, Sub-Comm. on Employment 7 (Feb. 28, 1963) (on file with the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 101).
426. See MATTACHINE SOC'Y OF WASH., D.C. AND EAST CoAsr HOMOPHILE ORGS., HOW TO
HANDLE A FEDERAL INVFTGATION (1963) (on file with the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320
(Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 117).
427. Id. 3. The instructions continued to state that "[oin matters having in any way to do with
homosexuality, say NOTHING; 'nothing' means NO thing; and 'no' means NONE AT ALL, with
NO exceptions." Id. 7.
428. Id. 11.
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homosexuals to get coaching and advice from MSW, the Mattachine
Society of
New York, the New York DOB, and Philadelphia's Janus
429
Society.
Like other civil rights groups which were Kameny's model, MSW
organized public protests of the federal exclusion policies. In April 1965,
seven men and three women picketed the White House to protest the
government's sexual orientation exclusions. In June, twenty-five welldressed homophiles, seventeen men and eight women, picketed the CSC.
In August, twelve picketers marched in front of the State Department. On
October 23, thirty-five to forty-five picketers protested in front of the
White House.4 30 At the conclusion of the protest, Kameny presented a
letter to the President, signed by Mattachine groups in Chicago, Florida,
New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., objecting to
discrimination in federal employment, military service, and security
clearances. The message was summed up by a couple of placards:
"Private Sexual Conduct Is Irrelevant to Federal Employment" and
"Denial of Equality of Opportunity is Immoral. 4 3' All of the demonstrations were elaborately written up and photographed by FBI observers
and substantially ignored by the print media.
Consistent with its advice sheet, MSW also supported lawsuits
against the government.432 MSW secretary Bruce Scott and his ACLUallied lawyer won a landmark victory in Scott v. Macy.433 In 1962, the
CSC disqualified him for employment because of "immoral conduct,"
namely, his disorderly conduct arrests in 1947 and 1951. Ruling on
Scott's due process challenge, Chief Judge David Bazelon voted to
remand the case to the district court, with instructions to enter summary
judgment for Scott. 34 "The Commission must at least specify the
conduct it finds 'immoral' and state why that conduct related to
'occupational competence or fitness,' especially since the Commission's

429. See id. 3.
430. See D'EMhLIO, supra note 3, at 165 & n.35; OUT IN ALL DIRECTIONS, supra note 201, at
209; Homosexuals Picket in Nation's Capital,LADDER, July-Aug. 1965, at 23.
431. ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS

1945-1990, at 122 (1992); Memorandum by the FBI, East Coast Homophile Organization
Demonstration in Front of White House, October 23, 1965 (Oct. 25, 1965) (on file with the FBI,

FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 7, Serial No. 131).
432. The first successful lawsuit was Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
granted,376 U.S. 904 (1964). Dew's dismissal as an air traffic controller for homosexual acts at age
eighteen was upheld by the D.C. Circuit, but after the Supreme Court granted certiorari the
government agreed to reinstate Dew. Married with children, Dew maintained throughout the litigation
that he was heterosexual in orientation.
433. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

434. See id. at 185.
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action involved the gravest consequences.*4 35 Faced with this rebuke,

the CSC again tried to disqualify Scott for a separate reason, his "failure
to respond to the question as to whether or not [he had] ever engaged in
homosexual acts," as required by regulation.436 On appeal to the circuit
court yet again, Chief Judge Bazelon showed that he could play the
procedure game as well, rejecting this attempt on the grounds that4 3Scott
7
had not been given sufficient notice of the dismissal by the CSC.

In response to Mattachine pressure and the first Scott decision, the
CSC finally met with MSW in September 1965.438 At the request of
the CSC, MSW submitted in December several memoranda developed by
MSW and the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union to demonstrate
the irrationality of that policy. In a letter dated February 23, 1966, the
CSC explained, for the first time in public, the precise rationale for its
policy. (The letter is Appendix B to this Article.) Contrary to its position
in 1963, that homosexuals were not suitable for federal employment,
Chairman John Macy claimed that the CSC did not exclude "homosexuals" per se--only people who engaged in "overt" homosexual "conduct"
which became public through an arrest or general knowledge. So long as
the homosexual does not "publicly proclaim that he engages in homosexual conduct" or "prefers such relationships," Macy suggested he could
serve and the CSC would not pry. But once the word is out, the CSC
must consider the "revulsion" of coworkers and "offense to members of
the public." In short, public mores (i.e., office morale and the
government's prestige with the public) served as a heckler's veto against
employment of openly homosexual individuals.
What Macy was offering was the mutually protective closet,
whereby the homosexual could serve, so long as he or she were not
openly gay. This early version of "don't ask, don't tell" was unacceptable
to the new homophile leaders like Kameny. Public mores could not
support state discrimination against people of color or Jews, as a
normative matter. Why should they be enough to justify antigay
435. Id. at 184-85 (footnotes omitted). Chief Judge Bazelon wrote only for himself-4there was

no majority opinion. Judge Carl McGowan voted to overturn the government's action "solely for
what seem[ed] to [him] to be the inadequacies, in terms of procedural fairness, of the notice given
to appellant of the specific elements constituting the 'immoral conduct' relied upon as disqualifying
him for all federal employment." Id. at 185 (concurring opinion). Judge, soon to be Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, Warren Burger dissented.
436. Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 645 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Recall that this kind of argument
was the Fourth Circuit's reason for upholding Montgomery County's discrimination against Joseph
Acanfora. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1974).
437. See Scott, 402 F.2d at 648-49.
438. The meeting is described in Franklin E. Kameny, U.S. Government Hides Behind Immoral
Mores, LADDER, June 1966, at 17.
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discrimination? Surprisingly, it was no longer acceptable to some judges.
On the eve of Stonewall, Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the CSC's
compromise in Norton v. Macy.439 In 1963, Clifford Norton, a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration budget analyst, was interrogated
but not arrested by the Morals Squad of the D.C. police for picking up
a man in cruisy Lafayette Park. Failing to follow MSW's unimpeachable
advice (say NOTHING), Norton coughed up his orientation, as well as
his employer, which promptly discharged him for "immoral conduct." On
appeal to the D.C. Circuit, Chief Judge Bazelon subjected the CSC's
policy to withering scrutiny. There was no evidence that Norton's
midnight incident undermined his ability to do his technical, numbercrunching job; no coworkers or citizens had complained. In light of
Kinsey's findings that at least thirty-seven percent of American men have
at least one homosexual encounter in their lifetime, the CSC's abstract
vision of morality was ridiculously broad, potentially disqualifying over
one-third of the country's males from public service. Chief Judge
Bazelon also noted that it was likely that such individuals were presently
in public service, completely beyond the agency's competence to
discover, without any noticeable impact on the efficiency of the
service." 0 Particularly in light of Griswold and new concerns about
people's privacy rights, Chief Judge Bazelon held, for the most part, that
homosexuality is irrelevant to federal employment and that the CSC
could not dismiss an employee on the basis of sexual orientation without
showing a "nexus" between orientation and job performance."
Although formally resting upon standard due process notions that
government decisionmaking be rationally related to statutory goals,
Norton was a wedding of the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence and
MSW's equality jurisprudence. Its powerful critique wounded the general
exclusion of lesbian and gay people, but hardly finished it off. Other
federal courts either refused to apply Norton's demanding requirement of
a rational nexus between the employee's homosexuality and his or her
job, or distinguished Norton on its outrageous facts.442
Nonetheless, the pressure of ongoing and indeed escalating litigation
impelled administrative rethinking. In 1972, for example, the Post Office
and the Government Printing Office, in separate actions, rejected the

439. 417 F.2d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
440. See id. at 1167 n.28.
441. See id. at 1168.
442. See, e.g., Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. CI. 1969); Richardson v.
Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 609 (D.D.C. 1972).
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CSC's position and permitted gay employees to continue working." 3
In early 1973, SIR brought a class action lawsuit against the CSC on
behalf of its members and Donald I-Eckerson, a supply clerk dismissed
because the CSC discovered he had been discharged from the Army for
"homosexual conduct." The federal district court in Societyfor Individual
Rights, Inc. v. Hampton4' followed Norton to declare unconstitutional
the Federal Personnel Manual's blanket exclusion of "[p]ersons about
whom there is evidence that they have engaged or solicited others to
engage in homosexual or sexually perverted acts with them." 4 5 The
court insisted upon Norton's nexus requirement and enjoined the CSC
from excluding or discharging people merely because of their homosexuality or discreet homosexual activity.446 The court's injunction
came during the CSC's own internal deliberations about how (not
whether) to revise its policy."7
Responding to Societyfor Individual Rights, the CSC adopted the
Norton nexus approach in a bulletin, dated December 21, 1973:
"Accordingly, you may not find a person unsuitable for Federal
employment merely because that person is a homosexual or has
engaged in homosexual acts, nor may such exclusion be based on a
conclusion that a homosexual person might bring the public service into
public contempt. You are, however, permitted to dismiss a person or
find him or her unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence
establishes that such person's homosexual conduct affects job
fitness--excluding from such consideration, however, unsubstantiated
conclusions concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal
service.'" 8
In 1975, this instruction was formally codified in the CSC's rules for
disqualification, which also dropped "immoral conduct" from the list of
disqualifying conditions." 9 The CSC's guidelines for "Infamous or
Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct" were revised to say the following:

443. See PostalService Dumps CSC's Anti-Gay Policy, ADVOCATE, Dec. 20, 1972, at 24; U.S.
Agency Backs Down on Fiing,ADVOCATE, Nov. 8, 1972, at 3 (GPO).

444.
445.
446.
447.

63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aft'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 400 n.l.
See id.at 402.
See Postal Service Dumps CSC's Anti-Gay Policy, supra note 443, at 24 (CSC revising

policy in late 1972).

448. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Conm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 n.14 (9th Cir, 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).

449. See Civil Service Comnmission Rules and Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,047 (1975)
(codified at 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1976)).
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Court decisions require that persons not be disqualified from Federal
employment solely on the basis of homosexual conduct ...Based on
these court decisions [and an] outstanding injunction, while a person
may not be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclusions
concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service, a person may
be dismissed or found unsuitable for Federal employment where the
evidence
establishes that such person's sexual conduct affects job
4 50
fitness.

In 1978, the statute governing the CSC was amended to prohibit
discrimination against employees "on the basis of conduct which does
not adversely affect the performance of the employee." 45 ' Although the
statute and CSC rules codified the Norton nexus approach, they left open
dismissals for homosexual "conduct." What did, or could, that entail?
Before the 1978 statute took effect, John Singer was dismissed from
his clerical job at the EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing federal
workplace discrimination law. The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal
against a Norton-Pickeringattack on the ground that Singer was engaged
in offensive conduct that undermined his effectiveness as an employee.452 The "conduct" consisted of actions by Singer that the CSC said
"flaunted and broadcast [Singer's] homosexuality activities," to wit:
wearing gay pride buttons, applying for a license to marry his lover Paul
Barwick, and kissing another man twice in public. 5 Although it would
have been unthinkable, and unconstitutional, to discharge a straight man
for wearing a straight pride badge, applying for a license to marry a
different-sex lover, and kissing someone of the opposite sex in public,
the court upheld the penalty for expressive conduct. Singer appealed and,
surprisingly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 454 prompting the
government to apply the new civil service policy to reinstate Singer. 55
Norton's nexus approach was also the basis for challenging the
federal government's policy against giving gay people security
clearances. The D.C. Circuit vacillated on the issue, first holding that the
government had a rational basis in denying clearances to people who

450. Singer,530 F.2d at 256 n.15.
451. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 101(a), 92 Stat. 1114, 1115
(1975) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1994)).
452. See Singer, 530 F.2d at 255.

453. Id. at 249.
454. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
455. See Rhonda R. Rivera, QueerLaw: Sexual OrientationLaw in the Mid-Eighties (pt. 1), 10
U. DAYTON L. REV.459, 485 (1985).
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were subject to blackmail or mental instability.456 In Gayer v.
Schlesinger,"7 however, the court applied Norton and insisted that
security clearance decisions have some rational connection between
security needs and the applicant's sexual orientation. The court remanded
the case of openly gay Richard Gayer to the Pentagon to apply the new
standard, and the Pentagon ultimately reinstated his clearance.4" 8 The
Defense Department in 1974-75 appeared to be reconsidering its policy
of blanket exclusion, in light of legal defeats in the courts and with its
own hearing examiners. Computer scientist Otis Tabler's security
clearance was not renewed in 1972 because of his homosexuality.
Represented by Kameny and the ACLU, Tabler won back his clearance
after a hearing before the Pentagon's Industrial Security Clearance
Review Office.459 Although other claimants won similar reinstatements,
the security clearance 60exclusion survived into the 1980s and was
sustained in the courts."
2. Federal Military Exclusion: Standing Firm
The Defense Department in 1949 issued a directive which set
military policy concerning homosexuals for the next generation. Adapted
by each of the service branches, the directive held that a court martial
and dishonorable discharge were appropriate for homosexuals who
engaged in forcible intercourse or sex with minors. Administrative
separation and a general discharge on grounds of unsuitability were
usually appropriate for service personnel who engaged in or solicited
homosexual acts or who professed "homosexual tendencies." The armed
forces asserted discretion to retain personnel who engaged in isolated
homosexual acts and who could persuade a review board they would not
do them again (the so-called "queen for a day" exception). 461 It is
456. See Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (rejecting a due process
challenge); see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting an equal protection challenge).

457. 490 F.2d 740,753 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf.McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir.
1973); Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See generally Rivera, supra
note *,at 829-37 (containing a brief, but excellent, discussion of the security clearance cases).
458. See Gayer Gets Clearance, ADVOCATE, Oct. 8, 1975, at 9.
459. See PentagonRetreats on Security ClearanceIssue, ADVOCATE, Aug. 27, 1975, at 4.
460. The leading case was High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 563. In 1995, the President issued an

executive order that may have ended the exclusion. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg.
40,245 (1995).
461. See Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical,and
Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55, 76 (1991); William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and
MilitaryService: Legislation,Implementation, and Litigation, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121, 130 (1995);

Daniel R. Plane, Note, Don't Mess with "Don'tAsk Don't Tell", 79 MARQ. L. REV. 377, 382
(1995). For a discussion of the origins and early application of the armed services' exclusion of gays
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estimated that more than 2,500 service personnel were expelled under
less-than-honorable conditions between 1950 and 1965.462
The ACLU and MSW helped personnel fight their discharges or
persuade the armed forces to upgrade the discharge to honorable. This
was not a difficult task if the individual followed Mattachine's first and
only rule of federal interrogations: say nothing. Since the 1940s, the
armed services had relied on confessions as the primary basis for expulsions.463 In 1968, for example, MSW learned that the Army was
conducting a purge of suspected lesbians from the Women's Army Corps
stationed at Fort Myer, Virginia and Fort Ritchie, Maryland."" MSW
immediately went into action-notifying the commanding officers that
MSW and the press stood ready to report on any purges, leafletting the
bases with Mattachine's pamphlet on How to Handle a FederalInterrogation, and representing two women ultimately accused. MSW
representatives insisted on every iota of due process for the accused
WACs, both of whom were eventually cleared for lack of evidence.
WACs who chose not to resist were given less than honorable discharges.
The Supreme Court held in 1958 that service personnel have a due
process right to judicial review of administrative separations,' 6 and a
fair number of accused homosexuals took advantage of that right.
Lesbian and gay litigants prevailed when military procedure was so
insufficient as to be bizarre. Private Fannie Mae Clackum won backpay
and damages from the government for her general discharge from the Air
Force, because the Court of Claims found invalid an Air Force rule
allowing discretionary discharge in cases where the evidence of
unsuitability was insufficient to support a court martial.! 6 Procedurally,
attorneys for accused service personnel often requested stays, requiring
the armed forces to leave them in the service pending resolution of their

and lesbians, see ALLAN BtRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN INWORLD WAR H (1990).
462. See COLIN J. WILL AmS & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY: A
STUDY OF LESS THAN HONORABLE DISCHARGE 38-53 (1971). The authors' data were taken from

hearings held on military justice by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by Senator Sam Ervin, in 1962 and 1966.
463. On military interrogations where suspected homosexuals were threatened and cajoled into
confessions, see RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS INTHE U.S. MILlTARY-VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GuLF 124-31 (1993).
464. The account that follows is taken from Franklin E. Kameny, WAC's Prevail Over Army,
LADDER, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 7.
465. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958).
466. See Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226,227-29 (Ct. Cl. 1960). But cf.Beard v. Stahr,
200 F. Supp. 766, 767-68 (D.D.C. 1961) (upholding a statutory provision for the elimination of
officers deemed unsuitable for reasons of moral dereliction), vacatedon other grounds, 370 U.S. 41
(1962).
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constitutional claims. Courts understood that "discharge with anything
less than a record of honorable service constitutes a stigma of tremendous impact which will have a lifelong effect" but usually denied stays
on the ground that the accused was not likely to prevail.46 7
During the 1950s and 1960s, service personnel discharged on the
ground of homosexuality almost never conceded that they were homosexual (and often they were not). Hence, the only arguments available to
their attorneys were the standard due process ones. Only after Stonewall
did gay and lesbian service personnel openly announce their sexual orientation and challenge the military exclusion more broadly.4' Even
during that period the challenges were usually phrased in substantive due
process rather than equal protection language. In Champagne v.
Schlesinger," for example, two women discharged under honorable
conditions publicly admitted that they were lesbians and argued that their
exclusion was irrational. After the Navy admitted that dismissal of
lesbians was not mandatory, the appeals court dismissed the case so that
the women could exhaust their administrative remedies.470
The Air Force had a similar discretionary policy, and the District of
Columbia Circuit held in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force47'
that the armed forces were required to give reasons for separating openly
gay Sergeant Leonard Matlovich, who concededly had an exemplary
service record, while not separating many others. In a companion case,
the court upheld the claims of an openly gay sailor, Vernon Berg, against
the Navy's open-ended policy.4 Implicitly, the court was holding that
the Norton requirement, that there be a nexus between the disapproved
conduct and legitimate state needs, applied with some force in the
military discharge cases. Almost as significant as the court's decision was
the bad publicity the Berg case generated when the Navy, during

467. Unglesby v. Zinmy, 250 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1965); see also Bray v. United
States, 515 F.2d 1383, 1396 (CL Cl. 1975) (ordering all records expunged concerning an invalid
discharge from the Air Force based on alleged homosexuality). For other cases where courts have
denied relief, see Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1967); Benson v. Holloway, 312 F.
Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970); and Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1966), but compare
Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), in which the accused service person won a
stay.
468. See Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managingthe Military'sHomosexual Exclusion Policy: Text and
Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 691 (1992).

469. 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974).
470. See id. at 984.
471. 591 F.2d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Background for the Matlovich challenge can be found
in MIKE HIPPLER, MATLOVICH, THE GOOD SOLDIER (1989), and SHILTS, supra note 463, at 14849,
176-77, 185-86, 198-204,207-08,210-12,216-17,226-29, 234-40,245-47,251-57,277-81,285-88.
472. See Berg v. Claytor, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

104

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions

19971

CHALLENGING THE APARTHELD OF THE CLOSET

discovery, conceded that the justifications for the homosexual exclusion
policy had been studied and found to be lacking in an internal report (the
now-famous Crittenden Report) generated in 1957. 4 3' The study found
no evidence that homosexuals could not serve honorably and productively or that homosexuals were security risks; the only reason the policy
persisted was societal homophobia-not the most rational of bases for
state policy according to Norton.
In the wake of these developments, a coalition of gay service people
formed in 1976 to coordinate a normalization of lesbians and gays in the
military, and more service personnel came out of their closets and challenged the military's exclusion in the courts. In 1977, to take just one
case, a federal district judge rejected the military's rationales for
excluding lesbian air traffic controller Mary Saal.4 74 Even accepting the
illegality of consensual private intercourse, the district court held that
there was no legitimate reason to single out homosexuals for exclusion;
most heterosexuals also committed the forbidden activities--especially
oral sex. The armed forces relied strongly on the hostility of straight
personnel to gay personnel, an argument identical to that stressed by
opponents of racial integration in the 1940s. After Saal and other district
court victories, the military exclusion seemed to be following the pattern
of the civil service exclusion in 1973--to oblivion. That the President in
1977 was Democrat Jimmy Carter (ending eight years of Republican
presidents) was cause for gay optimism.
Accounts of the military exclusion's demise were exaggerated,
however. In 1977, the number of gay-related discharges jumped to 1,442,
up from 937 in 1975 and 1,296 in 1976. 7' The Carter Administration's
Department of Defense became one of the most zealous witchhunting
administrations in history. Like previous witchhunts, this new spate of
purges focused disproportionately on women. In 1980, the U.S.S. Norton
Sound became a focal point for the more aggressive Carter Administration policy.476 Assisted by the ACLU, nineteen women slated for

473. See E. Lawrence Gibson & Vernon E. Berg, III, A Personal View of the Pentagon's
Homophobia, ADVOCATE, June 15, 1977, at 6 (describing the Crittenden Report).
474. See Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201-02 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub. nom Belier
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489
F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207, 212-13 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
475. See SKLTS, supra note 463, at 295-96. Between 1973 and 1983, the armed forces would
discharge 15,000 service personnel because of allegations of homosexuality. See Harley David
Diamond, Note, Homosexuals in the Military: They Would Rather Fight Than Switch, 18 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 937, 937 (1984).
476. See SHIrS, supra note 463, at 336-39, 341-45, 347-55, 357-58, 361-62.
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discharge as suspected lesbians announced that they would go to court;
the Navy suffered through a large amount of bad press as a result. The
armed services won a critical victory that same year when the Ninth
Circuit reversed the decisions in Mary Saal's and two other cases. Judge
4 7 upheld the gay
Anthony Kennedy's opinion in Belier v. Middendoe]
exclusion against equal protection as well as due process attack, basically
accepting on faith that military experts knew best how to maintain good
order. Belier was the first of several victories at the federal appellate
level, and it encouraged the Carter Administration to solve the Matiovich
problem by devising new regulations that removed almost any discretion
that would allow openly gay or lesbian people to serve in the armed forces.478
Belier and the new Carter Administration regulations closed the
military closet door for the next twelve years. Why were gay rights
efforts so unsuccessful here, in contrast to their success against the civil
service exclusion? Doctrinally, the key distinction was the deference
courts paid to military judgments, a deference which the Supreme Court
in 1981 deployed to justify discriminating on the basis of sex in draft
registration.479 That the top brass in the armed forces strongly opposed
allowing openly gay people to serve not only carried weight in the courts
but, more importantly, blocked the kind of internal rethinking that
undermined the civil service and security clearance exclusions. Rhetorically, the armed forces deemphasized the old, rather dopey, arguments
(gay people were unstable, subject to blackmail) and recentered the
exclusion around the third-party effects of allowing openly gay people
to serve: given the close quarters of military life, the privacy of
heterosexual soldiers would be invaded; as a consequence, morale and
unit cohesion would suffer.
3. State and Municipal Governments: From Exclusion to
Protection of Gay Employees
In 1961, conviction, and often just detention, for a charge of
homosexual solicitation, lewdness, or sodomy theoretically disqualified
a person from state or local employment and from professional licenses
almost everywhere. The gay exclusion from state employment and
licensing was never enforced with any thoroughness, however. The most
vigorous state witchhunt in the 1960s was that of Florida's Johns

477. 632 F.2d 788, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980).
478. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1981), reprintedin ESKRIDmE & HUNTER, supra note 98, ch.
4, § 3(c).
479. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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Committee, which by 1964 had outed several dozen state employees,
mostly teachers, thereby costing them their jobs and their teaching
certificates.480 Given the state's sustained effort, it is remarkable that
so few gays were actually apprehended. As Florida's level of
witchhunting was beyond the capacity or the desire of most other
jurisdictions, discreet lesbian and gay employees could serve without
much fear of dismissal so long as they were discreet (don't ask, don't
tell). Where their homosexuality did become public, they could lose their
jobs or be reassigned, as Mike McConnell and Paul Acanfora learned.
Inevitably, most jurisdictions came to accept the Norton principle that an
employer must establish a nexus between homosexuality and the
requirements of the employee's position before a dismissal would be
considered legal. Slowest progress was made in positions where there
were seriously alleged third-party effects: police work (the morale and
unit cohesion argument) and teaching (harm to children).
Little progress was made in these areas until after Stonewall. The
critical case was Morrison v. State Board of Education.4 8' Marc
Morrison, a secondary school teacher in Los Angeles, gave counsel and
advice to his colleague, Fred Schneringer, when the latter was breaking
up with his wife. For a one-week period in April 1963, Morrison and
Schneringer became physically intimate, although it did not appear that
either violated California's laws against sodomy and oral copulation.
Guilt-ridden, Morrison reported the incident to his principal and resigned
his public school position in 1964. In 1966, the California Board of
Education revoked Morrison's teaching certificate, depriving him of
employment in the private, as well as public, sector. The only basis for
the revocation was the one incident and Morrison's admission of
homosexual tendencies.4 A closely divided California Supreme Court
overruled the revocation. Justice Mathew Tobriner's opinion interpreted
the "immoral conduct" provision of the Education Code to mean conduct
impairing the teacher's pedagogical effectiveness. 4 This narrowing
interpretation avoided what the court thought were three serious
constitutional problems with a broad construction: it would be too vague
to give teachers notice of conduct they should avoid;414 it would threaten teachers' privacy by tempting states to pry into their extracurricular

480. See FLORIDA LEGISLAIVE INVESTIGATION COMMITE, supra note 222.

481. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
482. See id. at 377-78.
483. See id. at 386-87.
484. See id. at 387-90.
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lives, in tension with Griswold, 48 5 and it would violate the SheltonPickering principle that "[n]o person can be denied government

employment because of factors unconnected with the responsibilities of
Following the philosophy of Norton, Justice
that employment."'
Tobriner held that "[t]he power of the state to regulate professions and

conditions of government employment must not arbitrarily impair the
right of the individual to live his private life, apart from his job, as he
deems fit."'

Like Norton itself, Morrisonwas not enthusiastically received by the
lower California courts.4 s Rejecting these narrow readings, the California Supreme Court applied Morrison to overturn a school board's effort

to dismiss a teacher arrested but not charged with sexual solicitation in
Board of Education v. Jack M.489 Although the alleged homosexual

conduct was not as private as it had been in Morrison,the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's findings that the teacher's conduct did not come
to public attention or impair his effectiveness as a teacher.49 ' Courts in
most other jurisdictions applied Morrison's nexus requirement in public
school settings with deference to school board determinations that
homosexuality alone was sufficient to undermine a teacher's effectiveness. 49' Even when courts found that a school board acted unconstitutionally, as in Acanfora, they often found some way to deny reinstate-

485. See id. at 390-91.
486. Id. at 391.
487. Id. at 394.
488. For example, in McLaughlin v. BoardofMedicalExaminers, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353 (Ct. App.
1973), California's intermediate appellate court upheld the board's discipline of a doctor who had
been convicted of lewd solicitation in a public place due to his fondling of a decoy policeman. See
id. at 354, 359. The court assumed the need to show a nexus between the crime and McLaughlin's
fitness to practice medicine, but offered only the theory that "appellant's problem apparently stays
with him most, if not all of the time; and in light of his present conduct, there is little assurance that
it will be relegated to isolated places and occasions away from his patients." Id. at 357; see also
Governing Bd. of Mountain View Sch. Dist. v. Metcalf, Ill Cal. Rptr. 724, 728 (Ct. App. 1974)
(dismissing homosexual teacher based on invalid criminal charge); Purifoy v. State Bd. ofEduc., 106
Cal. Rptr. 201, 208 (Ct. App. 1973) (revoking teacher's certificate); Moser v. State Bd. ofEduc., 101
Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (Ct. App. 1972) (same).
489. 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977).
490. See id. at 609-10.
491. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1346 (Wash.) (upholding
a teacher's dismissal after his homosexuality had become publicly known, which "'impair[ed] [his]
efficiency as a teacher with resulting injury to the school had he not been discharged"), cert.denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977); cf. Gish v. Board of Educ., 366 A.2d 1337, 1342 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (upholding a school board's demand for psychiatric examination to determine "fitness" of
homosexual teacher), certificationdenied, 377 A.2d 658 (NJ.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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ment.492 The public school remained a charged setting for openly
lesbian or gay teachers because of parental concerns about sexual
predation or progay role models who might influence their children's
budding sexualities.493 On the other hand, courts were willing to strike
down state policies discriminating against teachers because of their
abstract (non-identity speech) discussions of homosexuality.49' Note the
close fit with Pickering.
The police cases followed the same pattern: courts were unwilling
to invalidate policies against openly gay police officers but did
intervene-and apply Pickering-when someone was discharged for nonidentity speech.495 Other state professional exclusions that discriminated
against gay people were more successfully challenged. States as divergent
as New York and Florida rejected sexual orientation as a criterion for
membership in the legal bar.49 6 An ABA survey in 1976 found that no
state bar asked applicants about their sexual orientation, and all but a
handful reported that they would not ordinarily consider such
information. 497
492. See, eg., Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch. No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.
1975), aff'g 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or. 1973). Both the district court and the circuit court agreed that
Peggy Burton had been wrongfully terminated by the school board because of her status as a
practicing homosexual-the statute the school board relied on was found to be unconstitutionally
vague. The award of damages was limited to money damages and an order that the school board
expunge any references of the dismissal from her personnel file. See id.at 851-52. The courts
refused, however, to order her reinstatement, on the grounds that she was nontenured and there were
no guarantees that her contract would have been renewed. See id.
at 854.
493. See Judd Marmor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 3, 4-5 (Judd Maror ed., 1980) (discussing
adolescent homosexual behavior).
494. See National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp.
1273 (D. Del. 1977).
495. See Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
496. CompareIn re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 358 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1978) (requiring the bar
to admit an openly gay attorney unless there is a "substantial connection between [his] antisocial
behavior and his ability to carry out his professional responsibilities"), with State ex rel. Florida Bar
v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957) (disbarring a homosexual attorney because of "behavior
contrary to good morals and in violation of the laws of the state"). Years later, Kimball applied for
admission to the New York bar. See In re Kimball, 301 N.E.2d 436 (N.Y. 1973). He was initially
turned down, based upon his 1956 arrest for "committing an indecent and lewd act in a public place"
in Florida. This was what led to his disbarment there; ironically, the statute under which he had been
arrested was declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in 1971. See id.at 436-37
(Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting). The New York court held, however, that his application should be
reconsidered, noting that "the Committee on Character and Fitness found [him] to be of good
character and qualified" Id. at 436. "While [Kimball's] status and past conduct may be now and has
been in the past violative of accepted norms, they are not controlling, albeit relevant, in assessing
character bearing on the right to practice law." Id.
497. See Rivera, supra note *,at 859.
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Ironically, the principles of JackM. and Norton were more readily
followed by city councils and state legislatures (although not without a
fierce struggle) than by state or federal judges. The first big victory came
in February 1972, when New York Mayor John Lindsey issued an
executive order banning sexual orientation discrimination in city
employment. More than forty cities adopted similar policies (usually by
vote of the city council) between 1971 and 1984, including Atlanta
(1971), Boston (1982), Chicago (1982), Detroit (1979), Los Angeles
(1977), Minneapolis (1974), Philadelphia (1982), San Francisco (1978),
Seattle (1975), and Washington, D.C. (1973). (Appendix C of this Article
lists other jurisdictions, including counties and states.) Notably, there
were no states that formally ended antihomosexual public employment
policies before the federal government more or less did in 1975.
Pennsylvania was the first state to bar such discrimination, in April 1975,
49
when Governor Milton Shapp issued a controversial executive order.
Similar executive orders were issued by the governors of California
(1979), New York (1983), and Ohio (1983); legislatively, similar
measures were enacted in Illinois (1981), Michigan (1981), and
Wisconsin (1982).
In parallel fashion, most of these foregoing jurisdictions considered
broader measures to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by private
employers as well. The first jurisdictions to do so were university towns
in Michigan (Ann Arbor and East Lansing, both in 1972), but the first
significant law was adopted by Washington, D.C.4 Starting as early
as 1971, activists Frank Kameny, Eva Freund (of NOW), and Cade Ware
and Bill Bricker (both of GAA) were mobilizing information and
lobbying pressure for Mayor Walter Washington and members of the
District's City Council to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. In
1973, Councilmember Marjorie Parker was persuaded to include sexual
orientation as a prohibited classification in her human rights bill, which
prohibited discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, real estate, and credit practices. With the key support of the
mayor and Representative Ronald Dellums (a member of the House

498. In response to Governor Shapp's order, the legislature passed a bill prohibiting "anyone"
who had been convicted of committing "'deviate sexual intercourse"' or "'who ha[d] admitted to acts
that would constitute deviate sexual intercourse"' from performing 'any duties relating to (I) persons
confined in a penal, reform or correctional institution, (I) juveniles, (III) law enforcement as a police
officer, (V) the mentally ill or (V) the mentally retarded."' Governor Shapp successfully vetoed the
bill, calling it vindictive and overbroad. GovernorShapp Vetoes Anti-Gay BillPassed in Unanimous
Senate Vote, ADVOCATE, Nov. 19, 1975, at 9.
499. The account in the text draws from David L. Aiken, Broadest Protectionfor Gays: D.C.
Rights Law Gets PreliminaryNod, ADVOCATE, Aug. 29, 1973, at 5.
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committee overseeing the District), the human rights bill was adopted in
1973.' °° Contrast the success of local gay activists with the District's
government, with their failure to persuade Congress to adopt a similar
law nationwide. On May 14, 1974, Representative Bella Abzug
introduced a federal gay rights bill that would have protected against
sexual orientation discrimination in public and private workplaces, public
accommodations, and housing. Although similar bills were introduced in
every Congress after 1974, none even received a congressional hearing
until 1994.01
Other important jurisdictions prohibiting private workplace
discrimination included Detroit (1979), Los Angeles (1979), Minneapolis
(1974), Philadelphia (1982), and San Francisco (1978).5 °2 The first
statewide ban was created when the California Supreme Court interpreted
the state labor code's prohibition of political activity discrimination to include sexual orientation in the Gay Law Students case. Wisconsin
adopted the first state statute barring such discrimination in 1982. Just as
notable as these success stories were the stories of frustration, however.
Like the federal bill, job protection proposals in most states and localities
were not adopted during this period. New York City was the most
surprising holdout: starting in 1973 and every year thereafter, the wellorganized gay lobby would push for adoption of a nondiscrimination
ordinance and would lose in committee or on the floor of the council.
Similarly frustrating were annual defeats in the legislatures of Massachusetts, Oregon, and California (legislation proposed by Willie Brown to
codify and clarify Pacific Telephone & Telegraph).
More sobering was the limited efficacy of the measures that were
adopted. Many cities that officially or informally stopped discriminating
against gay people still had police departments that did. In 1975, virtually
every city in the United States (San Francisco being the main exception)
either had a policy against hiring gay people as police officers or
informally indicated that they would not do so.5 3 The list of "willing
to hire" was longer in 1981 (New York, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.,

500. In 1977, two years after D.C. received home rule from Congress, the council reenacted the
Human Rights Act as D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp 1996). It was this Act
that Georgetown was successfully charged with violating by its gay rights groups.
501. The repeatedly unsuccessful bills to prohibit job discrimination against gay people came
back to haunt gay rights. Courts invoked Congress's disinterest in these bills as evidence that Title
VI's prohibition of sex discrimination did not extend to sexual orientation claims. See, e.g.,
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
502. See Appendix C for the gay rights protections afforded by these and other cities.
503. See George Mendenhall, Gay Cops: An Issue GettingAttention Nation-Wide, ADVOCATE,

Nov. 19, 1975, at 14.
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and Chicago being prime additions), but most continued to discourage

such applications or, at best, followed a don't ask, don't tell
approach."° Additionally, the measures that were adopted were, in the

words of reporter Randy Shilts, "toothless paper tigers."5 °5 Most of the
laws provided only an administrative mechanism and no damages relief

for grievants. Because of their fear of publicity, gay employees were less
likely than others to risk a lengthy process for so little payoff, and
virtually no one filed charges in most cities (San Francisco again being

an exception proving the rule).
The most alarming limitation of gay rights measures was how easily
some of them triggered antigay political backlash. One of the first

jurisdictions to adopt a job nondiscrimination measure, Boulder,
Colorado, was also the first to see it repealed, by a popular referendum
in May 1974."° An ironic consequence of sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws was their contribution to a new politics of traditional
values.5 7 Seasoned by local tryouts in Colorado (1974) and California
(1976), the new politics made its national debut in Dade County, Florida
in 1977. When Dade County adopted a law broadly protecting against
sexual orientation, singer and former beauty queen Anita Bryant formed
a coalition, "Save the Children," to repeal the law by popular referen-

dum. In May of that year, 50% of Dade County's voters turned out for
the referendum and voted 69% to 31% for repeal.

"Save the Children" was significant, first, as the first nationally
prominent antigay campaign; second, as a hugely successful one,
showing risk-averse politicians that there was a large and mobile
constituency adverse to progay legislation; and, third, as an example of
the rhetorical shift first prominent in the California sodomy law battle,

and abortive referendum, in 1976. Consistent with her own thinking and
504. See Brett Averili, On the Beat with Gay Cops: Caution and Closets in New York,
ADVOCATE, May 14, 1981, at 15. At the same time progress was occasionally made in some locales,
setbacks occurred elsewhere. Atlanta in 1977 not only reaffirmed its antigay policy but reinstituted
questions focusing on police applicants' homosexual experiences. Commissioner Reginald Eaves
found no fault with gay officers per se but feared "antagonisr" from homophobic straight officers.
"'I don't think I need that additional problem.... I'm still fighting the feeling against hiring women
and blacks,"' he said. Gay Police: ControversyHeats Up, ADVOCATE, Oct. 5, 1977, at 12. Mayor
Ralph Perk of Cleveland was less enlightened, justifying his opposition to gay police: ."[P]eople who
feel it is necessary to have sex with animals, or with children, or rubber dolls, or themselves or with
the same sex are not practicing what is normal. I call them pomomaniacs."' Id.
505. Randy Shilts, CityRights Laws-Are They JustToothless PaperTigers?,ADVOCATE, Mar.
10, 1976, at 6 (generally, yes).
506. See "A Handy Issue": Voters Upset Gay Rights Law, ADVOCATE, June 19, 1974, at 6.
507. On the new politics of traditional values, see generally JOHN GALLAGHER & CHRIS BULL,
PERFECT ENEM: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOVEMENT, AND THE PoLrTcs OF THE 1990s
(1996).
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that of her core constituency, Bryant argued that "homosexuality is
immoral and against God's wishes," the traditionalist argument in favor
of sodomy laws and, now, against sexual orientation discrimination laws
that would "encourage" such immorality. Following a nonbiblical but
also traditionalist line of thinking, Bryant charged that the gay rights law
would encourage people to cross-dress, to molest children, and even to
have sex with animals. But as its tag name revealed, her campaign most
often maintained that gay rights infringed the rights of third parties,
namely, parents and their children. "'Miami's law infringed upon my
rights,"' Bryant said, "'or rather discriminates against me as a citizen and
a mother to teach my children and set examples of God's moral code as
stated in the holy scriptures.""'5 "
After the votes were counted, Bryant gloated:
"Wewill now carry our fight against similar laws throughout the nation
that attempt to legitimize a lifestyle that is both perverse and dangerous
to the sanctity of the family, dangerous to our children, dangerous to
our freedom of religion and freedom of choice, dangerous to our
survival as one nation, under God. ' 'St9
True to her word, Bryant traveled from locale to locale preaching against
nondiscrimination laws. More important, a national network of money
and organizational know-how was available in other states to fuel repeal
campaigns. Wichita, Kansas; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Eugene, Oregon
immediately followed Dade County in repealing their gay rights
ordinances by referenda.1 California in 1978 faced a statewide
initiative sponsored by state Senator John Briggs which would have
overridden Jack M. and disqualified from public school employment
anyone engaged in the "advocating, soliciting, imposing or encouraging
or promoting of private or public homosexual activity directed at, or
likely to come to the attention of, schoolchildren and/or other employees." '' The Briggs initiative was defeated in part because its strategy
was too broad: eager to merge homosexual conduct with status, Briggs
wrote an initiative that directly implicated First Amendment concerns and

508. Joe Baker, Anita... With the Smiling Cheeck, ADVOCATE, Apr. 20, 1977, at 6. "'The
recruitment of our children is absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of homosexuality.
Since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit and freshen their ranks,"' presumably stealing
children from heterosexuals. Id.
509. Joe Baker, Miami: The Message Was Loud and Clear:Stay in the Closet!, ADVOCATE, July
13, 1977, at 6.
510. For the unsuccessful challenge to the St. Paul referendum, see St. PaulCitizensforHuman
Rights v. City Council, 289 NV.2d 402 (Minn. 1979).
511. Cal. Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978). The Proposition is illuminatingly discussed in Nan
D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1702-06 (1993).
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placed gay-friendly heterosexuals at risk as well. The failure of the
initiative revealed the electoral riskiness of blatant antigay appeals and
the limits of both the old (sodomites and child molesters) and new (rights
of parents) antigay rhetoric.
B. Immigration and NaturalizationExclusions
The Nationality Act of 1940 required that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") deny citizenship to people who could not
demonstrate "good moral character." ' The statute listed various
actions that could be treated as evidence of bad moral character,
including adultery, but not homosexuality." 3 The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) prohibited immigration
into the United States of persons "afflicted with psychopathic personality,
epilepsy, or a mental defect," 14 as well as persons "who have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude" or have admitted
committing acts constituting such a crime. 15 The statute also required
deportation of these noncitizens. 6 Notwithstanding the ambiguity of
both statutes, the INS in the 1950s interpreted them to exclude homosexuals and bisexuals from the country and from the privileges of citizenship. The Public Health Service ("PHS"), charged with administering the
psychopathic personality exclusion in conjunction with the INS, read the
McCarran-Walter Act the same way. By these actions, the federal
government reinforced the impression that gay and lesbian people were
not true "citizens" of this country. Both exclusionary policies were
challenged and partially nullified, between 1961 and 1981.
1. Unsuccessful Challenges to the Exclusions, 1961-1969
During the 1960s, noncitizens challenged these policies without
success. In Posusta v. United States,517 Judge Learned Hand overruled
the INS's decision to deny citizenship to Marie Posusta on the ground
that she had committed adultery with the man she later married. Judge
Hand ruled that the moral character requirement was not penal and could

512. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 307(a)(3), 54 Stat. 1137, 1143 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1994)).
513. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (good moral character refuted if noncitizen is a drunkard, adulterer,
murderer, prostitute, gambler).

514. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477,
§ 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990).

515. Id. § 212(a)(9), 66 Stat. at 182 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)),
516. See id. § 241(a)(1), 66 Stat. at 204 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)(A)).
517. 285 F.2d 533, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1961).
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not be invoked to punish past conduct, but rather "to admit as citizens

those who are likely to prove law-abiding and useful., 5 18 Posusta,

when read together with the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold,
suggested that noncitizens must engage in public and not just private
immorality, a distinction which was usually not applied to homosexuals
prior to Stonewall. In 1968, for example, a New York state judge denied
naturalization to Olga Schmidt on grounds of "immoral conduct" because
she had engaged in intimate relations with a female friend in her
home.51 9 In response to Schmidt's contention that she had limited her
activities to consensual and private settings, the court said that "'[flew
behavioral deviations are more offensive to American mores than is
homosexuality.' 521 The exclusion of homosexuals from citizenship
never reached the Supreme Court during this period. The same was not
true of the immigration exclusion.
The Ninth Circuit, in Fleuti v. Rosenberg,52' held that the term
"psychopathic personality" was too vague to be constitutionally applied
to homosexuals generally. The court explicitly relied on medical studies
and experts' skeptical of the precision or usefulness of the old term
"psychopathic personality."' M Reflecting severe internal division, and
surely uncertainty, on the issue, the Supreme Court decided the case on
narrower grounds.5z
The Supreme Court squarely overruled Fleuti'sholding in Boutilier
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service.524 The case involved Clive
Michael Boutilier, a Canadian national who was first admitted to this
country in 1955. Eight years later, he applied for citizenship but admitted
that he had been arrested in New York on a charge of sodomy, later reduced to simple assault and dismissed on default of the complainant. 52
Boutilier affirmed that he was bisexual, and an affidavit from Professor
518. Id. at 536.
519. See In re Schmidt, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
520. Id. at 92 (quoting H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (granting

a husband a favorable divorce because of wife's homosexuality)).
521. 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Fleuti
rejected the analysis used in Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961), which had applied
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) to exclude a lesbian, notwithstanding expert testimony that lesbians are not
necessarily psychopathic personalities.
522. See Fleuti, 302 F.2d at 658 n.19.
523. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), vacating on other grounds 302 F.2d 652

(9th Cir. 1962). At the urging of the PHS, Congress amended the McCarran-Walter Act to override
Fleuti, deleting the word "epilepsy" and adding "or sexual deviation," allowing for explicit
authorization to exclude homosexuals. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), § 212(a)(4),
79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988)).
524. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
525. See id. at 119-20.
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of Psychiatry Montague Ullman stated: "'The patient has sexual interest
in girls and has had intercourse with them on a number of occasions.... His sexual structure still appears fluid and immature so that he
moves from homosexual to'5heterosexual
interests as well as abstinence
26
with almost equal facility. '
Based upon this evidence, the PHS and INS excluded Boutilier on
the ground that he was afflicted with "psychopathic personality." The
Supreme Court affirmed. The majority opinion, by Justice Clark, not only
read the term "person afflicted psychopathic personality" as a code word
for "homosexual," a reading with support in the statute's antihomosexual
legislative history, but also extended the exclusion to an apparent
bisexual who was undisputedly functional, an extension with little
support in the legislative history.121 Justice Clark not only ignored
Fleuti'sconcern with vagueness, he also failed even to mention the equal
protection problems of reading a broad sexual orientation classification
into an ambiguous statute. Echoing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fleuti,
Justice Douglas's dissent scolded the Court for ignoring the expert
consensus that psychopathic personality was a meaningless term. 28
After Boutilier,the exclusion of homosexuals from immigration was
firmly in place under the psychopathic personality provision, which made
the mere admission of homosexuality a basis for exclusion. 29 Indeed,
Boutilier's force was strengthened by Congress's addition of "sexual
deviation" as a basis for exclusion in 1965. Often overlooked was the
fact that persons who engaged in homosexual acts could also be excluded
on the grounds that they committed crimes of moral turpitude. For
example, in ordering the deportation of a man who had lived in the
United States for thirty-nine years, the Second Circuit held that a conviction under New York's disorderly conduct (degenerate) statute constituted
a crime of moral turpitude justifying exclusion. 3 ° Interestingly, because

526. See Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 1966)
(alteration in original).
527. Boudlier, 387 U.S. at 121-23; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation,90 CoLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990).
528. See Boutilier,387 U.S. at 126-27, 135 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also noted
that even the "Public Health Service, from whom Congress borrowed the term 'psychopathic
personality' admits that the term is 'vague and indefinite."' Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
529. See, e.g., Lavoie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732,736 (9th Cir. 1969)
(finding that an admitted homosexual was a per so "psychopathic personality" as required by
Boutilier);Campos v. United States Immigration &Naturalization Sern., 402 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.
1968) (ordering deportation of gay man seeking change of status from nonimnmigrant-student to
permanent resident).
530. See Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Wyngaard v.
Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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the challenges in the immigration cases were to agency policies and not
to the statutes themselves, the equality arguments were not constitutional
arguments. Rather than sailing under the banner of due process and the
First Amendment, as in the employment cases, equality arguments in the
immigration cases sailed under the banner of statutory interpretation. In
the 1960s, however, the arguments sank like the Spanish Armada.
2. The Courts and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Limit the Naturalization Exclusion, 1971-1981
Two years after Stonewall, in In re Labady,531 federal Judge
Walter Mansfield pressed the INS on the naturalization issue. His opinion
ordering citizenship for a law-abiding, sexually discreet, but openly gay
Cuban immigrant, explained that when homosexual conduct "is entirely
private, the likelihood of harm to others is minimal and any effort to
regulate or penalize the conduct may lead to an unjustified invasion of
the individual's constitutional rights." '32 He recognized that there was
some tension between his construction of the 1940 naturalization law and
Boutilier'sconstruction of the 1952 law, but reconciled the two by noting
that one of Boutilier'smoral offenses had been sexual activity in a public
park.533 Although merely a district court opinion, In re Labady was
followed by other courts.5-I
Under pressure from increasing losses sustained in court and having
already abandoned its prior view that private adultery and fornication
barred a finding of good moral character, the INS relented on the issue
of lesbian and gay naturalization as well. In an August 1976 policy
change, the INS announced:
"The fact that a petitioner for naturalization is or has been a practicing
homosexual during the relevant statutory period is not, in itself, a
sufficient basis for a finding that he lacks the necessary good moral
character. However, where there has been a conviction of a homosexual
act or the admission of the commission of such an act in a jurisdiction
in which it is a criminal offense or when the homosexual act involves
minors, or the use of threat or fraud, or the taking or giving of money
or anything of value, or the act of solicitation thereof is in a public

531.

326 F. Supp. 924, 927-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

532. Id. at 927.
533. See id. at 926 n.2.
534. See, e.g., Nemetz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 647 F.2d 432, 436 (4th Cir.
1981); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (D. Or. 1975). But see Kovacs v. United States, 476
F.2d 843, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1973) (refusing petition for citizenship by gay man who lied about his
sexual orientation).
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place, the Service['s] view is that a showing of good moral character
'
is precluded."535
It is not clear how many lesbians and gay men were affected by this
change in policy, but one case illustrates the potential effect. A Danish
lesbian was granted citizenship in 1978 after twenty-five years of
unsuccessful petitioning.53 6 No explanation was provided for the sudden
volte-face, but the new policy surely played a role. On the other hand,
the INS still treated gay applicants differently. Richard Longstaff, a
resident for fifteen years, was quizzed intensely about his sex life by the
INS, which not only denied him citizenship but ordered him deported
53 7
under Boutilier.
3. The Public Health Service Pushes the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to End the Immigration Exclusion,
1970-1981
The struggle to reverse Boutilier was a medical as well as legal
struggle, given the involvement of the PHS as well as the INS. In 1970,
the first spring after Stonewall, gay activists confronted their tormenters
at the American Psychiatric Association's ("APA") annual convention in
San Francisco. They wanted to remove the characterization of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder from the APA's diagnostic manual, the
DSM-H.53 8 Irving Bieber, then the leading antigay psychiatrist, was
laughed off the stage by gay protesters. "'I've read your book, Dr.
Bieber,"' yelled one protester, "'and if that book talked about black
people the way it talks about homosexuals, you'd be drawn and quartered
and you'd deserve it.""'5 9 A paper on electroshock treatment for sexual
deviation met with shouts of "'torture' and "'Where did you take your
residency, Auschwitz?' The crowd, not only the activists but psychiatrists, as well, erupted in pandemonium at the conclusion of the paper.
While some psychiatrists clamored for air fare refunds, others called on
4
the police to shoot the protestors.

535. Immigration DepartmentRelaxes Gay Policy, ADVOCATE, Sept. 22, 1976, at 10 (quoting

INS Interpretations § 316.1(0(7), as amended 1976).
536. See Rivera, supra note *,at 942 n.900.
537. See HassledBriton Tells Story,ADVOCATE, Sept. 20, 1979, at 13; see also In re Longstaff,
716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983).
538. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITy AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE PoLITICS OF

DiAGNOsIs 102 (1981); see also Gary Alinder, Gay LiberationMeets the Shrinks, reprintedin OUT
OF THE CLOsETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 141 (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1972); Stuart
Auerbach, Gays and Dolls Battle the Shrinks, WASH. POST, May 15, 1970, at Al.
539. BAYER, supra note 538, at 103.

540. See Alinder, supra note 479, at 144; see also BAYER, supra note 538.
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Dr. Kent Robinson, a psychiatrist, believed that the protesters'
claims had possible merit and negotiated a panel at the 1971 APA
convention, which would include gay representatives. Robinson contacted
gay activist Frank Kameny to organize the panel. Despite securing an
official panel at the 1971 convention in Washington, D.C., the activists
did not want to appear mollified by the limited participation, and
continued to organize street protests. 54' On May 3, 1971, gay activists
stormed the stately Convocation of Fellows at the APA Convention, and
Kameny seized the microphone to deliver a diatribe against the
profession: "'Psychiatry is the enemy incarnate. Psychiatry has waged a
relentless war of extermination against us. You may take this as a declaration of war against you.""'5 2 Gay activists later went on to conduct
their panel. At the end of the convention, Kameny and his fellow
panelists demanded that the APA revise its diagnostic manual to delete
references to homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder. 3
Two years later, after continued pressure from gay activists, as well
as pressure from within the profession that included declarations by gay
psychiatrists and a review of the medical literature, the APA's Nomenclature Committee was poised to accept the change. 5' Bieber and
Charles Socarides organized an Ad Hoc Committee Against the Deletion
of Homosexuality and mobilized psychoanalysts to protest any caving in
to gay pressure (as they would understand the matter). The proposal was
presented and discussed at the 1973 APA Convention, where it received
strong support. On December 15, 1973, the Nomenclature Committee
5s
voted to drop homosexuality's classification as a disease in DSM-H.
The decision survived an unprecedented "referendum" (a vote among
APA members) instigated by the Ad Hoc Committee. When the new
DSM-III was issued later in the 1970s, homosexuality as an illness was
a nonissue. 4 6
On July 17, 1974, Dr. John Spiegel, president of the APA, wrote the
INS to inform the agency of the APA's official action delisting

541. See BAYER, supra note 538, at 103-05.
542. Id. at 105.
543. See id.at 106-07.
544. See id.at 115-21.
545. See id.at 121, 129-34, 136-38; Richard D. Lyons, Psychiatrists, in a Shift, Declare
Homosexuality No Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1973, at Al.

546. The manual did include the category "ego-dystonic homosexuality" as a diagnostic
category. It was defined as "'[a] desire to acquire or increase heterosexual arousal so that
heterosexual relations can be initiated or maintained and a sustained pattern of overt homosexual
arousal that the individual explicitly complains is unwanted as a source of distress.' BAYER, supra

note 538, at 176. Although the category was undoubtedly strange, gay activists were mum, lest any
protest trigger renewed debate over the 1973 deletion. See id.
at 178.
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homosexuality as a sexual "deviance." Dr. Spiegel urged the INS to "use
[its] statutory powers of discretion to refrain from the exclusion,
deportation or refusal of citizenship to homosexual aliens."' 4 The INS
General Counsel responded, first, with Boutilier as binding precedent on
his agency and, second, with the assertion that "homosexuals" must, in
any event, be denied citizenship on the ground that they lack "good
moral character," required by 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)."' The Menninger
Foundation wrote the INS, "congratulating" it and criticizing the APA.
"Soon homosexuals will want to 'marry,' have control of children,
advocate their way of life as being normal to young people and so
on. ' 4 The matter was not reopened during the Nixon-Ford
Administration.
At the beginning of the Carter Administration in 1977, INS,
Department of Justice, and White House officials met with ACLU and
NGTF leaders to discuss the latter's petition for the INS to change its
policy. I do not know exactly what assurances were made at this
meeting, but it is clear that Boutilier was an important agenda item for
the INS by 1977. In November, the PHS notified the INS that it no
longer felt professionally capable of participating in the exclusion of gay
people as "psychopathic personalities" or "sexual deviates" after the APA
actions.550 The INS's General Counsel's office was unwilling to allow
the PHS off the hook, though, and insisted that Boutilier required the
PHS's continued participation."5 '
Matters stood in bureaucratic impasse until the summer of 1979,
when the administrative debate was ruptured by legal developments. Carl
Hill, an openly gay British news photographer, was detained on June 13,
1979, by the INS because he was wearing a "gay pride" button. Attorney

547. Letter from John P. Spiegel, President, American Psychiatric Association, to Leonard F.
Chapman, Jr., Director, INS (July 17, 1974) (on file with author). This letter and subsequent
unpublished materials referred to in this section were obtained by the Author under the Freedom of
Information Act.
548. Letter from INS Acting General Counsel to Dr. Walter F. Barton, Medical Director,
American Psychiatric Association (Aug. 8, 1974) (on file with author).
549. Letter from The Menninger Foundation to Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Director, INS (Sept.
12, 1974) (on file with author).
550. See Letter from William H. Foege, Assistant Surgeon General Director, Center for Disease
Control (CDC), to Leonel J. Castillo, Commissioner, INS (Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with author). The
INS punted for the time being. The PHS made the same pitch to the White House the next year. See
Memorandum from Julius B. Richmond, Assistant Secretary for Health and Director, PHS, to the
Hon. Margaret Constanza, Assistant to the President (May 5, 1978) (on file with author).
551. See Memorandum from David Crosland, General Counsel, INS, to Carl J. Wack, Associate
Commissioner of Examinations, INS (June 30, 1978) (on file with author); Letter from Carl J. Wack,
Associate Commissioner of Examinations, INS, to William H. Foege, Assistant Surgeon General,
PHS (Nov. 20, 1978) (on file with author).
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Don Knutson of Gay Rights Advocates obtained an order from federal
Judge Stanley Weigel restraining the INS from excluding Hill, because
Hill suffered from no medically cognizable "deviation' or "psychopathy"
as the statute required.5" In August, and apparently in response to the
Hill litigation, the PHS formally abandoned any role in diagnosing gay
people as "sexual deviates" or people afflicted with "psychopathic
personality." Invoking the 1974 edition of DSM-I and the forthcoming
1979 edition of DSM-II, the Surgeon General justified the change as
reflecting "current and generally accepted canons of medical practice
with respect to homosexuality.... [T]his change in the policy of the
PHS with respect to the physical and mental examination of aliens has
been made to reflect the most current judgments of health professionals
on this subject."5'53
Enforcement of the psychopathic personality exclusion directly
involved the PHS, which was not only charged with examining
immigrants for physical and mental defects,' but a PHS certificate
was also required before the INS could exclude an immigrant under one
of the "medical" exclusions.5 5 Thus, when the PHS refused to issue
certificates or examine homosexuals, the statutory scheme was thrown
into turmoil. The INS suspended exclusions of homosexuals5 6 and
sought a legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice. That office advised the INS that it was required
to enforce Boutilier even without the PHS's cooperation.5 7
In 1980, the INS devised an ingenious don't ask, don't tell policy:
3. Primary Inspection-An alien shall not be asked any questions
concerning his or her sexual preference during primary inspection.
4. Referral to Secondary Inspection-An alien shall be referred to
secondary inspection for examination as to homosexuality only under
the following circumstances: (1) When an alien makes an unsolicited,
unambiguous oral or written admission of homosexuality. Buttons,

552. See Gay Britisher Barredfrom U.S., The Let in, ADVOCATE, July 26, 1979, at 7; Don
Knutson, Immigration Lifts Its Lamp to Gays-Reluctantly, ADVOCATE, Oct. 4, 1979, at 7.

553.
General,
2, 1979)
554.
555.

Memorandum from Julius B. Richmond, Assistant Secretary for Health and Surgeon
to William H. Foege, Director, CDC, and George I. Lythcott, Administrator, HSA (Aug.
(on file with author).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1994) (as amended).
See id. § 1226(d) (If the PHS certifies that an immigrant "is afflicted with... any mental

disease, defect, or disability" excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(5), the INS decision to
exclude "shall be based solelyupon such certification." (emphasis added)); cf.id.§ 1225(a) ("inspection, other than the physical and mental examination" shall be done by the INS).
556. See Memorandum from Leonel J. Castillo, Commissioner, INS, to Executive Group (Aug.
10, 1979) (on file with author).

557. See 3 Op. Off. Legal Council 457, 459 (1979).
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literature or other materials referring to "gay rights" or describing or
supporting homosexuality shall not be considered unambiguous
admissions of homosexuality....
5. SecondaryInspection-An alien referred to secondary inspection for
examination as to homosexuality shall be questioned privately.
Inspectors must perform their duties in a professional manner and not
allow personal beliefs to taint the inspection of the alien. An alien referred under paragraph 4 shall be asked only whether he or she is
homosexual. If the answer is "no", the alien shall not be detained for
further examination as to homosexuality. If the answer is "yes", the
alien shall be asked to sign a statement to that effect....
6.--No search under section 287(c) is5to
be performed for the purpose
58
of seeking evidence of homosexuality.
The INS applied this new policy anemically in the 1980s, yet still
suffered the further indignity of having it invalidated by the Ninth Circuit
when Carl Hill returned to the United States and sought an injunction
against INS enforcement of Boutilierwithout the required PHS certificate
of deviancy or psychopathy. The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction
against INS enforcement due to its inconsistency with the statute's
reliance on the still-uncooperative PHS to conduct an examination and
issue a certificate before the psychopathic personality exclusion could be
applied. 5 9
At this point, the government had several options. The INS

eventually chose the following: (1) The INS did not ask for an appeal of
its loss in Hill. In light of the earlier INS attitude about the case, this is

558. Telegraph Memorandum from David Grosland, Acting Commissioner, INS, to All Regions
(Sept. 8, 1980) (on file with author).
In response to the refusal of the PHS to make medical determinations of
homosexuality and the determination of the office of legal counsel that the INS was
nonetheless obliged to exclude homosexuals, the INS has adopted a new policy,
"Guidelines and Procedures for the Inspection of Aliens Who Are Suspected of Being
Homosexuals." This statement provides that an arriving alien will not be asked any
questions regarding his sexual preference. If an alien "makes an unambiguous oral or
written admission of homosexuality" (which does not include exhibition of buttons,
literature, or other similar material), or if a third person who is also presenting himself
for inspection "voluntarily states, without prompting or prior questioning, that an alien
who arrived in the United States at the same time... is a homosexual," the alien may
be examined privately by an immigration officer and asked to sign a statement that he
is a homosexual. That statement forms the evidentiary basis for exclusion.
In re Langstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1449-50 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Press Release
of the Department of Justice, Guidelines and Proceduresfor the Inspection of Aliens Who Are
Suspected ofBeing Homosexuals (Sept. 9, 1980)).
559. See Hill v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1983). But cf.Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1449-50 (allowing exclusions of homosexuals who admit
that fact, even without a PHS examination and certificate).
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puzzling and suggests some shift in Executive Department internal
decisionmaking. (2) The INS agreed to follow Hill, but only within the
Ninth Circuit, and continued to follow its earlier policy in all the other
circuits. It is not unusual for agencies to "nonacquiesce" in a court
decision and follow it only in the circuit where it was issued. (3) The
PHS was directed by the Department of Justice and agreed to issue a
certificate for "self-proclaimed homosexual aliens presented by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service--but only in the Ninth Circuit.
Elsewhere in the country, the PHS would refuse to have anything to do
with "homosexuals." 5"
Perhaps dissatisfied with this compromise solution, the INS adopted
policies more consistent with those already followed by the PHS.
Instituting a practice of telling "self-proclaimed homosexual aliens" that
they could apply for a "waiver of excludability," the INS deferred action,
excluding them for the duration of their stay in the United States.
Moreover, the alien could apply for the waiver before he or she came to
the United States, and the suggestion was that such waivers would be
routinely granted. In 1990, after a decade of limping along in this
manner, Congress, with the support of the INS and PHS, repealed the
statutory provision mandating exclusion of people afflicted with
psychopathic personality and sexual deviation. 6'
C. Families We Choose
The most intimate private space, outside of the bedroom, was the
family living in a common home. For lesbians and gay men, this also
became the most contested public space, as most states were substantially
or completely unwilling to recognize gay families of choice. The
intensity of the antihomosexual opposition, unheard of elsewhere in the
world, was a consequence of three different kinds of anxieties: that gay
people molest children or "recruit" impressionable children into homosexuality and, therefore, must be stopped; that gay families of choice are
at war with natural gender roles necessary for successful relationships
and child rearing and, therefore, should not be encouraged; and that the
traditional family, already in decline, would be lost on a slippery slope

560.

See Letter from D. Lowell Jensen, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Edward N. Brandt,

Jr., Assistant Secretary for Health (Apr. 5, 1984) (on file with author); Letter from Laurence S. Farer,
Acting Director, PHS Division of Quarantine, to Andrew J. Carmichael, Jr., Associate Commissioner,
Examinations (June 8, 1984) (on file with author); see also Philip J. Hilts, Agency to Use Dormant
Law to Bar Homosexualsfrom U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 1990, at 24.

561. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (1994)).
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of horribles if gay families were recognized and, therefore, society should
draw the line against any such recognition.
1. Same-Sex Marriage

Although their members were keenly interested in the issues, the
Mattachine Society and DOB did not make the right of lesbian and gay

couples to marry a prominent item on their agendas in the 1950s and
1960s.'( In light of police harassment of private gay spaces and

employer witchhunts, it was impractical for homophile groups to invest
any of their scarce resources in a positive agenda such as marriage.

Stonewall liberated pent-up gay energy on the topic of marriage, much
of it radical. GLF said in 1969: "We expose the institution of marriage

as one of the most insidious and basic sustainers of the system. The
family is the microcosm of oppression."563 By insisting on monogamy,
marriage suppresses the sexual liberty that is a chief aim of gay

liberation, the radicals maintained. Drawing from Marxist theory, radicals
also argued that marriage is an extension of the capitalist system.
Through the customs of courtship and marriage, "[c]ompetition and
exclusive possession, traits of the marketplace, are extended to erotic

relations among persons.

'

The most important radical criticism of

65
marriage drew from feminist and lesbian feminist theory.
Radicalesbians denounced marriage because it had traditionally been

562. In 1953, E.B. Saunders stated that any serious effort to attain rights for homosexuals must
advocate marriage rights, but he admitted that marriage was not then a "prominent" item in the
homophile agenda. See Reformer's Choice: MarriageLicense or JustLicense?, ONE, Aug. 1953, at
10; see also CORY,supra note 416, at 135-44 (ch. 13, "Love Is a Wonderful Thing"). Writers for
The Ladder,published by DOB, did not even discuss the possibility of legal marriage between two
women, but were instead fascinated by cases where one woman "passed" as a man in order to obtain
a marriage license. See eg., Two Women Married,LADDER, Sept. 1961, at 8; Sequel, Two Women
Married, LADDER, Feb. 1962, at 21. On the value of lesbian marriage, compare Gene Damon,
Lesbian Marriage,LADDER, Aug. 1958, at 12 (recounting her seven-year relationship as one in
which "nothing, except of course death, will separate us"), with Jody Shotwell, Gay Wedding,
LADDER, Feb. 1963, at 4 (sarcastic account of nuptials between two lesbians, which reported that
after "the invited guests had assembled, the performance (pardon, the ceremony) began," and
characterized the guests as ambivalent).
563. Gay Revolution Comes Out, RAT, Aug. 12-26, 1969, at 7 (interview with members of
GLF). On gay radicalism in general, see DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS (1971); KAY TOBIN &
RANDY WICKER, THE GAY CRUSADERS (Jonathan Katz ed., 1975).

564. GAY LIBERATION 12 (Red Butterfly 1971).
565. Two important works espousing the feminist critique position are SHuLAmrrH FIRESTONE,
THE DIALCTIC OF SEM THE CASE FOR M0S REVOLUTION (1970), and Sheila Cronan,
Marriage,reprintedin RADICAL FEMINISM 213 (Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973). See generally ALICE
ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEANM INAMERICA 1967-1975 (1989); HERMA HILL
KAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 239-56 (1988) (feminist materials

critiquing marriage).
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deployed to enslave and brutalize women. Women were enslaved by the
role of housekeeper, dependent upon the male breadwinner, and
brutalized by the law's refusal to recognize a husband's rape of his wife
as criminal, or at least tortious.
Many gay activists, however, did not wholly subscribe to the ideas
and rhetoric of GLF and the Radicalesbians. For example, the National
Coalition of Gay Organizations drew up a comprehensive list of demands
for law reform in February 1972, reflecting both the ideas of gay
marriage advocates and radical critics. The last demand was to
"[r]epeal... all legislative provisions that restrict the sex or number of
persons entering into a marriage unit and exten[d] legal benefits of
marriage to all persons who cohabit regardless of sex or numbers." 5'
More importantly, lesbian and gay couples increasingly began to apply
pressure on local officials-demanding marriage licenses from shocked
clerks, who usually denied their applications.5 67 In response to these
denials, gay couples went to court. Activists Jack Baker and Mike
McConnell were the first gay couple to file a lawsuit seeking recognition
of their marriage, the license for which they obtained by tricking a clerk
into assuming they were a different-sex couple. Unfortunately,
McConnell lost his job and the plaintiffs lost their lawsuit in Baker v.
Nelson,5' 6 but they were followed by a steady stream of lesbian and
gay couples seeking legal recognition for their unions.
Because the gay marriage issue was an unformed one in the early
1970s, marriage license clerks sometimes were unsure precisely how to
respond to these new kinds of applicants. In Kentucky, for example,
when Tracy Knight (a dancer) and Marjorie Ruth Jones (a mother of
three) applied for a marriage license with the Jefferson County Clerk of
the Circuit Court, James Hallahan, he asked the district attorney for a
legal opinion. District Attorney J. Bruce Miller stated that the application
should be denied, because it represented "the pure pursuit of hedonistic
'
and sexual pleasure."569
Hallahan denied the application. He later

566. Demanded of the National Coalition of Gay Organizations, State, No. 8 (Feb. 1972).
Federal Demand No. 4 was: "Elimination of tax inequities victimizing single persons and same-sex
couples." Id.
567. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,68 S.CAL. L. REv. 745, 750 & n.17 (1995).
568. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Mina. 1971). Baker and Nelson then sought official recognition of their
spousehood from the federal government, as they filed joint tax returns and applied for spousal
benefits under the veterans benefits program. See McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting the claim).
569. Stan MacDonald, Two Women Tell Court Why They WouldMarry,LouIsVILLE COURIER-J.,
Nov. 12, 1970, at A14. The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld this action in Jones v. Hallahan,501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), the second published decision denying a same-sex couple their marriage
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testified that their marriage "might cause a 'breakdown' of government
and 'retard' the continuity of the human race. The problem 'could spread
throughout the world."'5 70
A few clerks and district attorneys were more open-minded. In
March 1975, Boulder County Clerk Cela Rorex issued marriage licenses
to no fewer than six same-sex couples in Colorado, after District
Attorney William C. Wise told her that the state's gender-neutral
marriage law did not clearly forbid same-sex marriages., "'I don't
profess to be knowledgeable about homosexuality or even understand it,'
[Rorex] said. 'But it's not my business why people get married. No
minority should be discriminated against."' 5s Rorex and Wise received
nearly 100 telephone calls, some of which threatened them with God's
punishment or violence because of their understanding of the law.
Responding to citizen complaints, the state attorney general put a stop to
the Boulder County experiment in same-sex marriage.573 A series of
74
unsuccessful lawsuits by the gay married couples followed.Y
A few months later in Maryland, the Montgomery County Clerk's
Office issued a marriage license to Michelle Bush and Paulette Hall, even
though Maryland had adopted a 1973 statute specifically prohibiting
same-sex marriages. 5 The clerk grumbled that he had been misinformed as to the exact nature of the applicants, but a state attorney
opined that the clerk could not revoke the license once he had issued it.
In any event, the lesbian couple moved to the District of Columbia,
where Councilmember Arrington Dixon had introduced a bill to legalize
gay marriage. The local GAA chapter lobbied for the bill, and longtime
gay activist Frank Kameny proclaimed the bill necessary to assure
lesbian and gay residents first-class citizenship. Once alerted to Dixon's
proposal, however, the local Roman Catholic Church and various local
Baptist Churches mobilized in fervent opposition to the bill. Succumbing
to these larger constituencies, Dixon withdrew his proposal. 6

license.
570. MacDonald, supra note 569, at A14.
571. See Grace Lichtenstein, Homosexual Weddings Stir Controversyin Colorado,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1975, at 49; Colorado Gays Many, GAY BLADE, May 1975, at 1.
572. Lichtenstein, supra note 571, at 49.
573. See CoLO. OP. ATr'Y GEN. (Apr. 24, 1975) (on file with author).
574. See Sullivan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 772 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1985); Adams
v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Lichtenstein,
supra note 571, at 49.
575. See Maryland Challenges Gay Marriage,GAY BLADE, Aug. 1975, at 1.
576. The history of the Dixon Amendment is recounted in Dean v. Districtof Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 310-12 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part). For the position of Kameny and the
gay community, see Cheryl Kimmons, The Casefor Gay Marriage,GAY BLADE, June 1976, at 6.
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The difficulty of obtaining gay marriage rights by the political
process was vividly illustrated by experiences in Wisconsin and
California. In October 1971, Manomia Evans and Donna Burkett applied
for a marriage license from Milwaukee County Clerk Thomas
Zablocki.5 7 Like other clerks, Zablocki obtained a legal opinion before
acting; the county's lawyers told him not to issue the license. Suing
Zablocki, Evans and Burkett were the first African-American couple to
bring legal proceedings in pursuit of same-sex marriage. At the same
time, S.B. 1410 was introduced in the Wisconsin legislature to amend the
state's marriage law to57include same-sex couples. Both the bill and the
lawsuit went nowhere.
The California legislature, as part of a general review of domestic
relations law in 1971, revised its authorization for marriage to include
"[a]ny unmarried person," gender-neutral language that replaced the
previous statutory language "[a]ny man or woman."5 79 When the
California legislature decriminalized consensual sodomy law, effective in
1976, gay activists interpreted California law to permit gay marriage and
filed a lawsuit to that effect.5 80 An alarmed County Clerks Association
went to the legislature to modify the statute by changing "any person"
back to "any man and woman." After a gay-bashing debate over samesex marriage, both chambers of the legislature voted by overwhelming
margins to amend the marriage law as requested.'
Recall that
California had the most gay-friendly state politics in the country. Yet
even in that state, same-sex marriage had virtually no mainstream
political support.
The stories of same-sex marriage petitions in Colorado, Maryland,
the District of Columbia, Wisconsin, and California reveal typical
patterns of action and reaction. Lesbian and gay couples eagerly grasped
for the right after Stonewall and sometimes had initial success, but once
the community at large was alerted to the possibility of "gay marriage,"
political opposition surfaced with a vengeance and crushed the effort. For
two decades after the 1975 defeats, lesbian and gay couples continued to

577. See Marriage Fight Due: Wisconsin Black Women Slate Christmas Wedding, MOTHER,
Dec. 1971, at 1.
578. See Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
579. Act of Dec. 14, 1971, ch. 1748, sec. 26, § 4101(a), 1971 Cal. Stat. 3736, 3747 (emphasis

added) (current version at CAL. Civ. CODE § 4101 (West 1983)).
580. See Myma Oliver, Gay Couple Can't Wed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1977, pt. II, at 6.

581. See Act of Aug. 17, 1977, ch. 339, secs. 1-2, §§ 4100, 4101(a), 1977 Cal. Stat. 1295,
1295-96 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4100, 4101(a)). For information concerning the
debate and vote, see Senate Approves Measure Banning Gay Marriages,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12,1977,
at 33; and CaliforniaAssembly Approves Bill Banning Gay Marriages,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1977.
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petition clerks, attorneys general, and, on rare occasion, legislators for
recognition of their right to marry. For two decades, these officials said
"no."" Many of these petitions were accompanied by lawsuits alleging
that state statutory or constitutional law assured gay people of same-sex
marriage rights."

Relying on the Supreme Court's invalidation of states' prohibition
of different-race marriages in Loving v. Firginia,5 4 attorneys for
lesbian and gay couples invoked two different kinds of arguments. Most
invoked the argument that homosexuals had a fundamental "right to

marry,"5 5 a right established for heterosexual couples in Loving as
arising from the Due Process Clause," and required heightened equal

protection scrutiny following the 1978 Supreme Court decision in
Zablocki v. Redhail5 ' In the Baker-McConnell decision, the Minnesota

Supreme Court held that the right to marry was inapplicable to homosexuals, because marriage by definition required a man and a woman, not

two men. 88 The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion for women in the Knight-Jones case. 8 9 Through 1997, no judge
90
in the United States has disagreed with this proposition.
Another argument employed by same-sex marriage plaintiffs built
on Loving's first ground for decision, that a state's prohibition of

582. Numerous state attorney generals rendered negative opinions on the subject. See, e.g., 1983
ALA. ATr'Y GEN. Q. REP. vol. 190, at 30; ARK. Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 62 (Apr. 26, 1995); COL. OP.
ATr'Y GEN. AG File No. CAG/AGBDM/KL (Apr. 24, 1975); 1993 IDAHO AIr'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
119, 132; KAN. Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 247 (Aug. 4, 1977); ME. Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 28, at 13 (Oct.
30, 1984); MIss. Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 110, at 2 (July 10, 1978); 1997 NEB. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
170; S.C. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 423 (1976); TENN. Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 43 (Feb. 29, 1988); VA. OP.
ATT'Y GE . 154 (1977).
583. See Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Familiesand the Law: A ProgressReport, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 930-37 (1994).

584. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
585. This included the attorneys for Jack Baker and Mike McConnell in Baker v. Nelson, 191
NAV.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), and Tracy Knight and Marjorie Ruth Jones in Jones v. Hallahan,501
SAV.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
586. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
587. 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); see also id. at 396, 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
(expressing concern that the majority opinion's broadly stated right to marry would open the door
to homosexual marriage).
588. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
589. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
590. In the 1970s and early 1980s, numerous decisions rejected same-sex couples' assertions
of lawful marriage. SeA e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982); Cuevas v.
Mills, No. 86-3244, slip op. at 1 (D. Kan. Oct. 27, 1986); Jennings v. Jennings, 315 A.2d 816, 820
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (dictum); Irwin v. Lupardus, No. 41379, slip op. at 2 (Ohio June 26,
1980); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Slayton v. State, 633
S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (dictum); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974).
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marriage for different-race couples is invidious racial discrimination.
Attorneys for John Singer and Paul Barwick argued that the state's
prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples constituted sexual
discrimination in violation of the state of Washington's newly enacted
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), which provided that "'[e]quality of
rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex."' 5 91 After Loving, a ban on different-race marriages
became an impermissible classification on the basis of race-the whitewhite couple could get married, while the white-black could
not-because it did not pass the heightened justification required under
Supreme Court equal protection precedents. Read together with
Washington's ERA, a ban on same-sex marriages should similarly be
considered an impermissible classification on the basis of sex--the
woman-man couple can get married, while the woman-woman cannot--requiring the same type of heightened scrutiny. The state court of
appeals rejected this argument in 1974, stating that the ERA could be
construed only to ensure equality "between men and women," and did
not extend protection for same-sex marriages."9 Although the sex discrimination argument was accepted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in
1993, 3 it saw no further action in the 1970s.
The right of two lesbians or two gay men to marry one another was
rejected as firmly in the 1970s as the legal system has ever rejected a
minority right. The only arguable victory in the 1970s was a New
Jersey
decision recognizing a marriage between a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual and a biological male, but the judges reached this result only
because they were able to persuade themselves that the partners were
different sexes. 5" Otherwise, legal agitation for gay marriage during
the 1970s completely failed. 95 The stated reasons were definitional and
viciously circular: two women have no right to marry because "marriage"
means a man and a woman. 96 The underlying reason, surely, was that

591. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190 (quoting Washington's ERA).
592. See id. at 1194.
593. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
594. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,211 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). This position was
rejected in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (App. Div. 1971) (by implication);
Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); and In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d
828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987), all of which held that male-to-female transsexuals or transvestites
are still men for purposes of marriage statutes. See also B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (holding that a female-to-male transsexual was not a male for purposes of marriage because
of inability to procreate).
595. See Leonard, supra note 583, at 930, 937.
596. The factual inaccuracy of this assertion is demonstrated in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., TIE
CASE FOR SAMiE-SEx MARRIAGE ch.2 (1996).
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permitting gay marriages seemed like a recognition of complete equality,
when virtual equality was all society was willing to offer or accept.
Furthermore, such an equality was antithetical to the beliefs of numerous
religious groups, which continued to protest the creation of a legal right
to enter into same-sex marriage.
2. Legal Relationships Short of Marriage
One response of gay activists to these developments proved more
successful: the domestic partnership movement.5 9 The first major
domestic partnership bill was passed by the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors in 1982, but Mayor Diane Feinstein vetoed it on the ground
that anything that even faintly "mimics a marriage license" was
unacceptable to her vision of straight society. 9 Two years later, the
Berkeley City Council adopted the first operative municipal domestic
partnership policy, which ultimately allowed city employees to obtain
health benefits for their registered domestic partners.5 99 Eventually,
local coalitions of gay activists and allies obtained similar or slightly
broader domestic partnership ordinances, executive orders, or policies
during the late 1980s into the 1990s.' ° While domestic partnership
gives legal title to same-sex relationships, it does not, however, unite
couples sexually and financially in the way that marriage does.
Practical response to the unavailability of economic rights for
lesbian and gay couples was marriage by private contract. 6 1 Same-sex
couples can replicate some of the advantages of marriage by contractually merging their lives along lines that marriage law does as a matter of
right. Thus, lesbian and gay couples have long been able to purchase
property in joint tenancy, establish joint checking accounts, grant one
another power of attorney, and name one another primary beneficiaries

597. See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992);

Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic PartnershipRecognition in the Workplace: EquitableEmployee
Benefits for Gay.Couples (and Others), 51 OrlO ST. LJ. 1067 (1990).
598. San FranciscoMayor Says No to Gay Marriage,WASH. BLADE, Jan. 28, 1983, at 9.
599. See Eblin, supra note 597, at 1072.
600. These included successes in West Hollywood (1985, implemented in 1989), Santa Cruz
and Madison (1986), Los Angeles (1988), Seattle and New York City (1989), San Francisco (1990),
Washington, D.C. (1991), Chicago and Baltimore (1993), New Orleans and San Diego (1994), and
Denver (1995).
601. See David Link, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments
of Same-Sex Couples, 23 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1055, 1109-10 (1990); Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
ContractualOrderingof Marriage:A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 207-09,
223 (1982).
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in their respective wills. 2 These mechanisms are mainly available to
couples with substantial incomes, and no one knows how often such
legal devices are deployed to create do-it-yourself marriages.
Joint tenancy and joint bank accounts are all but invulnerable to
legal challenge, but the same is not true of wills and contracts, creating
monetary and legal rights in favor of a homosexual lover over blood
relatives. Wills, for example, can be challenged on grounds of "undue
influence," and courts often consider a will that prefers strangers (including unmarried lovers) to the testator's relatives as evidence of undue
influence. 03 Such challenges were brought by relatives against the
homosexual lovers of testators as early as the 1940s.' After Gertrude
Stein's death in 1946, for example, the Stein family stripped her fortyyear life partner, Alice B. Toklas, of virtually all inheritance and left her
penniless. 6 5 There have been few reported decisions, but In re Will of
Kaufmann61 is probably not atypical of the situation faced by homosexuals in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Kaufinann, an heir to the Kay Jewelry company, became intimately
involved with attorney Walter Weiss, who became Kaufmann's lover and
business adviser. When Kaufmann died, his last will named Weiss as
sole executor and primary beneficiary. Kaufmann's brother challenged
the will, and the New York courts invalidated it on the basis of undue
influence. The court stated that Kaufmann was completely dominated by
Weiss, but a subtext of the decision was the judges' antihomosexual
feelings. A letter declaring Kaufmann's love for Weiss and gratitude for
his care was interpreted by the court as reflecting, not sincere gratitude
or love, but "gratitude utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to
a state of fervor and ecstasy."60 7 The dissenting judge believed the

602. See generallyE. CARRINGTON BOGGAN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE: THE BASIC
ACLU GuIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 103-22 (Norman Dorsen & Aryeh Neier eds., 1975)
(discussing the barriers to gay marriage, the financial disabilities that follow, and alternative means
for obtaining financial benefits that normally result from marriage); Julie Lee,.. . Economics ofthe
Gay Marriage, LADDER, Apr.-May 1969, at 12 (discussing the practical ways to create financial
independence for lesbian couples).
603. For an excellent analysis of this precept applied to lesbian and gay lovers, see Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator,42 U. PrIT. L. REV. 225 (1981).
604. See, eg., In re Spaulding's Estate, 187 P.2d 889 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (upholding a
will that left everything to the testator's young male lover while ignoring the testator's nephew); cf.
In re Estate of Larendon, 30 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (invalidating a will that left
everything to the testator's male lover who had terrorized testator and ultimately murdered him).
605. See Rivera, supra note *,at 908 n.657.

606. 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965); see Sherman,
supra note 603, at 239-48 (an exhaustive discussion of Kaufmann, opining that it reflected real risks

for the homosexual testator).
607. Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
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result rested upon "surmise, suspicion, conjecture and moral indignation
and resentment."6 8
The only reported case in the 1970s, also from New York, held that
a homosexual lover/heir could not rely on the Fifth Amendment to refuse
to testify about the sexual relations he enjoyed with the testator.6 9 It
seems likely that an increasing number of wills probably were executed
in the 1970s but at some risk of nonenforcement, a hypothesis supported
by the other contracting cases reported in that decade. In some cases,
courts were willing to enforce contract rights, notwithstanding the sexual
orientation of the participants, but typically they just ignored evidence of
the parties' homosexual relationship." l In other cases, courts refused
to enforce such contracts because of undue influence. This was the
611
holding of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Knowles v. Binford.
Binford and Florence Knowles were "like sisters for more than 70 years,"
and they lived together for the last decade of Binford's life.612 During
that period, Binford amended a trust instrument to settle all its income
on her friend Knowles, thereby cutting out her nephews and nieces. As
in Kaufmann, the blood relatives successfully challenged the amended
trust; in Knowles, however, there was no probative evidence of undue
613
influence.
A final contract-based mechanism for imposing spousal obligations
outside of marriage arose out of Marvin v. Marvin."4 In that case, the
California Supreme Court held that unmarried partners could sue for
enforcement of explicit or implicit promises of support or financial
sharing upon the dissolution of a relationship outside of marriage. Marvin
was immediately applied to direct support payments to a partner in a
lesbian relationship who could point to an express contract, 615 but was
not applied to a gay male relationship which the appeals court characterized as predominately sexual and which lacked any such express

608. Id. at 689 (Witmer, J., dissenting).
609. See In re Anonymous, 347 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
610. See weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. 1979) (holding that property passed to
decedent's gay lover under theory of implied trust; the court politely deemed the parties' sexual
relationship inconclusive).
611. 298 A.2d 862 (Md. 1973).
612. Id. at 866.
613. Although the court acknowledged that Knowles was well-to-do financially--indicating a

lack ofmotive, an essential element for a determination of undue influence-that fact "did not necessarily extinguish the spark of cupidity." Id.
614. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
615. See Lesbian to Pay Support, ADVOCATE, July 12, 1978, at 12.
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contract. 16 As in the marriage cases and the will and trust cases, the
courts often found a way to discriminate against lesbian and gay couples.
In any event, Marvin was not immediately followed in most other states
and, even in California, was not interpreted to give a non-marital partner
rights against third parties.6 7 Ultimately, contract was little better as
a path to lawful partnership rights than domestic partnership.6 3
3. Custody of Children from Prior Marriages
Many of the people who came out of the closet after Stonewall were
married with children. It was rare for the state to try to take away a
homosexual parent's children, in part because the Supreme Court
recognized a person's fundamental right to the companionship and care
of their children in other contexts. 619 But where there was a dispute
between two parents over custody or visitation, judges in most of the
early cases created a variety of statutory common law discriminations
against lesbian and gay parents. 620 The rhetorical basis for such discriminations shifted in the 1970s--from per se rules against gay or
lesbian parental custody, based on the notion that homosexuality was
criminal or bound to have adverse effects on children, toward Norton-like
rules requiring (and finding) a connection between a parent's homosexuality and harm to children because of third-party reactions. Even courts
that rejected homosexuality as a decisive factor in custody determinations
tended to impose special requirements on lesbian and gay parents'
visitation and custody rights.
One discrimination was a per se rule that homosexuality disqualified
a parent from custody. Early cases rested the per se rule on the

616. See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981). Later decisions have been more
willing to apply Marvin-like principles to lesbian and gay unions. See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248
Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
617. See, e.g., Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987).
618. Another option for family formation was adult adoption. See Sherman, supra note 603, at
254-55; Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1628
(1989). This proved unfeasible for most, because many states limited adoption to persons substantially younger than the adopter, or created an exception banning homosexual adopters altogether.
See, e.g., Act of June 8, 1977, ch. 77-140, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 466, 466 (codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985)); In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424,425,426 (N.Y.

1984).
619. See, eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that the state may not
assume custody of the children of unwed fathers without allowing a hearing on parental fitness and
presenting proof of neglect).
620. Excellent overviews of these cases can be found in Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Custody Rights ofLesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 691
(1976); Rivera, supra note *, at 883-904.
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immorality of the gay parent's lifestyle."2 Courts either referred to
sodomy laws as reason enough to disapprove gay parenting or expressed
stereotyped views about "predatory" homosexuality. These rationales
were undermined by state sodomy repeals and by medical evidence that
homosexuality is a normal form of sexual development. 6
When lesbian or gay male parents introduced such expert evidence
in states that had deemphasized sodomy laws (either by repeal or
reduction to misdemeanor), they often won custody. A key case was
Schuster v. Schuster,6n where a lesbian couple, Sandy Schuster and
Madeleine Isaacson, presented expert psychiatric evidence that parental
sexual orientation is irrelevant to the child's development and that their
children were healthy and normal. The courts involved maintained
custody with the mothers, but with conditions. The trial court
admonished the mothers not to "use" the children as a showcase for
"homosexuality," and the appeals court refused to allow the mothers to
live together. 24 This was not an unusual condition. The first open
lesbian to win custody of her children, Camille Mitchell, was shackled
with severe constraints on same-sex socializing by Santa Clara County
Judge Gerald Chargin.6 5
During the 1970s, the antihomosexual discourse shifted from the per
se rule, based upon the intrinsic immorality of the lesbian or gay parent,
to a rule requiring judges to focus on the best interests of the child. That
inquiry was slanted, however, by insisting that homophobic third-party
reactions be considered.'
In S v. S, 627 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed a trial court for failing to change child custody from
mother to father when the mother came out as a lesbian. Based upon a
journal article, the court accepted as a fact that "the lesbianism of the

621. See, eg., Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding
that, in determining custody, it was error to exclude evidence of a mother who had been observed
with her head between the bare legs of another woman); Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842, 843

(Ga. 1973) (awarding custody to the grandparents because the mother, among other things, had
taught the child about the "gay life"); Commonwealth exrel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A2d 379,382
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) (awarding the mother custody because of the undesirable influences stemming
from the father's homosexuality).

622. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL
REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 15 (John M. Livingood ed., 2d prtg. 1976).
623. 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (en bane); see also Rivera, supra note *,at 898-90.

624. See Schuster, 585 P.2d at 133.
625. See Gay Mother Wins Children's Custody, ADVOCATE, July 19, 1972, at 6.
626. See Julie Shapiro, Custodyand Conduct:How the Law FailsLesbian and GayParentsand

Their Children,71 IND. LJ.623, 633-39 (1996); Juliet A. Cox, Comment, JudicialEnforcement of
Moral Imperatives: Is the Best Interest of the Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain Societal
Homogeneity?, 59 MO. L. REV. 775, 885-88 (1994).
627. 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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mother, because of the failure of the community to accept and support
such a condition, forces on the child a need for secrecy and the isolation
imposed by such a secret, thus separating the child from his or her
peers."628 Although courts in coastal states adopted a more neutral
approach to the best interests of the child,629 awarding custody to the
nonhomosexual parent remained the typical outcome almost everywhere
else in 1981.630 The leading case which insisted upon a more neutral
best interests of the child inquiry was Bezio v. Patenaude,631 wherein
the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that there had to be a specific
showing of harm to the child, exclusive of general cultural prejudice, to
justify depriving a lesbian or gay parent of custody.
Another form of discrimination was a rule disallowing unsupervised
visitation by the gay or lesbian parent. Although the New Jersey Superior
Court ruled that a gay father's constitutional interest in the companionship of his children militated against a per se rule prohibiting visitation
or contact with the children altogether, the court held that the welfare of
the children justified severe restrictions on that visitation.6 32 The court
relied on the father's advocacy of gay rights (he was a member of GAA)
and the speculative possibility that the children, according to the
mother's expert, "would be subject to either overt or covert homosexual
seduction which would detrimentally influence their sexual development. 6 33 Accordingly, the court limited the gay father's visitation time
and conditioned any visitation on the father's agreement that he "not
involve the children in any homosexual related activities or publicity,"
or have his lover present at any time.6 4 Similar discriminatory conditions, imposed upon the visitation rights of gay parents, were commonly
approved by state appellate courts. 635

628. Id. (citing Karen G. Lewis, Children ofLesbians: Their Point of View, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N

SOC. WORKERS 198 (1980)).
629. See, e.g., M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) ("[n]othing

suggests that [the mother's] homosexual preference in itself presents any threat of harm to her
daughters"); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 1978).
630. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81-82 (N.D. 1981); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640

P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Roe v.
Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985); cf D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(stating that a parent's homosexuality, standing alone, is an insufficient basis io deny custody; there

must be some "evidence of... homosexual activity... in the presence of the children").
631. 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980).
632. See In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90,92,97 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), affd, 362 A.2d
54 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).

633. Id. at 96.
634. Id. at 97.
635. See, e.g., Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing visitation
provided that there was no intimate sexual conduct in the children's presence and disallowing
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Related to the state's concern about lesbian custody was a concern
about gay adoption. I was surprised to find so little law on the subject
from the 1970s. The main development was Florida's enactment in 1977
of a statutory prohibition of adoption by gay people.636 Apparently, the
reason for the lack of case law is that there was a widely held but tacit
discretion for case workers to look the other way if they felt an adoption
or foster care placement with a gay person or couple was in the best
interests of the child-so long as there was no publicity.637 The adoption issue was yet another example of the perseverance of a don't ask,
don't tell philosophy.
CONCLUSION: GAYLEGAL EXPERIENCE AND AMERIcAN PUBLIC LAW

The foregoing analytical account of the gaylegal experience between
1961 and 1981 is brimming with implications for larger themes of
American public law and jurisprudence. I offer three provocative theses
that are supported by my survey.
Thesis Number I is that evolution in public law is driven by changes
in society, culture, and politics.

638

In the larger time frame, public law

is not just the application of "neutral" principles, but is really a conflictual struggle to determine what in the short term will be considered
"neutral" application of agreed-upon principles and criteria. Thus, from
today's vantage point, there is little that is neutral about the position
overnight visitation if the parent's lover was present); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1185
(Miss. 1990) (upholding restriction that provided for visitation only outside the presence of mother's
lesbian lover); J.L.P. (H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding a
restriction that prohibited overnight visitation and taking the child to gay activist social gatherings);
Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (allowing visitation provided that
the child be shielded from the knowledge of the father's homosexuality); see also In re Jane B., 380
N.Y.S.2d 848, 860-61 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (prohibiting overnight stays and limiting visits to instances
when her lesbian lover, or other homosexuals, were not present).
636. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985), which prohibits adoption by a "homosexual," a term the law does not define. See Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1995), rev'g 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (sustaining law against all
challenges except for equal protection and remanding for trial on that challenge). New Hampshire's
ban against adoptions or foster care by "homosexuals," which the legislature defined broadly, was
upheld in Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987). Compare Appeal in Pima County
Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (policy against adoptions by gay
people), with Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990) (allowing such adoptions when
in the best interests of the child).
637. See Illinois Agency Boiling: New Row Over GayFosterHomes, ADVOCATE, July 3, 1974,
at A-6 (gay state social worker placed children in gay foster homes for years, until he presented a
paper on the topic and ran into a buzzsaw of protests).
638. This idea is connected with legal realism but has been given particularly pungent
articulation by political scientist Jack Knight See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL
CONFLICT (1992).
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taken by the medical establishment, the INS and the PHS, and the federal
judiciary in Boutilier,that a bisexual man is inevitably afflicted with a
"psychopathic personality." The general principle was at best arguably
neutral---diseased people should be excluded from entering the country
and deported when found out-but the particular rule or precept was
completely partial, and in the worst way because it rested upon inaccurate information and, worse, prejudice. Its partiality was recognized by
conservatives and liberals alike when Congress repealed that part of the
immigration law in 1990, but that recognition was only possible because
a generation of openly gay people-including litigants like Carl Hill,
attorneys such as Don Knutson, and elected representatives such as
Barney Frank (a lead sponsor of the 1990 law)-changed people's minds
about the neutrality of the psychopathic personality criterion as applied
to gay or bisexual people.
A lot of public law issues that were settled in 1981 were settled in
the opposite way in 1961, including the validity of making cross-dressing
a crime (criminal almost everywhere in 1961, nowhere in 1981), the right
of gay people to congregate in bars (prohibited in most places in 1961,
in few places by in 1981), the right of states to bar gay people from
public education (allowed everywhere in 1961, in sharp dispute by 1981),
the admissibility of gay people as citizens (prohibited in 1961, generally
allowed by 1981), and granting lesbian mothers custody of their children
over the objection of their heterosexual former spouses (unheard of in
1961, increasingly heard and done in 1981, albeit often with restrictions).
The issues remained the same, and for the most part the language of
relevant statutes or constitutional provisions was stable as well. Change
was generated by a new political equilibrium that treated gay people as
a relevant perspective or interest, by practical difficulties in administering
the old policies in light of newly visible and emboldened gay communities, and by new attitudes among some straight people based upon their
experience with gay friends and relatives and new information relevant
to the policies at issue.
The first thesis can be illustrated horizontally (different law at the
same time) as well as vertically (different law over time). Many public
law issues were resolved quite differently in different jurisdictions by
1981, including the applicability of the criminal law to consensual private
intimacy between adults of the same sex, to public solicitation for samesex intimacy in private, and to homoerotica that displayed or graphically
described copulation or fetishes (such as sado-masochism). Generally
speaking, nonsouthern jurisdictions with big cities resolved these issues
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in gay-friendly, libertarian ways,639 while jurisdictions dominated by
rural and small town populations resolved these issues against gay people
and in favor of traditional values.6 ° The former had organized gay
populations centered in big cities, and the political community realized
it had to accommodate that constituency, albeit not necessarily at the
expense of other groups. The latter had smaller and less-organized gay
populations and stronger animus to gay people generally. Another way
of explaining the different levels of gay rights protection is to focus on
how intense opposition was in different jurisdictions. One interesting
variable was religion: states dominated by the Southern Baptist and
Mormon religions"4 were more likely to deny gay people rights than
states dominated by Roman Catholic, mainstream Protestant, and Jewish
religions.
An interesting corollary of the first thesis is that the particular
sources of public law make less difference than the evolving political
equilibrium. Thus I am skeptical of the idea that the Due Process Clause
is backward-looking(traditionalist), while the Equal Protection Clause is
forward-looking (reformist). 42 The gaylegal experience between 1961
and 1981 is inconsistent with this idea. The vagueness and criminal
procedure cases, all traveling under the due process umbrella, were
especially dynamic and forward-looking for gay people. The crossdressing cases are an even better illustration of the error one makes when
the Due Process Clause is viewed as nothing more than a repository of
static tradition. If due process invokes tradition at all, it is the general
principles confirmed by tradition (for example, the criminal law must
give fair notice of its commands) and the application of those principles

639. Notably, coastal states like California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Washington, and big-city midwestem states Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,

Ohio, and Wisconsin.
640. Notably, southern and western states, including states with big cities but still politically
dominated by small town and rural values-Texas, Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida,

Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia. These issues did not even surface in southern
and western states that had no big cities, such as Mississippi, South Carolina, WVyoming, New
Mexico, Nevada, Alaska, and others.

641. Baptists are strongest in the South and Mormons in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Utah,
all states strongly resistant to gay rights.

642. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship
Between Due ProcessandEqual Protection,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). This would be a facile
way to reconcile Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), for example: the latter due process decision defers to traditionalist sodomy laws, while the
former equal protection decision looks ahead to equal gay citizenship. This attempted reconciliation
slights the possibility that Romer provides an occasion to rethink and someday overrule Hardwick.
The case is made in WILLLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET ch. 4 (forthcoming 1998).
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in light of ever-evolving social conventions (for example, dress of one's
sex is unclear today in ways that would not have been unclear in 1864).
Relatedly, it is simplistic to distinguish sharply between equal
protection and due process. Consider the equal employment cases, in
which the Mattachine Society and other gay rights organizations saw
their challenges to civil service exclusions of gay people as forwardlooking and as an important step toward equal citizenship. But their
lawyers always made due process arguments, and often won with them.
Both due process and equal protection ensure that state action cannot be
arbitrary, and it is little more than formalism to distinguish sharply
between a due process and an equal protection victory in cases like
Norton and Society for Individual Rights, Gayer,Morrison, JackM., and
Matlovich-all of which were due process decisions that contributed
strongly to equal rights for gay people.
Thesis Number 2 is that public law nonetheless is an independent
variable affecting minority group experiences, by shaping cultural
consensus and by empowering or confining the power of authority
figures and their subjects. 3 Without denying the primacy of social,
cultural, and intellectual phenomena, public law powerfully affected the
gay experience in America during the period 1961 to 1981. The
introduction to this Article shows how law made a difference in the daily
lives of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people. Consider
a couple of broader contributions that law has made. The Warren Court's
jurisprudence was a major reason the closet culture collapsed; the
Justices, most of whom were homoignorant or homophobic (Justice
Douglas's charge in Boutilier), laid the necessary groundwork for
Stonewall, which occurred the year Chief Justice Warren retired from the
Court. How is this so? The Court's main contribution was to establish a
public law consensus, inspired by the First Amendment, that state and
federal censors could not obtain ex parte prior restraints (Marcus and
Bantam Books), educational gay publications could not be censored at all
(One, Inc. v. Olesen), homoerotic materials could not be censored unless
they met fairly stringent requirements (Manual Enterprises), unpopular
people were entitled to associate and form political action groups without
state harassment or inquiry (Rumely and NAACP v. Alabama), public

643. This insight is mainly derived from the work of Michel Foucault, especially his The
History of Sexuality (three volumes published in English 1978, 1985, and 1986). See the discussion

of Foucault in ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 98, ch. 3, § 2(B). The idea also inspires some
critical race theory. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
LegitimationinAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (responding to critical legal
studies' critique of liberal rights theory, from a race perspective).
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employers could not discipline employees for addressing issues of public
concern (Pickering)nor pry into their private business and association
(Shelton and Griswold), the state could not even indirectly burden the
exercise of deviant religious faith (Sherbert), public schools and
universities could not censor students' expression (inker) and association (Healy), and, most important of all, every American had a right to
express her identity and convictions, no matter how unpopular
(Brandenberg).
This complex web of constitutional expectations, some of which
were well ahead of American public opinion, facilitated the spirals of
coming out stories following Stonewall. Just as legislative and administrative organs of the state had created the closet during the McCarthy era
(1947-1956), judicial organs had laid the foundation for its partial
collapse during the Warren Court era (1953-1969). Indeed, the two
phenomena worked together: the McCarthy era pushed people like Frank
Kameny out of the closet by hunting them, and the Warren era gave
Kameny and like people enough legally protected room to organize gay
liberatory organizations, publications, and churches which flowered after
1969. The Warren Court's equal protection (race) decisions inspired
closeted gay people to think that they too might be entitled to human
dignity, and the Court's due process decisions (criminal procedure,
privacy, public employment) empowered allies of gay liberation (the
ACLU, gay-friendly attorneys) and shackled its enemies (chiefly, the
police and censorious legislators).
Given the law's important effect on gay history, I am surprised that
gay experience had so little effect on the law during this period. I can
detect no effect on the Warren Court, but a discernible effect on the California Supreme Court. For the latter, gay rights cases gave the court
opportunities and challenges that pressed state public law in ever more
progressive directions between 1961 and 1981. The court grew from
cautiously gay-friendly (Vallerga and Bielecla) to strongly gay-affirming,
almost visionary (JackM. and PacificTelephone & Telegraph). The U.S.
Supreme Court, ironically, was pressed in a different direction by the gay
rights cases. Although serving in the post-Stonewall era, Chief Justice
Warren Burger led a more antihomosexual Court than Earl Warren had,
with gay people receiving no scintilla of rights from the Court. In a
Court that was resolutely middle-of-the-road, the cases forcing the Court
to confront "sexual deviancy" were red flags that pressed the Court into
lurches rightward. Among the Burger Court's more reactionary and
sometimes procedurally offbeat precedents were those denying gay and
transgendered people the benefit of Papchristou's vagueness doctrine
(Rose and Stone, as well as the denial of certiorari in Mayes), Griswold's

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/7

140

Eskridge: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
1997]

CHALLENGING 7E APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

and Roe v. Wade's right of personal privacy (Doe and later Hardwick),
Loving's right to marry (the denial of appeal for lack of a substantial
federal question in Baker v. Nelson and the denial of certiorari in
McConnell), Roth/Memoirs' right to pornography deemed nonobscene
according to national standards (Miller), and Stanley's right to possess
obscene materials in the privacy of one's home (Kaplan).In a small way,
post-Stonewall gay liberation and the litigation it pressed onto the
Warren and Burger Courts contributed to the Supreme Court's hysterical
rightwing lurches.
The Burger Court, in turn, contributed in minor but discernible ways
to the antihomosexual reaction in 1970s America. The Court's privacy
and vagueness decisions discouraged state court and perhaps also state
legislative revocations of laws criminalizing consensual sodomy, public
lewdness, and solicitation; the Court's criminal procedure decisions, its
wacky Twenty-First Amendment opinion in LaRue, and its pornography
decisions empowered antigay police forces, liquor licensing agencies, and
censors, respectively; the Court's move toward deference of military,
educational, and other institutions in First Amendment cases laid the
foundation for lower courts to deny gay rights claims in those areas
(Beller). By treating sex as dirty conduct rather than sexual expression,
gay people as criminal sodomites, and cross-dressers as sickos, the
Burger Court was aligned with Anita Bryant, John Briggs, and Jerry
Falwell. At the very least, the Court avoided any opportunity to help gay
and transgendered people correct what appear now to be outmoded
concepts and unproductive forms of state regulation.
Thesis Number 3 is that legal rights have ambiguous social legacies
for their beneficiaries.' Consider the ordinances adopted in the 1970s
protecting gay people against job discrimination in the public and private
sector. On paper, these laws look like great legal victories, but in practice
they were often found to be toothless or worse. They were often toothless
in that employees rarely invoked them and largely remained in the job
closet. They were worse than toothless when their enactment contributed
to a sense of complacency within the gay community, a feeling that the
state had actually done something for them, when in fact little was going
to change without struggle within the workplace, which few were willing
to initiate. The change in people's lives did not come when consensual
sodomy laws were repealed or nondiscrimination laws adopted, but when
gay pressure was brought to bear on police and employers to stop
644. This thesis is inspired by Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV.
673 (1992), and Siegel, supranote 20, although I am less pessimistic about the legacy of legal rights

than either author.
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harassing and discriminating against gay people. On the other hand,
gaylegal history illustrates how the enactment of progay laws could and
did contribute positively to gay life. San Francisco's ordinance prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the private sector and the
California Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
were key reasons for a radical change in policy by one of the state's
largest employers, Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company. The
company became one of the best employers in the state for gay people,
and the legal prods over several years were the main reason for that
volte-face.
In a similar vein, lesbian and gay communities ran the risk of
overrelying on judges. Especially in the 1960s, this was an inevitable
temptation, because the political process was so hostile to gay rights
everywhere. It remained a temptation in the 1970s, for even after
Stonewall only a fraction of the gay population was openly gay, and a
tiny fraction did all the political work. The free rider problem applied to
gay political power with a vengeance," and appeals to the judiciary
were a useful way to rescue a largely invisible minority from the
apartheid of the closet. A problem was that judges were themselves
political creatures and tended to reflect the same antihomosexual culture
that dominated the political process." 6 What judges were most useful
for was to force part of the political process to listen to factual material
and to rethink antihomosexual policies. Significantly, trial judges who
actually heard gay-friendly witnesses and gay people themselves in
person were somewhat more willing to rethink antigay policies than
appellate judges. 47 Progay judicial decisions were only useful,
however, when gay groups followed up on them to press for more

645. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
646. The gaylegal experience in fact inverts the idea in UnitedStates v. Carolene Products Co.,

304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), that a special province of the judiciary is to protect minorities
against whom there is great prejudice in the political process. So long as gay people were despised
and completely invisible in political culture, the courts did not help the group and even contributed
to gay marginalization (Boutilier,Mishkin, Rose, and Doe). It is only after the group has established

its political power that it can expect the courts to sweep away old legal disabilities and discriminations. Having said that, I should note that judges with life tenure or the functional equivalent were
marginally more willing to challenge antigay policies earlier than most politicians. Consider the eveof-Stonewall examples of Chief Judge David Bazelon (Norton), Justice William 0. Douglas and

Judge Leonard Moore (Boutilierdissenters in the Supreme Court and Second Circuit, respectively),
and Justice Mathew Tobriner (Morrison).
647. This was most true in the litigations involving the armed forces exclusion (Belier was the

first in a long line of appellate decisions reversing district court injunctions for lesbian and gay
service personnel), the security clearance exclusion (Gayer), constitutional challenges to sodomy and
public lewdness or solicitation crimes (the District of Columbia cases reported in Appendix A), the
lesbian child custody cases (S. v. S.), and the challenges to the immigration exclusions (Labady).
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permanent change in the administrative and legislative processes. A
central lesson of gaylaw is the importance for minority groups of
working in all the processes of the state and exploiting policy windows
in whichever branch seems most open to rethinking.
The most ambiguous feature of new gay rights was the response
they engendered from opponents. Gay visibility and rights triggered an
organized political response in Idaho in 1972, Arizona in 1975,
California in 1976, and a nationwide traditional values network-which
gay journalist Randy Shilts dubbed the "polyester conspiracy"--was in
place by 1977, when it won referenda in Dade County and three
medium-sized cities. The new "religious right," as it has come to be
called, did not sweep the field, as it suffered a big setback with the
Briggs initiative in 1978 and watched as city after city adopted nondiscrimination ordinances in response to a reinvigorated gay rights
movement.
The most important feature of the antigay lobby in the mid-1970s
was the way it reconfigured the justifications for antigay policies.
Antigay policies were justified in the 1960s by arguments that homosexuals are immoral and disgusting, medically sick and gender-bending, and
predatory to children. These arguments were less robust in the 1970s
because of new medical evidence against the sickness and child
molestation myths, feminist consciousness-raising as to issues of gender
and sexuality, and the popular embrace of the privacy philosophy.
Although traditionalists still made those arguments, their discourse
shifted in the mid-1970s to emphasize this modem argument: even if
homosexuals should be tolerated (i.e., not put in jail), homosexuality
should not be "promoted" by the state; and in many contexts homosexual
presence would be an invasion of heterosexuals' privacy. The shift in
emphasis from the "evil homosexuals" rationale to the "no promo
homo"/"protect heteroprivacy" ones was substantially accomplished by
1981.
This is what Reva Siegel calls the modernization of justification.
From women's experience, she argues that opposition to minority rights
can be strengthened by rejustifying old policies under modernized
rhetoric. The gaylegal account in this Article does not much support her
thesis. Two antigay policies (the armed forces and marriage bans)
emerged in this period as strong as ever, and their continued robustness
today (1997) may be due in part to modernized rhetorical justifications,
though the more likely explanation is that both bans are mythically too
central to heterosexual culture to abandon easily. Other antigay
policies-laws criminalizing sodomy, public lewdness, and crossdressing; rules against gays congregating in bars, student clubs, and the
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workplace; censorship of homoerotica; employment discrimination
against gay people, especially in education and police forces; and bars to
lesbian and gay parenting-decisively lost ground even though there
were plenty of defenders who refocused their arguments on no promo
homo and heteroprivacy. The dynamic of evolving justification that
Siegel excavates is genuine and interesting, but I do not think it has
strong normative consequences for gay or other minority rights.
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APPENDix A
ATTACKS AND DILUnONS OF STATE CONSENSUAL SODOMY

LAWS, 1961-1996*
Legislative Repeals
State

Constitutional Challenges

and Amendments

Alabama

Vagueness challenge rejected. Hom
v. State, 273 So. 2d 249 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1973).

Reduced to misdemeanor. Act of
May 16, 1977, No. 607, § 2318,
1977 Ala. Acts 812, 844-45.

Alaska

Crime against nature law invalidated
on grounds of vagueness. Harris v.
State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969).
Sodomy prohibition survived.

Sodomy law repealed. Act of July
17, 1978, ch. 166, § 21, 1978
Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 118-19.

Arizona

Vagueness and privacy challenges
rejected. State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d
6 (Ariz. 1976). Challenge to law
criminalizing mutual masturbation
rejected. State v. Mortimer, 467 P.2d
60 (Ariz. 1970).

Reduced to misdemeanor. Act of
May 31, 1977, ch. 142, § 67, 1977
Ariz. Sess. Laws 678, 730.

Arkansas

Vagueness challenge rejected. Connor v. State, 490 S.W.2d 114 (Ark.
1973). Equal protection and establishment clause challenges rejected,
privacy challenge sidestepped for
lack of standing. Carter v. State, 500
S.W.2d 368 (Ark. 1973).

Repealed. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, No.
280, ch. 32, 1975 Ark. Acts 500,
612-15, 698-99. Sodomy prohibition
reenacted as a misdemeanor for
same-sex couples only. Act of Mar.
28, 1977, No. 828, § 1, 1977 Ark.
Acts 2118, 2118-19.

California

Vagueness challenge rejected. Ex
parte Ranker, 183 P. 686 (Cal. App.
1919). Privacy challenge rejected.
People v. Hud, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718
(Ct. App. 1970).

Repealed. Act of May 12, 1975, ch.
71, § 7, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131, 133.

Colorado

Vagueness challenge rejected. Gilmore v. People, 467 P.2d 828 (Colo.
1970).

Repealed. Act of June 2, 1971, cl.
121, § 1, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws
388, 423.

Connecticut

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act effective Oct. 1,
1971, No. 828, § 214, 1969 Conn.
Pub. Acts 1554, 1618.

Delaware

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of July 6, 1972, ch.
497, § 1, 58 Del. Laws 1611, 166566 (1972).

District of
Columbia

Vagueness challenge rejected. Riley
v. United States, 298 A.2d 228
(D.C. 1972). Equal protection dhallenge rejected. Stewart v. United
States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. 1976);
United States v. Cozart, 321 A.2d
342 (D.C. 1974).

Repealed by D.C. Council in 1981,
Act of July 21, 1981, No. 4-69,
§ 13(b), 28 D.C. Reg. 3409, 3421,
but vetoed by the U.S. House of
Representatives. Repealed without
congressional override in 1994. Act
of Dec. 28, 1994, No. 10-385,
§ 501(b), 42 D.C. Reg. 53, 62.

* This Appendix includes any law criminalizing anal or oral sex between consenting adults and
includes statutes prohibiting the crime against nature, gross indecency, lewd and lascivious conduct,
and carnal copulation.
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Legislative Repeals
and Amendments
Crime against nature law repealed.
Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 74-121,
§ 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 371, 372,

State
Florida

Constitutional Challenges
Crime against nature law, as to
homosexual sodomy, invalidated on
grounds of vagueness. Franklin v.
State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
Unnatural and lascivious act law
survived. Thomas v. State, 326 So.
2d 413 (Fla. 1975).

Georgia

Privacy challenge, as to homosexual
sodomy, rejected. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga.
1996).

Expanded to include oral sex on a
woman. Act of Apr. 10, 1968, No.
1157, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1249,
1299.

Hawaii

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of Apr. 7, 1972, No.
9, sec. 1, § 1300, 1972 Haw. Sess.
Laws 32, 139.

Idaho

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Carringer, 523 P.2d 532 (Idaho
1974).

Repealed. Act of Mar. 18, 1971,
No. 143, § 5, 1971 Idaho Sess.
Laws 630, 730. Reenacted. Act of
Mar. 27, 1972, No. 336, § 18-6605,
1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844, 966.

Illinois

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of July 28, 1961,
§ 35-1, 1961 Ill. Laws 1983, 2044.

Indiana

Vagueness challenge rejected. Estes
v. State, 195 N.E.2d 471 (Ind.
1964).

Repealed. Act of Feb. 25, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 148, § 24, 1976 Ind.
Acts 718, 815-16.

Iowa

Carnal copulation law, as applied to
different-sex couples, invalidated on
grounds of privacy. State v. Pilcher,
242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).

Repealed. Act of June 28, 1976, ch.
4, § 526, 1976 Iowa Acts 549, 77475.

Kansas

Cruel and unusual punishment challenge rejected, privacy challenge
sidestepped for lack of standing.
State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 93
(Kan. 1976).

Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. Act of Apr. 23, 1969,
ch. 180, 1969 Kan. Sess. Laws 440,
457.

Kentucky

Sodomy law invalidated on grounds
of privacy and equal protection.
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).

Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. Act of Apr. 2, 1974,
ch. 406, § 90, 1974 Ky. Acts 831,
847.

Louisiana

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Phillips, 365 So. 2d 1304 (La.
1978); State v. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d
89 (La. 1975). Privacy challenge
rejected. State v. McCoy, 337 So.
2d 192 (La. 1976). Equal protection
challenge rejected. State v. Baxley,
656 So. 2d 973 (La. 1995).

None.

Maine

Vagueness and privacy challenges
rejected. State v. White, 217 A.2d
212 (Me. 1966).

Repealed. Act effective Mar. 1,
1976, ch. 499, § 1, 1975 Me. Laws
1273, 1299-1300.
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State
Maryland

Constitutional Challenges
Vagueness challenge rejected. Blake
v. State, 124 A.2d 273 (Md. 1956).
Privacy challenge rejected. Neville
v. State, 430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981).
Perverted practices law inapplicable
to different-sex couples. Schochet v.

Massachusetts

Vagueness challenge rejected. Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 120 NE.2d
189 (Mass. 1954). Unnatural copulation law construed to exclude consensual sodomy. Commonwealth v.
Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass.

Legislative Repeals
and Amendments
None.

State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).

None.

1974).

Michigan

Vagueness challenge rejected. People v. Dexter, 148 N.W.2d 915
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967), and subsequent cases. Subsequent challenges
invited. People v. Howell, 238
N.W.2d 148 (Mich. 1976) (plurality
opinion). Privacy challenge sustained but in unreported lower court
opinion not appealed by the state.
Michigan Org. for Human Rights v.
Kelly, No. 88-815820 (CZ) (Wayne

None.

Cty. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990).

Minnesota

Privacy challenge sidestepped for
lack of standing. State v. Gray, 413
N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).

Sentence reduced to one year. Act
of May 19, 1977, ch. 130, § 4, 1977
Minn. Laws 220, 221.

Mississippi

Vagueness challenge rejected, privacy challenge sidestepped for lack
of standing. Miller v. State, 636 So.

None.

2d 391 (Miss. 1994).

Missouri

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.
1972). Federal privacy challenge
rejected, but state privacy claim
preserved. State v. Walsh, 713

Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. Act of July 6, 1977,
S.B. No. 60, § 1, 1977 Mo. Laws
658, 662.

S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).

Montana

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Ballew, 532 P.2d 407 (Mont.
1975).

Repealed for different-sex couples.
Act of Apr. 4, 1973, ch. 513, § 1,
1973 Mont. Laws 1335, 1339, 1360.

Nebraska

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Temple, 222 N.W.2d 356 (Neb.
1974).

Repealed. Act of June 1, 1977,
Legis. B. 38, § 328, 1977 Neb.
Laws 88, 228.

Nevada

Vagueness challenge rejected. Hogan
v. State, 441 P.2d 620 (Nev. 1968);
Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 429 (Nev.
1969).

Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. 1977 Nev. Stat. 515,
515. Repealed for same-sex couples.
Act of June 16, 1993, ch. 236, § 1,
1993 Nev. Stat. 515, 515.

New Hampshire No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of July 2, 1973, ch.
532, § 26, 1973 N.H. Laws 999,
1011.
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Legislative Repeals
and Amendments

Constitutional Challenges

New Jersey

Invalidated on grounds of privacy.
State v. Ciufinni, 395 A.2d 904
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).

Repealed. Act of Aug. 10, 1978, ch.
95, § 2C:98-2, 1978 NJ. Laws 482
687-92.

New Mexico

Privacy challenge rejected. State v.
Elliott, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976).

Repealed. Act of Apr. 3, 1975, ch.
109, § 8, 1978 N.M. Laws 394, 399.

New York

Invalidated on grounds of privacy.
People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936
(N.Y. 1980).

Reduced to misdemeanor, but
remains on the books after Onofre.
Act of Apr. 11, 1950, ch. 525, § 15,
1950 N.Y. Laws 1271, 1278-79.

North Carolina

None.

North Dakota

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Enslin, 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1976). Privacy challenge
rejected. State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d
843 (N.C. C. App. 1979).
No reported challenges.

Ohio

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of Dec. 14, 1972, § 2,
1972 Ohio Laws 1906, 1906-11.

Oklahoma

Vagueness and privacy challenges

None.

Repealed. Act of Mar. 19, 1977, ch.
122, §1, 1977 N.D. Laws 265, 26567.

rejected. Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d
987 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). Sodomy law invalidated as applied to
different-sex couples. Post v. State,
715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.
1986).
Oregon

Invalidated on grounds of vagueness.
Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th
Cir. 1973).

Repealed. Act of July 2, 1971, ch.
743, § 432, 1971 Or. Laws 1873,
2002-03.

Pennsylvania

Invalidated on grounds of privacy
and equal protection. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa.
1980).

Reduced to misdemeanor. Act of
Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. L. 1482, No.
334, § 1, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482.

Rhode Island

Vagueness challenge rejected. State
v. Milne, 187 A.2d 136 (R.L 1962),
and subsequent cases. Privacy challenge sidestepped. State v. Lopes,
660 A.2d 707 (ILL 1995); State v.
Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.L 1980).

None.

South Carolina

No reported challenges.

None.

South Dakota

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of Feb. 26, 1976, ch.
158, § 22-8, 1976 S.D. Laws 227,
262.
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State
Tennessee

Constitutional Challenges
Vagueness challenge rejected. Rose
v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). Invalidated on grounds of privacy. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250

Legislative Repeals
and Amendments
Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. Act of June 14, 1989,
ch. 591, § 1, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

1169, 1206.

Texas

Repealed for different-sex couples,
reduced to misdemeanor for samesex couples. Act of June 14, 1973,
ch. 399, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
883, 916-17.

Utah

Privacy challenge rejected. Wade v.
Buchanan. 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
State privacy challenge sidestepped.
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941
(Tex. 1994); d City of Dallas v.
England, 846 S.W. 2d 957 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) (writ of appeal dismissed for technical reasons).
No reported challenges.

Vermont

No reported challenges.

Virginia

Privacy challenge rejected. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd,

Reduced to misdemeanor. Act of
Mar. 20, 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-403,
1973 Utah Laws 584, 610.
Repealed. Act of Apr. 23, 1977, No.
51, § 2, 1977 Vt. Acts & Resolves
145, 148.

None.

425 U.S. 901 (1976).

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Wyoming

Privacy and vagueness challenges
rejected. State v. Rhinehart, 424
P.2d 906 (Wash. 1967).
No reported challenges.
Vagueness challenge rejected. Jones
v. State, 200 N.W.2d 587 (Wis.
1972). Privacy challenge rejected.
Gossett v. State, 242 N.W.2d 899

Repealed. Act of June 27, 1975, ch.
260, § 9A.92.010, 1975 Wash. Laws
817, 858-67.
Repealed. Act of March 11, 1976,
ch. 43, 1976 W. Va. Acts 241, 24142.
Reduced to misdemeanor. Act of
Nov. 23, 1977, ch. 173, § 92, 1977
Wis. Laws 728, 743. Repealed. Act
of May 5, 1983, Act 17, § 5, 1983

(Wis. 1976).

Wis. Laws 37, 38.

No reported challenges.

Repealed. Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch.
70, § 3, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 228,
234.
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UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2045

rebmaz7 2j, 1966
The Kattachine Society of Washington
P. 0. Box 1032
Washington. D.C. 20013
Gentlement
Pursuant to your request of August 15. 1965. Commission representatives met with representatives of the Society on September 8, 1965.
to enable the Society to present Its views regarding the Government
policy on the suitability for Federal employment, of persons who
are shown to have engaged In homosexual acts.
The Society was extended 30 days to.submit L written memorandum iI
support of the positions set forth at these discussions to ensure
that full consideration could be given to its contentions and supporting data by the Commissioners. On December 13. 1965. the
Society filed five documents, which, along with the substance of
the September discussions, have been considered by the Commissioners.
The core of the Society's position and Its recommendations is that
private. consensual. out-of-working hours homosexual conduct on the
part of adults, cease to be a bar to Federal employment. In the
alternative it Is asked that the Commission activate continuing
discussions with repiesentatives of the Society to take a "progressive, idealistic, humane, forward-looking, courageous role" to
elicit the holding of objective hearings leadina to the adoption of
the Society's recommendation.
The Commisslon's policy for determining suitability is staLeG as
followss
"Persons about whom there is evidence that they have
engaged In or solicited others to engage In homosexual
or sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence
of rehabilitation, are not suitable for Federal employIn acting on such cases the Commission will conment.
sider arrest records, court records, or records of conviction for some form of homosexual conduct or sexual
perversion; or medical evidence, admissions, or other
credible infornatlon that the individual has engaged In
or solicited others to engage In such acts with him.
Evidence showing that a person has homosexual tendencies.
standing alonep Is insufficient to support a rating of
unsuitability on the ground of immora.l conduct."
We have carefully weighed the contentions and recommendations of
the Society, and perceive a fundamental misconception by the Society of our policy stemming from a basic cleavage in the perspective
by which this subject is viewed. We do not subscribe to the view,
which indeed is the rock upon which the Hattachine Society is
founded, that "homosexual" Is a proper metonym for an Individual.
Rather we consider the term "homosexual" to be properly used as
an adjective to describe the nature of overt sexual relations or
conduct. Consistent with this usage pertinent considerations encompass the types of deviate sexual behavior engaged In. whether

* Letter from John W. Macy, Jr. Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, to the Mattachine Society of Washington (Feb. 25, 1966).
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Isolated, Intermittent. or continuing acts, the age of the particular participants, the extent of promiscuity, the aggressive or
passive character of the Individual's participation, the recency
or the incidents, the presence of physical, mental, emotional, or
nervous causes, the Influence of drugs, alcohol or other contributing factors, the public or private character of the acts. the Incidence of arrests, convictions, or of public offense, nuisance or
breach of the peace related to the acts, the notoriety, If any, of
the participants, the extent or effect of rehabilitative efforts.
if any. and the admitted acceptance of. or preference for homosexual relations. Suitability deterninatrons also comprehend the
total Impact of the applicant upon the job. Pertinent considerations here are the revulsion of other employees by homosexual conduct and the consequent disruption of service efficiency, the apprehension caused other employees of homosexual advances, solicitations 'or assaults, the unavoidable subjection o? the sexual deviate
to erotic stimulation through on-the-job use of common toilet.
shower, and living facilities, the offense to members of the public
who are required to deal with a known or admitted sexual deviate
to transact Government business, the hazard that the prestige and
authority of a Government position will be used to foster homosexual activity, particularly among the youth, and the use of Government funds and authority In furtherance of conduct offensive
both to the mores and the law of our society.
In the light of these pervading requirements It Is upon overt conduct that the Commssion's policy operates, not upon spurious
classification of individuals. The Society apparently represents
an effort by certain individuals to classify themselves as "homosexuals" and thence on the basis of asserted discrimination to
seek, with the help of others, either complete social acceptance
of aberrant sexual conduct or advance absolvement of any consequences for homosexual acts which come to the attention of the public authority. Homosexual conduct, Including that between consenting adults In private, Is a crime In every jurisdiction. except
under specified conditions, In Illinois. Such conduct Is also considered Immoral under the prevailing mores of our society.
We are not unaware of the numerous studies, reports and recomendations pertaining to the criminal aspects of aberrant sexual conduct
and the unequal and anomalous Impact of the criminal laws and their
enforcement upon individuals, who for whatever cause, engage in
homosexual conduct.
It Is significant to note. however, that the
renowned Volfenden Report. which recommended that consensual homosexual conduct, In private between persons over 21 years of age. he
excluded as an offense under the criminal law of England. nevertheless recognized that such conduct may be a valid ground for exclusion from certain forms of employment. Id p. 22. Whether the
criminal laws represent an appropriate socletal response to such
conduct Is a matter properly addressed to the state legislatures
and the Congress.
It is beyond the province of this Commission.
We reject categorically the assertion that the Commission .pries
Into the private sex life of those seeking Federal employment, or
that It discriminates In ferreting out homosexual conduct. *The
standard against criminal, Infamous, dishonest, Immoral. or notoriously disgraceful conduct Is uniformly applied and suitability
Investigations underlying Its observance are objectively pursued.
We know of no means, consistent with American notions of privacy
and fairness, and limitations on governmental 'authority, which
could ascertain the nature of Individual private sexual behavior
between consenting adults. As long as It remains truly private,
that Is, It remains undisclosed to all but the participants. It Is
not the subject of an Inquiry. Where, however, due to arrest records, or public disclosure or notoriety, an applicant's sexual behavior, be It heterosexual or homosexual, becomes a matter of
public knowledge, an inquiry may be warranted.
Criminal or licentious heterosexual conduct may equally be disqualifying, and like
homosexual conduct. may become the subject of legitimate concern
In a suitability investigation. In all Instances the Individual
Is apprised of the matter being investigated and afforded an opportunity to rebut, explain, supplement or verify the information.
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To be sure if an individual applicant were to publicly prdclaim
that he engages In homosexual conduct, that he prefers such relationships, that he is not sick, or emotionally disturbed, and that
he simply has different sexual preferences, as some members of tile
Hattachine Society openly avow, the Commission would be required to
find such an individual unsuitable for Federal employment. The
same would be true of an avowed adulterer, or one who engages in
incest, illegal fornication, prostitution, or other sexual acts
which are criminal and offensive to our mores and our general
sense of propriety. The self-revelation by announcement of such
private sexual behavior and preferences is itself public conduct
which the Commission must consider in assaying an indlvidualls
suitability for Federal employment.
Hence It is apparent that the Comuissionls policy must be judged
by Its Impact in the individual case In the light of all the circumstances, Including the individual's overt conduct. Before any
determination Is reached the matter Is carefully reviewed by a
panel of three high level, mature, experienced employees, and all
factors thoroughly considered. The fairness of this result, In the
light of the Investigative evidence including the applicant's
statements, is subject to administrative review and may also be
judicially reviewed. Hence there are safeguards against error and
Injustice.
We can neither, consistent with our obligations under the law,
absolve individuals of the consequences of their conduct, nor do
we propose by attribution of sexual preferences based on such conduct, to create an insidious classification of Individuals. We
see no third sex, no oppressed mibority or secret society, but
only Individuals; and we judge their suitability for Federal employment in the liAht of their overt conduct. We must attribute
to overt acts whether homosexual or heterosexual, the character
authority and
ascribed by the laws and mores of our society. Our
course.
other
no
permit
duty
our
By direction of the Commissions

Simnazey
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APPENDIX C
JUISDICTIONS PROTECTING GAY & LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS

(1971-84)*

AffirmReal
Public Public
Year Employ- Accom- EmployEstate
Union ative
Municipality
Enacted ment modations mernt Housin' Education Practices Credit Practices Action
Alfred, NY
5/74
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Amherst, MA
5/76
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Ann Arbor, MI
7/72
X
X
X
X
X
X
Aspen. CO
I1rn/ X
X
X
X
X
Atlanta, GA
7/71
X
Austin, TX
775
X
X
X
X
Berkeley, CA
10/78
X
Boston, MA

6/82

X

Chapel Hill NC
Chicago. IL
Columbus, OH

9n5
6182
1/79

X
X

Cupertino. CA

in9

x

DetroiLMI
East Lansing, MI
Evanston, IL
Harrisburg. PA
Hartford, CT
Honolulu, Hi
(E.O.)
Iowa City, IA
Ithaca, NY
Los Aneeles CA
Madison, WI
Malden, MA
Marshall, MN
Milwaukee. WI
Minneapolis,
MN
Mountain View,
CA
New York, NY
E.O.)
Oakland, CA
Palo Alto, CA
Philadelphia, PA
Portland, OR
Pullman WA
Rochester. NY
Sacramento. CA
San Francisco,
CA
Santa Barbara,
CA

lfl9
5/73
8/80
3/83
4/79

X
X
X

3181
5m
9/74
S7
3/75
2/84
4/75
7/80

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

4/74

X

3/75

X

1"78
12/83
8/74
8/82
12/74
4/76
12/83
12/83

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

7/78

X

8/75
10/75

X

In9

X
X

Seattle, WA

Troy. NY
Tucson, AZ

1n7

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

* This Appendix is taken from a table developed by the National Gay Task Force.
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Public
Public
Real
Affirm.
Year Employ- Accom- EmployEstate
Union ative
Municipality
Enacted ment modations ment Housing Education Practices redit Practices Action
Urbana IL
4n9
X
x
x
x
x
Washington. DC 111'3
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Yellow Springs,
X
X
X
X
OH
7n5

County
Clallam Cty..
WA

Dane cL., WI
Hennepin Cty.,
MN
Howard Cty.,
MD

Public Public
Real
Affirm.
Year Employ- Accom- EmployEstate
Union ative
Enacted ment modations ment Housing Education Practices Credit Practices Action
11n6

X

8o80

X

11175

X

1115

X

Ingham cty.. Ml 6n8
King Cty, WA
Minnebaia Cry.
SD
Montgomery
Cy, TOD
Northampton
Cy., PA
San Mateo Cty.,
CA
Santa Barbara
CA
Santa Cruz Cty.
CA

x

X
X

X

1/81

X

X

X

X

X

X

5179

X

2/84

x

12/82

X

2/75

X

10/82

X

x

x
X
X

X

7175

Public Public
Real
AffirmYear Employ- Accom- EmployEstate
Union ative
State
Enacted ment modations ment Housing Education Practices Credit Practices Action
Calftonia (E.O.) 4179
X
Illinois
11/81
X
Michigan
3/81
X
New York (E.O.) 11/83
X
Ohio (E.O.)
12/83
X
Pennsylvania
(E.o.)
4176
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Wisconsin
2/82
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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